The Dissertation Committee for Jungkun Seo Certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:

Breaking with the Party:

Preferences, Procedures, and Party Position Shifts in Congress

Committee:

Peter Trubowitz, Supervisor

Sean M. Theriault

Bruce Buchanan

James Enelow

Kenneth Flamm

Breaking with the Party:

Preferences, Procedures, and Party Position Shifts in Congress

by

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Dedication

To My Mother and Father,

who have always trusted their first son

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Breaking with the Party:

Preferences, Procedures, and Party Position Shifts in Congress

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Jungkun Seo, Ph.D.

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Supervisor: Peter Trubowitz

While I do not dispute the pivotal role played by party leaders in setting and shifting a party position, I argue that the impetus for party shifts sometimes comes from the "bottom-up"—that is, from party members themselves. At times, the party position held by the leadership conflicts with some members' constituency interests. Faced with this conflict, backbench members use the legislative process to signal their intention to defect from the party on policy unless the leadership modifies the party's existing position.

Party members' party-splitting votes under constituency pressures, however, do not always lead the party into a new brand. If one party, particularly a majority party, is divided but the other party is united over a policy issue, this issue drives a wedge within the majority party. If this wedge issue continues to split the majority party and unite the minority party, the majority party is likely to shift its policy position to solve its dilemma of party division.

To test my theory of party position shifts, I explore three historical cases in which there was position change by one or both parties over immigration, national security, and trade. More specifically, these include: the switch of congressional Republicans from anti- to pro-exclusion on Chinese immigration in the post-Reconstruction period; the shift of congressional Democrats from a party of "guns" and "butter" to a party of only "butter" in the post-Vietnam War era; and Republican and Democratic flip-flopping on China and MFN in the post-Cold War period.

My findings suggest that policy change in these cases is driven by the shifting preferences of members as they try to resolve tension between the party and the constituency. Sometimes party rank-and-file members are in the driver's seat in defining the parties' positions. This is as true for foreign policy as it is for domestic policy. My dissertation shows that in a representative democracy, the transition from voters' preferences to lawmakers' votes occurs through the politics of procedural voting strategies in Congress.

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Legislators, Leaders, and Policy Change in Congress

> *"We can all point to a good many instances in which congressmen seem to have gotten into trouble by being on the wrong side in a roll call vote, but who can think of one where a member got into trouble by being on the losing side?"*
>
> David R. Mayhew
> *Congress: The Electoral Connection*[1]

A party's policy position, if credible and consistent, creates a brand name in the electoral market (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, Cox and McCubbins 1993, Aldrich 1995). Through this branding process, voters obtain low-cost information about how the party will perform in Congress. Like the role of ideology in Downsian spatial theories, a party's position serves as a useful cue for voters.[2] In fact, voters tend to expect the party with a credible policy position and record to better handle the issue at stake (Downs 1957, Stokes 1963, Enelow and Hinich 1984). Accordingly, enhancing the informative value of a party label should give an electoral boost to its candidates (Shepsle 1972, Bartels 1986, Alvarez 1997). Democratic theory underscores that voters ought to be properly informed of the plausible linkage between party positions in Congress and party labels in campaigns (Stokes and Miller 1962, Snyder and Ting 2002, 2003, Case-Wrone et al 2002).

[1] Mayhew (1974, 118)
[2] Recently, Snyder and Ting (2002) and Pope and Woon (2006) formalized "the importance of parties as producers of political brand name" (Snyder and Ting, 2002, 90).

In American political history, political parties have constantly adjusted their policy positions. Parties are in relentless search of electorally beneficial positions in accordance with voters' policy preferences (Key 1961, Arnold 1990, Aldrich 1995).[3] The Republican Party is now largely considered less enthusiastic about civil rights, but more passionate about national security and free trade (Gaddis 1982, Petrocik 1996, Coleman 1996, Destler 2001). During the Civil War and Reconstruction, however, the Republican Party was considered the "party of Lincoln," vigorously supporting civil rights and equal citizenship (Skowronek 1982, Gerring 1998, Gould 2003). The Grand Old Party had supported an isolationist foreign policy until World War II broke out. The party also favored protectionism and high tariffs during the era of industrialization (Goldstein 1989, Trubowitz 1992, 1998, Fordham 1998, 2000, Zakaria 1998, Katznelson and Shefter 2002).

The Democratic Party's policy positions have also changed over time. Today Democrats are often thought to be weak on national defense and favor governmental activism in promoting social welfare, civil rights, and fair trade (Ferguson 1984, McCormick 1989, Friedberg 2000). In the 1960s, however, Democrats took the lead in national security, championing defense spending (Mintz and Hicks 1984, Hart 1998, Hogan 1998, Narizny 2003). Back then, the Democratic Party was known as the party of state rights, hostile to federal enforcement of civil rights (Brady 1988, Carmines and Stimson 1989). In addition, Democrats favored free trade – a position they had held since the nineteenth century (Bensel 1984, 2000, James 2000).

[3] With respect to preferences, Key (1961) and Arnold (1990) included not only current and present preferences, but also "latent" opinions and "potential" preferences, respectively.

Legislative scholars have vigorously considered why parties change their policy positions. Early research found that electoral competition forced a party to move closer to voters' preference (Downs 1957, Black 1958, Miller and Stokes 1963, Wittman 1977). New members in Congress have often been described as forming a bloc and aiming to transform their party's policy stance (Burnham 1970, Brady 1988, Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Some suggest that issues themselves evolve and influence changes in a party's position (Asher and Weisberg 1978, Carmines and Stimson 1989). Others claim that Presidents play a pivotal role in shifting their party's policy preferences (Bond and Fleisher 1990, Milkis 1993, James 2000). Certainly, there is no shortage of studies about *why* parties sometimes reshape their policy stances. But, less is known about *how* parties shift their policy consensus.

Most of the party literature considers party position shifts as a top-down process. Party leaders are thought to drive the process (Downs 1957, Peabody 1976, Calvert 1987, Smith 1989, Rhode 1991, Cox and McCubbins 1993, Sinclair 1995). To build a reliable party position, so this leader-focused argument goes, party members act together in the legislative process, which triggers the collective action problem that the party can only be successful if the entire party switches positions at the same time.[4] Party leaders, who are delegated certain powers and resources by the members, perform the task of coordinating a shift in policy stance among members of the party caucus.

[4] The theory of conditional party government by Aldrich and Rohde (1995, 2000) posits that party members delegate powers to leaders when they share homogeneous preferences. On the other hand, Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005), advocating the theory of party-as-a-cartel, claim that the party leadership executes powers over members, independent of their shared preferences.

Although I do not dispute a pivotal role played by party leaders in setting and shifting a party position, I argue that the impetus for changes sometimes comes from the bottom up – that is, from party members themselves and demonstrate how some rank-and-file members affect party position shifts. At times, the party position held by the leadership conflicts with some members' constituency interests (Mayhew 1974, Fenno 1978, Canes-Wrone et al 2002). Faced with this conflict, backbench members look for ways to strategically signal leaders about their disaffection with the party's status quo position. They use the legislative process to signal their intention to defect from the party on policy unless the leadership modifies the party's existing position. Froman and Ripley (1965) earlier explained about the impact of constituency pressures on members:

> "Perhaps the most important single factor which helps to explain why a member deviates from positions taken by the party leadership is the kind of constituency he represents. Members like to vote with the party, to be sure, but they also wish to be re-elected. For some members, on some issues, voting against the party leadership is perceived as a necessary step to re-election."

Party members' party-splitting votes under constituency pressures do not always lead the party into a new brand. Another important dimension of party policy shifts entails the dynamic of party competition. I claim that the process of party position change occurs not only through members' split *within* a party but also through interactive relationship *between* parties. If one party, particularly a majority party, is divided but the other party is united over a policy issue, this issue drives a wedge within the majority party. If this wedge issue continues to split the majority party and unite the minority party, the majority party is likely to shift its policy position to solve its dilemma of party division.

In the meantime, when diverse internal factions within *both* parties are divided on a policy issue, there is little pressure posed on party leaders to alter their party stance. One plausible and practical solution on the part of leaders is to allow their members to cast position-taking votes in legislative processes. As long as party unity is secured for the final passage of bills and a rival party is also divided, party leaders regard members' position-taking strategies as acceptable. My principal claim is that if party rank-and-file members' threat of policy defection is credible given the context of party unity and competition, party leaders find it necessary to adjust and adapt policies to reduce the pressure on cross-pressured members.

This chapter provides a theoretical framework to analyze this bottom-up process of party position change. By focusing on intermediate and procedural votes, I show how cross-pressured party members strategically influence their party's policy stance. In particular, I illustrate that party rank-and-file members often use early votes to signal their support for constituent preferences rather than their party's position when the two conflict. These votes often serve as an early warning for the leadership about the need to rethink the electoral viability of the party's existing policy stance. This bottom-up process over wedge issues in Congress sometimes leads parties to redefine their policy preferences. How and when it happens are the subjects I take up in the pages that follow.

Legislators, Leaders, and Party Position Shifts

A party's position on a policy issue might be created and changed through diverse channels: campaign ads, platforms during conventions, presidential speeches, congressional leaders' messages, and scandals. It is important to note that this dissertation centers on party position shifts in Congress. When party members collectively agree on a particular position over a policy issue, the party is considered to retain a policy position. What is critical for my analysis of party position shifts is the nature of a credible party position. For a party position to be credible, two conditions should be met: a high level of overall support or opposition by party members and a minimal degree of policy disagreement among party rank-and-file (Hinich and Munger 1997).[5]

Thus, party position shifts occur when congressional party members collectively change their policy choices. But, legislative scholars have found that members of Congress rarely change their voting decisions over time. Voting stability has been confirmed as a key feature of legislative behavior (Clausen 1973, Fiorina 1974, Asher and Weisberg 1978, Smith 1981, Kingdon 1989, Arnold 1990, Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Members of Congress vote consistently so that they can rely on their voting history as an effective voting cue.[6] In examining congressional votes on recurring issues,

[5] Hinich and Munger (1997) show that a distant but united party position sometime resonates more effectively with voters than a close but split party stance.

[6] Arnold (1990, 87) suggests that "Strictly speaking, only freshman legislators must calculate the political implications of five or six hundred new issues. Other legislators face fewer new issues and, thus, fewer real decisions. For the recurrent issues, they need only determine if their previous votes have been well received and whether the political terrain has changed in the interim."

Hibbing (1991, 6) notices that "representatives, like most of us, utilize the past as a bench mark for understanding the present and perhaps the future."

Additionally, members of Congress generally refrain from changing their voting positions out of a desire to maintain credible voting records. Kingdon (1989, 277) explains that "congressmen find it difficult to explain inconsistency to their constituents." Poole and Rosenthal (1997, 74) conclude that "contemporary members of Congress do not adapt their positions during their careers, but simply enter and maintain a fixed position until they die, retire, or are defeated." A recent study (Tavits 2007) also confirms that a party policy shift in the domain of principled issues is perceived as a sign of inconsistency, which voters are likely to punish.

Members of Congress, however, do sometimes change their policy positions. Political scientists and congressional observers notice that legislators do not always stand by their earlier voting positions. For various reasons, from individual to institutional, congressional members sometimes switch their policy choices (Hibbing 1991, Stratmann 2000). In a seminal analysis of vote changes, Asher and Weisberg (1978) suggested that vote changes would occur due to the systematic sources of change: long-term issue evolution, membership replacement, and change in partisan control of the White House.

Other scholars explored specific policy areas to examine the source and process of a party's position change. Irwin and Kroszner (1999) analyzed the Republican conversion to a sustained bipartisan support for the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934. They claimed that the combination of interests and institutions played a key role in cementing the GOP's shift in position on trade and tariff policy. Meinke

(2005) conducted a time-series analysis of the House members' votes over a series of minimum-wage legislations from 1949-2000. His finding is that "members' long-term minimum-wage positions are not carved in stone" (Meinke 2005, 118).

Indeed, vote stability versus vote switching by members of Congress has been an enduring research topic for legislative scholars. First of all, students of congressional parties from V.O. Key (1964) to Eric Schickler (2001) have paid attention to the nature of parties. They suggest that the notion of "parties as diverse coalitions" ought to constitute a basic understanding of the major American parties. Under the simple majority electoral system, also known as the first-past-the-post method, political parties need electoral support from a wide spectrum of voters to become the majority party in the legislature. These umbrella-like parties often find their members caught between the constituency and the party.[7] District interests do not always match up with the national party position. When the interests of constituency and party conflict, party members face pressures from both groups. Schattschneider (1960, 73) earlier explains this tension with the majority coalition in the legislature.

> "The majority is held together by the alignment around which it was formed. It has a vested interest in the old lineup in which it confronts familiar antagonists already well identified in old contests. A new alignment is likely to confuse the majority; new alignments are usually designed to exploit tensions within the majority. Hence the fight is apt to be between interests that benefit by the maintenance of the old alignments and those demanding a new deal. The very fact that no alignment can satisfy all interests equally makes the political system dynamic."

[7] The majority party dilemma arises when the more far-reaching efforts the party makes to retain the majority status, the more likely party members are to pursue diverse and sometimes conflicting interests. Aldrich (1995, 7) points out that "the major American party is a broad and encompassing organization, a coalition of many and diverse partners, commonly called umbrella-like."

Another dimension of position switching has to do with the character of a policy issue at stake. American parties often confront wedge issues in the legislature. A wedge issue is defined as "any policy issue that is used to divide the opposition's potential winning coalition" (Hillygus and Shields 2007, 19).[8] Major parties in the two-party system try to keep hold of diverse constituencies, different ideologies, and sometimes competing sectional interests. In the process of consensus-building inside the party, party leaders are likely to adhere to the status quo position, which is supported by a majority of party members. But, when the party's position conversion is the only way to restore the party's credibility and competitiveness, party rank-and-file members collectively rebuild their party's policy consensus.

Last but not least, congressional scholars consider electoral competition as another basis for changes in the policy choices of parties and legislators. When parties compete fiercely, independent and swing voters tend to determine which party becomes the majority party in Congress. Consequently, party leaders seek to relocate the party position closer to that of the "middle-of-the-road" voters.[9] At the same time, the party leadership makes sure that their electoral strategies, including a new position building, do not necessarily alienate their own partisan stronghold (Downs 1957, Alesina and

[8] Hillygus and Shields (2007, 18) listed as wedge issues "gun control, abortion, global warming, immigration, affirmative action, school prayer, free trade, gay marriage, stem cell research, welfare reform, education, and internet taxation."

[9] Miller and Schofield (2003) call this strategy a "flanking move." They claim that Clinton's "New Democrat" tactic in 1992 presidential elections, for example, can be understood as "flanking move" to mobilize socially liberal Republican voters who were disaffected by Reagan's socially as well as economically conservative policy agenda drive during the 1980s.

Rosenthal 1995, James 2000).[10] Party leaders and members alike do not accept any policy positions that push away their party's supporters.

In the challenging task of staking out a new policy position, the party leadership often faces difficulties in persuading some of its rank-and-file members. As examined above, rank-and-file members represent diverse constituency preferences or personal ideologies within the "umbrella-like" political parties. As a result, wedge issue politics makes cross-pressured party members often side with their constituency preference through position-taking strategies. In addition, party competition at the national level does not automatically guarantee position conversion on the part of rank-and-file members. Party members tend to place more emphasis on their own political benefits than on the credibility of party position.

Furthermore, I assume that electoral value of party position varies among party members. Congressional members give various weights to the benefit of their party position in districts and the value of their voting records in the legislature (Adams 1997, Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2005). Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2005) push further this claim about the roles of party members in shaping and uniting parties' policy stance. What they suggest is that party members endogenously choose the level of party discipline. Legislators face electoral and institutional trade-offs. For legislators in

[10] A spatial theory approach explains that although Nixon's "Opening to China," for example, irritated many conservative and anti-communist party members, the distance between their ideal positions and Nixon's approach is still smaller than the distance between their ideal positions and the Democratic positions, particularly McGovern's. Therefore, Nixon's détente policy might be interpreted as an electoral strategy targeting the "middle-of-the-road" voters, with little risk of too much alienating his party-base. Also, for the perspective of position and leadership, See Shepsle and Bonchek (1997) and for the domestic politics of risking peace, see Schultz (2005).

campaigns, party discipline enhances the informative value of party labels. The same party discipline constrains members of Congress in their independent pursuit of their own legislative agendas. As a consequence, party members endogenize a party discipline-making process to maximize the utilities from both the party and preference.

Ultimately, it is rank-and-file members who collectively create and change party positions through legislative processes. Credible voting records that are largely in accordance with constituency preferences are vital for members of Congress as "single-minded seekers of re-election" (Mayhew 1974). Consequently, legislators as party members weigh in electoral benefits from their party positions and their own voting records. A party's policy stance is a form of a "collective" position. A legislator's voting records is a "personal" position. Both positions are critical for the party's rank-and-file members (Key 1966, Cox and McCubbins 1993, Jones and McDermott 2004). A next step of analysis centers on the question of how cross-pressured party members strike a balance between party influence and constituency demand in legislative processes.

Members' Bottom-up Strategies: Position Taking over a Wedge Issue

The aim of this dissertation is not to deemphasize the role of party leadership in setting and shifting the party stance, but to bring about a greater focus on party members and their effects on party position shifts. My argument is that rank-and-file party members and their intraparty coalitions play critical roles in charting a new course for the

party. Cross-pressured party backbenchers tend to cast position-taking votes. They are likely to use procedural votes to register their disagreement with the party position.[11]

For their warning of policy defection to be credible, rank-and-file members employ position-taking and coalition-building strategies during the legislative process. To warn leaders that they are siding with their constituency, cross-pressured members register their disagreement with the party position on procedural or intermediate votes. As a consequence of voting with their constituency, majority party members sometimes form a voting bloc with the minority party.

Position Taking and Coalition Building: Strategic Legislative Behavior

Mayhew (1974), in his seminal work on legislator behavior, described members of Congress as "single-minded-seekers-of-reelection." He detailed three specific activities in which lawmakers engage for the pursuit of their re-election goals: advertising, credit claiming, and position taking. According to Mayhew (1974, 61), position taking is "the public enunciation of a judgmental statement on anything likely to be of interest to political actors … and the statement may take the form of a roll call vote." Snyder and Ting (2005, 153) also suggest that position-taking strategies include "introducing and cosponsoring bills, making speeches, and building roll call records that are in tune with their constituents." They argue that an endogenous preference for position-taking emerges with citizens and legislators both preferring "open" proceedings.

[11] The procedural vote here is meant to be contrast with the final passage vote. My category of procedural vote includes not only procedural decisions by the Rules Committee, but also substantive votes such as ex-veto votes, amendments, and non-binding resolution votes.

Their formal modeling of preference-led strategies for public roll-call votes, however, seems to fail to answer why congressional anti-secrecy reforms succeeded in the 1970s, but not in 1940s.

Based on the congressional literature, I consider roll-call voting decisions as one of the major position-taking activities by legislators. In essence, my analysis is about the sources and processes of members' position taking and its impact on policy changes in Congress. Prior to final passage voting, party members often take positions different from those of their party. I suggest that congressional members cast these position-taking votes in particular legislative contexts. Legislators tend to show their party-splitting positions in legislative processes, especially when the final outcome of a bill at stake highly predictable in advance.

The case studies used in this dissertation showcase legislative processes in which party rank-and-file members take diverse positions. First, position-taking strategy prevails when a *presidential veto* is highly expected (McCarty and Poole 1995, Krehbiel 1998, Cameron 2000, Tsebelis 2002). Second, when passage of a final reauthorization bill (such as a fiscal year defense budget) is all but inevitable, party backbenchers express their dissatisfaction and disagreement through *amendments and recommittal motions* (Smith 1989, Lindsay 1991, Cox and McCubbins 2005). Third, party members often cast non-party votes when they are handling a *joint resolution* that is ultimately expected to clear both chambers by majority votes (Nokken 2003). I argue that party rank-and-file members find these legislative processes useful for their position-taking strategies without risking too much of their party's brand name.

The formation of intraparty coalitions is another bottom-up strategy employed by party rank-and-file members. In the majority party, where diverse coalitions inherently exist, party members tend to form groups beyond their committee membership. Similar constituency preferences, such as sectional interests or district ideology, tend to lead legislators to build and join an intraparty caucus (Hammond 1998). Making their collective cases inside and outside the party, the intraparty group members often make their voting decisions together, especially over policy issues which may heavily impact their own re-elections. Indeed, intraparty group members across the committees often prevail over committees' gate-keeping power. Thus, they effectively push for specific policy interests shared by cross-pressured members.

As Rae (1998, 41) correctly claims, "American party factions have proven to be elusive, and thus resistant to analysis." The loose and decentralized nature of American parties has prevented party factions from developing the organizational skills, discipline, and durability found among party factions in other Western democracies (Rose 1974). At the same time, it is hard to deny that factional configuration within the parties has constantly influenced the strategic calculations of party leaders in executing their legislative and electoral strategies (Sinclair 1982, Jacobson 1985, 1989, Ansolabehere, Snyder, Stewart 2001).[12]

[12] Reichley (1981), for instance, listed fundamentalists, stalwarts, moderates, and progressives as factions within the Republican Party during the first year of the Nixon administration. With respect to factional powers, Reichley points out that the coalition among the Republican fundamentalists and stalwarts, and the Democratic traditionalists accounted for four-tenths of the congressional membership in both chambers.

In essence, I claim that ideological, regional, and distributive politics surrounding foreign policy issues also interact with party factions (Laver and Shepsle 1990, Cox, Rosenbluth, and Thies 2000, Baer 2000). In addition, along with individual legislators' ideological changes from Congress to Congress, the rise and fall of party factions might also account for partisan polarization in the legislature (Jacobson 2004, Theriault 2004).[13] Legislators often get their voting cues from the same faction members as well as from the same party members.

Wedge Issue Politics: Party Cohesion and Party Competition

These defecting members have not always led to wholesale party conversion. The nature of the issue at stake and its impact party competition also play a pivotal role in remaking the party position. When a policy agenda becomes a wedge issue, which I define as an issue that splits the majority party and unites the minority party, parties are most likely to shift their position. In American political history, minority party members have often united their policy position to drive a wedge within the majority party (Schattschneider 1960).[14] As a result, the majority party leadership confronts a two-front

[13] For the relationship between cross-pressured members and president-as-legislative-leader, see Bond and Fleisher (1990)

[14] Interestingly, the term of "outside-in" used in the study of international relations can be applied to this logic of party position shifts (Pevehouse 2002). "Outside-in" influence describes and analyzes external pressures on domestic coalitions for foreign policy choices or democratization processes. In a similar vein, the minority party's united position adds a dynamic dimension to the majority party's position changing process.

battlefield: one against party-splitting rank-and-file members and the other against unified opposition by minority party.[15]

At the core of the politics of a wedge issue is majority-minority competition. With a wedge issue emerging in Congress, the minority party initiates the first move by shifting its position closer to that of cross-pressured majority party members. Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 48) confirmed that "From Schattschneider to Cobb and Elder and to Riker and to Kingdon, we know that certain individuals are likely to attempt to push issues either toward or away from the public agenda."

Thus, the majority party leadership confronts party-splitting backbenchers and unified minority members simultaneously. If a wedge issue continues to undermine the unity of the majority party, the party leadership can lose roll-call votes to the intraparty coalition, force its backbenchers to vote against their constituents' preferences, or yield to the demands of rank-and-file members to change the party position. Not surprisingly, the party's leaders find the last outcome to be the best one.

Figure 1.1 Politics of a Wedge Issue: Party Unity and Party Competition



[15] Representative Michael Castle (R-DE), a moderate House GOP commenting on the centrists' position in a polarized 109th Congress, claimed that "With the Democrats voting as a bloc against the Republican leadership, which gave us an important ability to negotiate what we wanted in legislation." Emily Pierce. "The Moderates; A Perfect Storm Helps Empower Hill Centrists" *Roll Call*, January 30, 2006.

Figure 1.1 illustrates a simple spatial logic of wedge issue politics.[16] The ideal points of each political group such as *m (minority party)*, *w (a wedge issue)*, *F (the floor median)*, and *o (an old position)* are presented. Status quo (*SQ*) is away from the floor median *F* so that a policy change is expected to some extent. Note the position change by the minority party, *m*. If *m* shifts its position near or at *F*, the floor median, the minority party induces a new policy change using the split among the majority party members. In the end, the majority party finds the split between *w* and *o* reduced to *F*, whereas the minority party secures a portion of the majority party to support a policy change from *SQ* to *F*, closer to *m*.

This dissertation incorporates the concept that party unity is a critical dynamic for a party position shift. Figure 1.2 illustrates how the demand for party unity is constraining both the party leadership and rank-and-file members in setting up party position in Congress. Party members (principal) are sometimes divided. The party leadership (agent) is thus forced to cope with legislators' strategic choices including position taking and coalition building. Responding to the pressure created by intraparty split and interparty competition, the party leadership is likely to later reconsider the issue of party position change (Fiorina 1974, Fenno 1978, Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987, Katz and Sala 1996, Levitt 1996). In sum, party rank-and-file members and their intraparty coalitions also play critical roles in charting a new course for the party. Members' strategic behavior surrounding party unity is ultimately an internal element of party position change.

[16] For this spatial illustration of wedge issue politics, I rely upon Kousser and McCubbins (2005).

Figure 1.2 Party Leaders, Rank-and-file Members, and Party Unity



Hypotheses Testing

To test my argument of bottom-up party position shifts, I derive some explicit hypotheses and test them on specific policy cases in the course of American political history. To a large extent, these hypotheses constitute constituency, ideology, and partisan dimensions. I test distinct hypotheses to examine how constituency pressure, ideological preference, and party influence force party members to cast position-taking votes and build intraparty coalitions. A special focus is on cross-pressured members over the politics of wedge issues.

The Constituency Pressures Hypothesis

> *Members of Congress, who are cross-pressured by their party and their constituency, are more likely to take position-taking strategies and coalition-building efforts than those members who find their party position consistent with their constituents' interests.*

Constituency pressures heavily affect members' voting decisions in Congress (Schattschneider 1935, MacRae 1952, Miller and Stokes 1963, Mayhew 1974, Fenno 1978, Bartels 1991, Baumgartner and Jones 1993, Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002, Jenkins, Schickler and Carson 2004, Theriault 2005). Some rank-and-file party members call for party position change because their constituency interests conflict with the party stance. My argument is that, if those cross-pressured members' position-taking and coalition-building strategies play out over a wedge issue, a party's policy position is likely to change. As a consequence, the main hypothesis in the following case studies should be: a party's policy position is most likely to change when a large number of its members are cross-pressured, or to put it differently, when the party's position on an issue is out-of-step with the reelection interests of a sizeable number of its members. Arnold (1990, 63) also elaborates on this point:

> "Unfortunately, a legislator can do virtually nothing to affect her party's general stance. Although the parties do change their positions over time, the impact of a single legislator on that change is necessarily small… Fortunately, a legislator can do a great deal to differentiate herself from the party (if that is to her advantage). A legislator may have little control over her party's positions, but she has complete control over her own policy positions. A Republican form a Democratic district can vote like a Democrat. She can fine-tune her policy positions to fit even the most complicated district. Her strategies may not persuade the most steadfast partisan voters to support her, but they may convince more amenable citizens to focus on her own, not her party's, positions."

Constituency influence forces party members to have a different approach to the issues of party position and party loyalty. When the western Republicans represented different constituents' preferences over internationalist policy vis-à-vis the eastern Republicans in the 1920s, the GOP members from the West had fewer incentives to unite themselves behind the party position over national security and partisan choice of defense spending. In fact, western Republicans faced high costs and low benefits from the GOP's strong position on American internationalism.

Similarly, a huge split between northern and southern Democrats over the issue of defense appropriations since the late 1960s came about as a result of the inherent trade-off between increased defense spending and increased welfare spending. Different constituency interests were represented by two major factions within the Democratic Party. Northern Democrats from "butter-oriented" districts had few incentives to unite themselves for the purpose of building a party position over national security and defense spending. By contrast, with the nation's military bases and budgets increasingly shifting towards the South, Southern members strongly supported defense spending increase. In sum, the difference between district interests and national party position is hypothesized to affect the cost-benefit analysis for party members.

The Ideology Hypothesis

> *Legislators with moderate and centrist ideology tend to be more interested in position-taking votes in legislative processes than those congressional members with more extreme preferences.*

Legislators' own ideology is also presumed to be a factor for members' position-taking and coalition-building strategies. Indeed, legislator ideology, along with constituency pressure and party influence, has been considered critical for legislative behavior by members of Congress (Downs 1957, Lindsay 1991, Hinich and Munger 1996, Poole and Rosenthal 1997, Gerring 1998). Downs (1957, 111) accounts for the relevance of ideology:

> "Different groups within the party use varying shades of the dominant party ideology as weapons against each other. In their struggle for power, each tries to convince influential party members that it is the bearer of the ideas most likely to win votes in the general elections."

Moderate members are assumed to have higher incentives to be "flexible" than "credible." Therefore, those moderate and centrist legislators may position themselves more conveniently on diverse issues. They might need distinct and moderate roll-call voting records on their own to counterweigh the costs of strong party label in their districts. I assume that those moderate members of Congress are likely to be interested in position-taking strategies in legislative process without necessarily abandoning their party's policy position in the stage of final passage of a bill.

On the other hand, members with partisan ideologies are hypothesized to want the party label to deliver strong and clear messages to the voters. In other words, those members of Congress who have more extreme ideologies are likely to see their parties clearly committed to a policy position. Extreme ideological preference, however, does not readily indicate whether members of Congress support a status-quo or policy change. For example, whereas conservative southern Democrats preferred maintaining the status-

quo party position on defense spending in the late 1960s, liberal northern Democrats favored a change in party position.

The Party Member Hypothesis

> *Cross-pressured members are likely to form an intraparty coalition over a wedge issue and to challenge the national party's position.*

The relevance of a political party for governance is linked to the question of party strength and responsibility. Krehbiel (1993) argues that party members vote together simply because they share similar policy preferences. He challenges party theorists to find evidence that party leaders influence roll-call voting by members of Congress, independent of individual legislator's policy preference. In addition, most of influential studies on legislative behavior in Congress deny partisan influence, such as in Mayhew (1974), Fiorina (1977), Shepsle (1979), and Weingast and Marshall (1988).

Herring's (1940) classic analysis, however, concluded that the United States had parties appropriate to its diverse political culture and decentralized government structures.[17] Key (1964) and Sorauf (1964) claimed that the American party was an "umbrella-style" coalition of many diverse partners, in accordance with the Kirchheimer's (1966) "catch-all" parties argument. Other scholars, most noticeably in Schattschneider-led APSA Report in 1950, called for the creation of responsible party

[17] Analyzing the regulatory choices of the Democrats during 1884-1936, James (2000) found that party affiliation emerged as a central factor in the definition of legislative choice. In the wake of party members' efforts to retain control of the presidency as a much-desired party resource, congressional members repeatedly fell in line behind those choices that repudiated their own policy preferences.

systems (Schattschneider 1960, Sundquist 1988). For most of the early twentieth century, the norm of "unified" party government deeply influenced major party theorists such as Key, Herring, and Schattschneider. They strongly supported the British-type responsible party doctrine.

The recent theories of "conditional party government" (Rohde 1991, Aldrich 1995, Aldrich and Rohde 1998, 2001) and "party-as-cartel" (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005) build on the premise that shared preferences do not automatically translate into preferred collective outcomes. Rohde and Aldrich elaborate on the condition for party government, which is that majority party members have homogeneous policy preferences diverge from those of minority party members. If the conditions are satisfied, party members delegate more authority to party leaders for structuring the legislative agenda to advance distinctly partisan issues.

This dissertation on party stance conversion centers on a dynamic nature of party competition in the context of party unity. A wedge issue, by definition, splits a majority coalition. Members who find the constituency preference different from the national party position tend to individually take positions and collectively build coalitions. Western Republicans in the 1880s and northern Democrats in the 1970s are two examples of numerous intraparty coalitions that have existed throughout American political history to advance sub-group interests.

Conclusion

If American democracy is representative, the positions staked by political parties should reflect their constituencies' interests. Voters, in turn, should use these policy positions as an important tool in judging lawmakers and casting ballots. As constituency preferences shift, parties, wanting to maintain voter allegiance, must also adjust their policy stance. The sources and processes of party position change has been an enduring topic in the congressional literature, but our understanding of how parties actually redefine their policy positions and embrace change is incomplete.

This chapter has advanced a framework for analyzing how political parties change their policy positions. Constituency pressures and the challenges they pose for rank-and-file members are the analytical focal points. Forced to choose between party and constituency, cross-pressured members threaten to defect over policy. When a coalition of cross-pressured members forms over a wedge issue, the threat of policy defection from the party becomes credible. Under these conditions, party leaders come to recognize that it is politically prudent to modify the party's stance on policy.

To support my argument about this bottom-up process of party conversion, I draw on evidence from historical case studies and focus on critical moments of party transformation. Because a snapshot of party position change might mask individual legislators' strategic vote switching, I map out the policy adjustment process during these turning points for America's parties. I examine a series of key legislative moments that congressional scholars and observers have identified as critical turning points.

My theory is laid out in formal terms and I rely on a battery of quantitative and qualitative data to test the argument. I explore three historical cases of position change by one or both parties over policy areas such as immigration, national security, and trade. More specifically, these include: the switch of congressional Republicans (from anti- to pro-exclusion) on Chinese immigration in the post-Reconstruction period; the shift of congressional Democrats from a party of "guns" and "butter" to a party of "butter" only in the post-Vietnam War era; and Republican and Democratic flip-flopping on China and MFN in the post-Cold War period.

Calling for a micro-foundation analysis of legislator behavior and strategy, this dissertation considers specific legislative debates in specific Congresses. To cover the policy issues of immigration, defense spending, and trade, I have chosen distinct congressional agendas: the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 in the 47th Congress (1881-1882), the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) appropriation bills in the 91st Congress (1969-1970), and the permanent Normal Trade Relations legislation with China in the 106th Congress (1999-2000).

Chapter 2 explores the case of Chinese exclusion in the post-Reconstruction era. The question is how the Republican Party, the "party of Lincoln," transformed itself into the "anti-Chinese party." My analysis of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and other anti-Chinese legislation reveals that radical Republicans in the Gilded Age embraced choices that repudiated their own strongly held ideology and policy preferences. I argue that the constituency demands for Chinese exclusion and the political needs of retaining

the presidency as a much-desired party resource led party members to shift their support away from civil rights to anti-Chinese immigration laws.

In Chapter 3, I investigate how and why congressional Democrats in the early 1970s became a partisan force favoring "butter" over "guns." As a result, defense spending since the Vietnam War has become a source of division within the Democratic Party (Rohde 1991). Changes in voter preferences and legislator choices over the defense budget were neither homogeneous across districts nor static over time. House floor politics in the post-reform era led northern Democrats to take positions catering to public opinion and against party unity. I find that the procedural voting context helped cross-pressured northern Democrats to balance demands both from their constituencies and their party.

I also argue in this dissertation that when both parties are internally divided over a policy issue, members' position-taking strategies are not likely to bring about parties' position shifts. With neither party united over a policy issue, cross-pressured legislators within both parties still express their concerns in legislative process, but their strategic voting behavior does not necessarily lead party leaders to reevaluate party positions. This case of position taking over a wedge issue for both parties is addressed in Chapter 4. The subject concerns congressional debates over free trade with China during the 1990s. As I show, given that it is highly unlikely for Congress to revoke presidential trade policy towards China, legislators use congressional joint resolutions to score political points.

As the China issue was debated in light of numerous important policy matters and normative concerns (some of which included human rights, religious freedom,

containment policy and globalization), legislators also weighed partisan strategies and procedural considerations in defining their positions towards China. In a polarized Congress during the 1990s, the China debate effectively reflected the blend of members' position-taking strategies and coalition-building efforts. In the end, individual position-taking tactics by both party members led nowhere regarding party position change in trade policy towards China.

Finally, I should note that my decision to test my hypotheses using cases of congressional foreign policy conflict is deliberate. Foreign policy constitutes a tough test of my argument because rank-file-members are normally thought to defer to party leaders on foreign policy matters and because constituency interests are usually thought to weigh less heavily on members' policy choices when it comes to foreign policy matters. My analysis indicates that neither of these assumptions holds up. Policy change in these cases is driven by the shifting preferences of members trying to resolve tension between party and constituency. Sometimes party rank-and-file members are in the driver's seat in defining the party's position. This is as true for foreign policy as it is for domestic policy.

Chapter Two: From the Party of Lincoln To the Party of "Chinese-must-go": *Party Transformation in the post-Reconstruction Congress*

> "Ought we to exclude them? The question lies in my mind thus: either the Anglo-Saxon race will possess the Pacific slope or the Mongolians will possess it. We have this day to choose … whether our legislation shall be in the interest of the American free laborer or for the servile laborer from China"
>
> Senator James G. Blaine (R-ME)[18]

> "If there were not a rivalry between the two political parties of this country for the political vote of the Pacific coast, this legislation would be received, in my opinion, with universal extraction from all intelligence and human men."
>
> Senator George F. Hoar (R-MA)[19]

Party members try to maintain a consistent policy position to build a credible reputation. Indeed, they are committed to a specific policy stance to represent the preferences of their electoral base. Downs (1957, 110), in his pioneering work on party strategies for median voters, suggests that "ideological immobility is characteristic of every responsible party, because it cannot repudiate its past actions unless some radical change in conditions justifies this." On the other hand, party members try to avoid getting their hands tied all the time. Legislators often need to adapt to new policy

[18] *Congressional Record,* 45th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1301, 1303 (Feb 14, 1879)
[19] Henry S. Cohn and Harvey Gee. 2003. ""NO, NO, NO, NO!" Three Sons of Connecticut Who Opposed the Chinese Exclusion Acts" (November 5, 2003). *University of Connecticut School of Law. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal.* Paper 5.

demands from their constituents. When policy issues, demographics, and ideological inclinations change, legislators and their congressional parties are pressed to adjust to changes in voters' policy preferences. In the end, political parties must weigh the trade-off between credibility and flexibility in making their policy choices.

The case of Chinese exclusion in the Gilded Age nicely illustrates this point. Both parties made efforts to be credible and flexible over the issue of excluding Chinese immigrant workers. The issue was multi-dimensional. Chinese exclusion represented the politics of immigration, labor, race, and presidential election. Partisan competition for every election in the post-Reconstruction was fierce. A prominent political historian noted that "landslides and big swings of voter sentiment from one party to another were nonexistent during the Gilded Age" (Gould 2003, 84). After the Compromise of 1877, the Hayes administration adopted a "southern strategy" to build a southern Republican Party and to pursue voters in the South (De Santis 1959, 1973).

In the late 1870s, the "Grand Old Party" was still regarded as a credible coalition for equal citizenship and voting rights. While holding on to their credit for "bloody shirts," the party of Lincoln found their members increasingly split on how to cope with new political demands in the Gilded Age. The Democratic Party, on issues of race and ethnicity, quickly returned to its pre-Civil War stance. Democrats tried to be flexible in their search for a policy issue to unite them and divide the dominant GOP. Anti-Chinese sentiment was one of those issues the Democratic Party exploited in the post-Reconstruction era (Saxton 1971, Mink 1986, Gyory 1998, Tichenor 2002). And Democrats met with a good deal of success. In 1882, a bipartisan majority in Congress

passed the Chinese Exclusion Act. It was the first time America ever banned immigration based solely on race.[20]

In the controversy surrounding Chinese exclusion some GOP members were caught between constituency and party leadership. GOP lawmakers found themselves stuck in the middle of two contradictory positions: supporting equal civil rights, which was needed to retain the party's traditional electoral base, versus cooperating with a newly emerging anti-Chinese movement, which was crucial for expanding the party's electoral reach. *Why* did GOP members ultimately forgo the party of Lincoln label and pass legislation to ban the Chinese immigration workers? *How* did the Republican members of Congress actually change their positions during the legislative process?

In the post-Reconstruction period, western states were emerging as the key swing states in presidential elections. In the contest between Republicans and Democrats for votes, cheap Chinese labor, especially along the Pacific Coast, became a critical policy choice for both parties. Western GOP members urged their party leaders to adopt a tough anti-Chinese platform. By contrast, eastern Republicans were divided, juggling the need to win the western states and maintain their party's ideological continuity. These cross-pressured members of the Republican Party played a pivotal role in reshaping the party's stance on immigration policy.

I have organized this chapter as follows. Section I provides a descriptive history of party position shifts concerning the exclusion of Chinese laborers from 1868 to 1943.

[20] Gyory (1998, 16) concludes that "The passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act reflects the passage of an era, revealing this fundamental change in both the Republican Party and the nation at large."

Next, section II compares and contrasts a series of anti-Chinese legislative bills. Taking party members' vote strategies into account, I derive specific hypotheses. Then, I test them using roll-call votes to see how party rank-and-file members influenced party position shifts in the Gilded Age. Section III reports the results of hypotheses testing and illustrates how cross-pressured party members affected their party's policy position. Finally, section IV concludes by revisiting the importance of member-driven policy change in Congress.

I. The Congressional History of Chinese Exclusion, 1868-1943

In 1868, the Chinese government asked Anson Burlingame, the first American minister staying in Beijing, to lead a diplomatic mission on behalf of China. Burlingame and his associates stopped by major cities and visited Washington D.C. to meet with President Andrew Johnson.[21] Having received large and friendly welcomes across the country, the Burlingame mission secured Senate ratification of a bilateral treaty. The Burlingame Treaty established reciprocal and most-favored nation rights between the United States and China. The treaty also recognized "the free migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects from the one country to the other (Kitts 1991, 38)."[22] Indeed, according to Gyory (1998, 27), the unanimous ratification of the treaty by the

[21] For a detailed account of Burlingame and his mission, see Kitts, *The United States Odyssey in China, 1784-1990* (1991), chap.4

[22] Tichenor, *Dividing Lines* (2002), Gyory, *Closing the Gate* (1998). The United States was actively encouraging the influx of Chinese workers as a source of inexpensive labor

Senate was "a rare moment of bipartisan unity during the nation's first postwar presidential campaign."

As wartime manpower shortage problems gradually receded, however, resentment of Chinese immigrant workers intensified in the West. The vast majority of Chinese immigrants settled in the new frontier on the Pacific Coast.[23] Between 1868 and 1871, twenty-two thousand Chinese immigrants arrived in San Francisco. Thereafter, Chinese immigration snowballed in the Western states, with 20,000 arriving in 1873, 14,000 in 1874, 16,000 in 1875, and 23,000 in 1876 (Tichenor 2002, 97). The influx of cheap Chinese labor was a boon to western industry. Railroads, mining, and manufacturing all turned increasingly to cheap Chinese laborers instead of relying on unionized white workers.[24] Low wages, longer working days, and a low chance of employment led white workers ultimately to blame the Chinese.

While Chinese laborers constituted 13.2 percent of the San Francisco labor force already in 1870 (Mink 1986, 75), national political parties continued to pass legislations aimed at abolitionism and racial equality. In the 1872 presidential election campaign, the GOP and the Democratic Party showed little difference in their positions towards Chinese immigrant workers. Table 2.1 compares a series of the party platforms over the Chinese exclusion debates.

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[23] Mink (1986, 74) indicates that between 1860 and 1870, the city of San Francisco had its population more than double into almost 150,000. The Bay Area labor market constituted almost one-third of California's population.

[24] Saxton, *The Indispensable Enemy* (1971) and Mink, *Old Labor and New Immigrants in American Political Development* (1986) provide thorough accounts of the anti-Chinese movement led by labor unions

By the late 1870s, however, mass-based anti-Chinese coalitions had arisen, creating trade-offs for politicians facing competitive national elections. Labor unions in the East joined their colleagues in the West to hold the Chinese immigrants responsible for the economic hard times of the 1870s.[25] A large number of anti-Chinese clubs and the Chinese Exclusion League formed across the country. They sent numerous petitions to Congress, condemning Chinese immigrants (Tichenor 2002, 103). Merchants and industrial and agricultural employers, however, were still interested in expanding trade with China, and hiring low-cost Chinese labor. In addition, religious leaders wanted to promote missionary work in China. The pro-China coalition in the Gilded Age, however, did not constitute a solid political base and force against the anti-Chinese alliance.[26]

These anti-Chinese sentiments and movements precipitated the rise of a new political party in California and the formation of a bipartisan coalition in Congress.[27] In the wake of the nationwide railroad strike in 1877, workers in San Francisco and their allies formed the Workingmen's Party of California. Denis Kearney, as the party's president, brought together supporters with his emotional "The Chinese Must Go" oratory (Mink 1986, Gyory 1998). The Workingmen's Party won one-third of seats for the California constitution convention in 1879, with the new constitution including at least

[25] On this point, Andrew Gyory (1998) disputes the direct impact of labor unions on the Chinese Exclusion Act passed by Congress in 1882. Gyory argues that labor organizations' hostility against Chinese immigrants was largely limited to the western states, whereas labor unions in the East were primarily opposed to importation, not necessarily immigration. Instead of organized labor, Gyory blames strategic politicians who used the issue of Chinese immigration to win electoral votes.

[26] See Tichenor (2002, 104, table 4.5) for a more detailed list of political groupings on Chinese exclusion issue.

[27] See Gyory (1998, 6-15) for an excellent literature review of the so-called "California thesis" and the "national racist consensus thesis."

eight anti-Chinese provisions (Mink 1986, 85).[28] In Congress, Democrats and Republicans from the western states formed an unusual bipartisan coalition to secure Chinese exclusion. In addition, southern Democrats tried to forge a West-South alliance "dedicated to white supremacy and defeat of Northeastern radicalism" (Tichenor 2002, 103).[29]

A national-level Chinese exclusion debate was finally triggered by a controversial bill, which was supported by a preeminent politician of the Gilded Age, James G. Blaine. In fact, both Democrats and Republicans approved clear-cut anti-Chinese planks at each of their 1876 national conventions to court the pivotal support from western states. Congressional members, however, had not faced the moment of casting votes on the issue of Chinese exclusion until 1879.

The Fifteen Passenger Bill, as it was popularly called, was designed to block any vessels carrying more than fifteen Chinese passengers. It was resolutely supported by front-runner for presidential candidate James G. Blaine and forced members of Congress to reveal their true preferences.[30] Although he used to be a "fierce Lincoln partisan

[28] Bensel (2000, 151), by contrast, suggests that anti-Chinese sentiment outside the West was "much more subdued." He provides an example of the joint resolution passed in the same year of 1879 by Connecticut General Assembly "Resolved, by this General Assembly, that the proposed law now pending in the Congress of the United States, restricting Chinese immigration, is a flagrant violation of a sacred and honorable treaty, and is wholly inconsistent with the principles and traditions of our republic, and with the broad principles of human freedom; and it is our earnest hope that its provisions may not disgrace our statutes."

[29] In terms of regional alliance during the 1890s over American foreign policies such as tariffs and naval expansion, Trubowitz (1998) elaborated on how the northern politicians successfully engaged the western members of Congress to form a West-North coalition with the South largely excluded.

[30] Alexander Saxton (1971), in his seminal work on labor and anti-Chinese movement in California, concurred with E.C. Sandmeyer (1939) that the year of 1879 was a turning point in federal effort to exclude Chinese immigrants (Gyory 1998, 168).

during the war and an early advocate of black suffrage and Radical Reconstruction," James Blaine was to become the nation's foremost opponent of Chinese labor, vehemently calling for the exclusion of Chinese from the labor force (Gyory 1998, 137).

For Democrats the anti-Chinese movement of the late 1870s was a unifying issue. Contending factions of the California Democratic Party stopped infighting under the banner of the anti-Chinese cause. The national Democratic Party also easily sustained their traditional welcoming of European immigrants with an intense hostility against racial minorities (Tichenor 2002). Particularly when the Workingmen's Party rapidly disappeared after the 1879 elections, the Democratic Party absorbed most Workingmen and Irish members to form a stronghold for a national anti-Chinese movement.

As a consequence, House Democrats, as the majority party, endorsed the Fifteen Passenger Bill overwhelmingly: 104 to 17, with 33 not voting.[31] Later, on February 15, 1879, Democratic senators also supported the bill by 22-9, with 5 not voting. Saxton (1971, 68), in his classic piece of Chinese problem in California, clarifies the advantage of Chinese exclusion for the Democratic Party:

> "What was then wanted was a set of new, or at least different, issues so that Democratic keynoters could say something other than 'me too'… In the hour of need party leaders were scanning the horizon; and there they noted, among other developments, two of outstanding interest. The first was the emergence of a crop of labor unions reassuringly similar to the old locofoco variety; the second was something new − an organizational type apparently unique to the Pacific slope − the anticoolie club. Signals were exchanged and it presently appeared that each of these three − the party, the unions, and the anticoolie clubs − required assistance from the others. However different their goals might be, they shared the same enemies."

[31] The New York Times claimed that "the Democratic House is entitled to the credit of passing the bill." (Gyory 1998, 140)

On the contrary, the Republican Party, as the party of Lincoln and equal civil rights, struggled to speak with a single voice over Chinese exclusion. Even earlier during the 1876 national convention, radical New England Republicans and California delegates clashed with each other over whether to endorse an anti-Chinese plank. In congressional debates, radical Republicans such as Senators George Frisbie Hoar (R-MA), Hannibal Hamlin (R-ME), and Henry L. Dawes (R-MA) stood up against the Fifteen Passenger Bill and invoked the nation's heritage of free immigration and equal civil rights (Gyory 1998). Gyory (1998, 230) succinctly summarized the dilemma facing Republican senators.

> "Most Republican senators from the Northeast and Midwest found themselves in a quandary, trying to reconcile the glowing ideals of the Civil War with the grimy problems of the Gilded Age."

Most of GOP senators were also opposed to the bill, but they became increasingly less concerned about protecting Chinese immigration than about protecting the lucrative Chinese market and violating the Burlingame Treaty as a national honor. After rejecting the Conkling amendments supportive of diplomacy for revising the Burlingame Treaty, the Senate passed the Fifteen Passenger Bill, with 46.2 percent of Republican senators opposed.[32] On March 1, 1879, President Rutherford B. Hayes, however, vetoed the bill with his veto message addressing unconstitutional abrogation of the Burlingame Treaty and the risks of merchants and missionaries (Gyory 1998).

[32] Senator Roscoe Conkling (R-N.Y.), an influential Stalwart Republican, suggested that "If by the end of the year China refused to revise the treaty's immigration clause, the United States would then consider that clause of the treaty void and proceed to pass laws to regulate or prevent the immigration or importation of Chinese subjects." *CR*, 45th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1305, 1307 (Feb 14, 1879).

In the next year, pressed by both parties, President Hayes sent James B. Angell, president of the University of Michigan, to China to negotiate a new treaty. With China having largely conceded to the demands from the United States, the Angell Treaty of 1880 marked a legal turning point for restricting Chinese immigrants, and paved the way for the Chinese exclusion bill in 1882.[33] With respect to the domestic political landscape, as already evidenced by the 1876 presidential election results with only 2.4 percent margin of victory for Hayes against Tilden, the West was again going to be key battle grounds for the upcoming 1880 presidential election in the post-Reconstruction era. And, for those pivotal and swing western states, Chinese exclusion was one of the most salient issues at stake (Tichenor 2002).

Through one of the most competitive national elections in 1880, the Republican Party won the presidency and took the control of both the House and the Senate. As soon as the 47th Congress opened the first session, Senator John F. Miller and Representative Horace F. Page, both Californian Republicans, introduced similar bills in both chambers to restrict Chinese immigrants.[34] Debates began on February 28, 1882, and Senator Miller sparred with Republican Senator Hoar of Massachusetts. Senator Miller, echoing Blaine and western members of Congress, stressed the positive impacts of Chinese

[33] According to Gyory (1998), China during this period was concerned about a possible Russian attack, the threat of war with Japan, and unreliable British support. As a result, the Chinese hoped to engage United States to protect the country.

[34] Having survived one of the narrowest presidential competitions in history, James A. Garfield was assassinated in 1881. Then, Chester A. Arthur, a long-time ally with New York Stalwart Senator Roscoe Conkling, took the oath of office as president of the United States, but his position on Chinese exclusion was not clearly known yet.

exclusion on the American laborer. Senator Hoar, on the contrary, was still committed to the ideals of civil rights and racial equality.[35]

When almost twenty senators jumped into the debate, most sided with the exclusion argument. Finally on March 9, 1982, the Senate approved the Chinese Exclusion Act, by 32 to 15, as "the first ever law passed by the United States barring any group of people from American shores purely because of race or nationality" (Gyory 1998, 254). All western senators regardless of their party labels supported the exclusion bill, and Senator Brown of Georgia was the only Democrat who cast nay vote. Fourteen of the fifteen negative votes came from the Republican Party, with the GOP again divided, as eight GOP senators supported Chinese exclusion, fourteen opposed, and fifteen did not vote.[36]

On April 4, President Chester Arthur sent his veto message to the Senate, but his main point was that "good faith requires us to suspend the immigration of Chinese laborers for a less period than 20 years."[37] Then, within two weeks of the veto, on April 17, a leading anti-Chinese Congressman Horace F. Page from San Francisco readily introduced a revised bill, which reduced the exclusion period from twenty years to ten. In overriding presidential veto, thirty five House members and six senators switched their

[35] For detailed illustration of senators' debates, Gyory (1998, 223-235) provides an excellent review.
[36] The House showed a similar pattern of voting records over the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act on March 23, 1882, with 169 yea votes, 69 nay votes, and 55 not voting. As for the GOP, the vote was 58-65 split, and 24 no votes. Democrats, on the contrary, were strongly united by 99-4, with 30 not voting.
[37] *The New York Times,* April 5, 1882. "The Chinese Bill Vetoed: Pacific Slope Congressmen Disappointed." Pg.1.

positions from either pro-China or no-vote to anti-Chinese. President Arthur signed the Chinese Exclusion Act on May 6, 1882.

With the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, as Tichenor (2002) shows, the number of Chinese immigrants decreased dramatically. Consequently, Republican members of Congress became quite less split over whether to extend the exclusion act for another ten years. Both in 1892 and 1902, when the bipartisan majority easily endorsed the extension of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the GOP legislators increasingly sided with the Democrats in support of Chinese exclusion. In 1902, for example, Republican senators supported the permanent extension of Chinese exclusion by 49-1, with 5 no voting.

In 1924 at the climax of anti-immigration sentiment, bipartisan majority in Congress passed the National Origin Act, a law that severely restricted immigration by establishing a system of national quotas to discriminate against immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, and to virtually exclude all Asians.[38] Figure 1 and 2 present sectional and partisan differences in the House and the Senate over mean proportion of anti-Chinese votes from 1879 to 1924.

Meanwhile, Congress repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1943 when China emerged as a key war-time ally during the World War II. President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Congress to repeal Chinese exclusion laws as a means of securing Chinese support in the war against Axis aggression. The repeal of Chinese Exclusion Act

[38] This 1924 quota system placed in the National Origins Act of 1924 stayed in effect until 1965, when the Immigration and Naturalization Services Act of 1965 (also known as the Hart-Celler Act or the INS Act of 1965) abolished the national-origin quotas.

of 1882, however, only meant putting Chinese under the same immigrant quota regulations of the 1924 Act that would allow an immigration of about 100 Chinese a year.

> "Nations like individuals make mistakes. We must be big enough to acknowledge our mistakes of the past and to correct them. By the repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws, we can correct a historic mistake and silence the distorted Japanese propaganda."[39]

II. The Partisan Politics of the Chinese Exclusion, 1879-1882

This chapter addresses two interrelated questions. First, who was for and who was against the Chinese exclusion bills? Second, who switched his positions over a series of anti-Chinese legislation? The Republicans in the House and Senate shifted their position from pro- to anti-Chinese over the period of 1879-1924. Democratic members of Congress were consistently opposed to Chinese laborers over the same period of time. Figures 2.1 through 2.4 capture the breakdown of partisan voting records over key anti-coolie bills in both chambers.

Hypothesis Derivation

Constituency Interests Hypothesis:

> *a. Members of Congress coming from manufacturing or agricultural districts are less likely to be opposed to Chinese laborers.*
>
> *b. MCs from a district with heavy population density are more likely to be opposed to foreign laborers including Chinese.*

[39] *The New York Times*, October 12, 1943. "President Urges Congress to Repeal Chinese Exclusion Act as War Aid."

c. MCs from a district dominated by foreign-born population are more likely to be sympathetic with Chinese workers and less likely to support Chinese exclusion.

The Constituency Interests Hypothesis examines whether districts' economic interests and demographic nature led representatives to support or oppose the immigration of cheap Chinese workers. First, agriculture-dominant districts and farmers might be expected to favor the continuing influx of coolie laborers. Particularly in rural areas, there was a shortage of low-cost labor and Chinese immigrant workers were generally welcomed. Higham (1955, 107), in his path-breaking study of the nativism of the Gilded Age, points out that "in California, agriculture expanded so swiftly that farmers short of hired hands even demanded a relaxation of the Chinese exclusion law."

Second, congressional members representing districts with active manufacturing activities might also be expected to vote pro-Chinese. President Arthur in his veto message confirmed that "experience has shown that the trade of the East is the key to national wealth and influence."[40] A number of Republicans sided with merchant or commercial interests, which favored increased trade with China and feared retaliation by the Middle Kingdom if the exclusion measure was approved by Congress. Of course, what was true of business was not always true of labor. In urban areas such as San Francisco, many white laborers viewed Chinese immigrants as a threat to their job security and pressed their congressional members to favor exclusion.

On the demographic side, congressional members from districts with a high population density would likely oppose any further arrival of foreign laborers including

[40] *The New York Times*. April 5. 1882. "The Chinese Bill Vetoed." pg.1.

Chinese. By contrast, legislators representing districts with many foreign-born constituents should be less antagonistic toward Chinese laborers.[41]

Vulnerable Member and Old Guard Hypothesis:

> *a. Congressional members coming from highly competitive districts are more likely to oppose Chinese laborers.*
>
> *b. Congressional members who served longer in Congress are less likely to be supportive of Chinese exclusion.*

Applying the "marginality hypothesis" (Downs 1957, Miller and Stokes 1963, Fiorina 1973, 1974, Bartels 1991) to the case of Chinese exclusion, I assume that legislators elected by narrow margins paid closer attention to the prevailing anti-Chinese mood among the electorate, as evidenced by immigration historians (Sandmeyer 1939, Saxton 1971, Mink 1986, Cohn and Gee 2003). One exception though are congressional members from competitive but pro-China labor districts. They are more likely to favor Chinese immigrant workers. I employ an interactive term for these cases.

Senior members of Congress, or the "Old Guard," are also likely to be more sympathetic to the rights of Chinese immigrant workers. Junior members were more likely to face stiff party competition in the post-Reconstruction period, and thus more likely to be sensitive to anti-Chinese sentiment. Legislators who had spent a longer time in Congress had less electoral incentive to oppose Chinese laborers.[42] The case of

[41] For these economic and demographic data in the post-Reconstruction era, I used a historical data set compiled by Parsons, Beach, and Dubin (1990) (Jenkins, Schickler, and Carson 2004).

[42] Obviously, there were some politicians who drastically changed their position over their career in Congress. For example, Senator Aaron A. Sargent of California, elected to the House in 1861

Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts and his attempt to delete the word "white" from the naturalization clause of the Immigration Act is one example. Research by Saxton (1971, 36) shows:

> "Charles Sumner of Massachusetts had moved to amend the naturalization clause of the Immigration Act by deleting the adjective 'white' wherever it occurred. Western senators, Republicans and Democrats united, led the counterattack. The climax came on July 4, 1870, when Sumner, taking advantage of the date, read into the record the mandate of the Declaration. His opponents remained unmoved. In the Republican Senate of 1870 Sumner was defeated 30 to 14."

Partisanship and Sectionalism Hypothesis:

> *a. Democratic members of Congress are more likely than Republicans to be supportive of Chinese exclusion.*
>
> *b. Legislators from the Northeast are more likely than other regional members to be opposed to the ban of Chinese immigrant workers.*

Gyory (1998, 15) claims that "politicians --- not California, not workers, and not national racist imagery --- ultimately supplied the agency for Chinese exclusion." According to Gyory, without considering a dynamic presidential election in the Gilded Age, any efforts to understand why Congress passed the Chinese exclusion legislation must be incomplete and misleading.[43] Tichenor (2002) also focused on electoral competition and partisan rivalry as a pivotal factor that forced congressional members to endorse the Chinese exclusion movement. When western states held the decisive vote for

---

and to the Senate in 1873, was a Radical Republican calling for equal civil rights and woman suffrage until he abandoned his humanist view of equality and became a the leading anti-Chinese crusader in Congress.

[43] Gyory (1998, 15) declares that "[t]he single most important force behind the Chinese Exclusion Act was national politicians of both parties who seized, transformed, and manipulated the issue of Chinese immigration in the quest for votes."

winning the White House, politicians at the national party level positioned themselves to win the votes of the white workers in the West.[44]

The Democratic Party, once the party of slavery, favored Chinese exclusion. Democrats' support of Chinese exclusion stemmed not only from their traditional dislike of foreign and minority workers, but also pressure in the post-Reconstruction era to expand the party's electoral base outside the South. Anti-Chinese sloganeering was a perfect tool for the Democratic Party to appeal to white workers outside the South.

The same could not be said of the Republicans. The GOP was largely split over the issue of Chinese laborers. While still waving the bloody shirt as an electoral strategy in the North, the Republican Party also needed to check Democratic advances in the West. The Northeast, the home of radical Republicans who still espoused the ideals of civil rights, still remained the party's stronghold. Meanwhile, business-oriented interests in the Northeast, which sought greater access to the China market, gave Republicans yet another reason to oppose the exclusion policy.[45] For these reasons, legislators from the Northeastern districts should be less hostile toward Chinese workers.

Position-Taking Strategy Hypothesis:

> *In legislative processes surrounding a presidential veto, Republican members of Congress are more likely than Democrats to shift their voting decisions over the Chinese exclusion.*

---

[44] Scott C. James' book *Presidents, Parties, and the State: A Party System Perspective on Democratic Regulatory Choice, 1884*-1936 provides an insightful research of how the party leadership and rank-and-file members interact to retain the "presidency as a much-desired party source" (2000, 267).

[45] For a detailed account of sectionalism and political economy of the Gilded Age, see Bensel (2000).

Recent path-breaking studies of veto bargaining have advanced our understanding of how the executive and legislative branches interact with each other in separation-of-powers systems (Krehbiel 1998, Cameron 2000). Krehbiel's examination of attraction-retention rates analyzes presidential "power to persuade" in the politics of veto and veto overriding. Cameron calls for a rational-choice based presidential studies and applies his "sequential veto bargaining model" to process of veto and veto threat. My focus is on how members of Congress respond with presidential veto or veto threat highly expected. Not necessarily changing policy preferences, I argue, count on presidential veto politics to advance their own position-taking strategies. In the context of Chinese exclusion during the post-Civil War era, some members of Congress used presidential veto for both scoring political points and securing policy changes.

While Mink (1986, 106) suggested that "the presidential veto confirmed Chinese exclusion as a Democratic issue," cross-pressured GOP members still need to persuade their constituents to accept anti-Chinese mood in California. Those Republicans members are hypothesized to have cast initial no votes to the Chinese exclusion bill. Then, After President Arthur's veto message revealed his main problem with the 20-year provision, and congressional anti-Chinese crusaders proposed a revised bill for 10-year exclusion, a large number of initial pro-Chinese legislators shifted to the position of "Chinese must go."

III. Results

To determine what affected members' voting decisions over the Fifteen Passenger bill in 1879, I simultaneously test the hypotheses using logistic regression. The binary dependent variable is whether a congressional member voted for the Fifteen Passenger Bill or not. As Table 2.2 shows, party and section variable perform well. Democratic Party membership significantly affected legislators' anti-Chinese voting decisions. When other variables are set to their mean values, a Democratic member of Congress chances of voting anti-Chinese increase by 27 percent.

By contrast, congressional members from the Northeast largely voted against the Fifteen Passenger bill in 1879. The predicted probability of a legislator from the Northeast voting anti-Chinese is 36 percent lower than a member from other parts of America. Other economic and demographic variables show insignificant influence on legislators' voting choices over the issue of banning a vessel with more than fifteen Chinese laborers.

Table 2.3 compares and contrasts members' voting behavior before and after President Arthur's veto of the Chinese Exclusion legislation in 1882. With a veto somewhat expected, President Arthur pointed out that "his main criticism was length of exclusion, not exclusion itself" (Gyory 1998, 244). In this stage of voting, members of Congress had taken their positions largely in accordance with their constituency interests. Both manufacturing and agricultural districts exerted significant influence over their representatives in voting against Chinese exclusion for the next twenty years. Also, as

expected, Democrats voted for the exclusion of Chinese workers, while the Northeastern legislators acted together as a pro-Chinese voting bloc in Congress.

After President Arthur delivered his veto message to the Senate, legislators' voting behavior changed as they attempted to override Arthur's veto with a revised bill. When anti-Chinese congressional crusader Representative Page proposed a revised version with a 10-year exclusion, the party variable was the only explanatory one that mattered in predicting voting decisions in Congress. Regardless of whether lawmakers came from the Northeast or from manufacturing and farm districts, party line voting prevailed. In addition, when the party variable was replaced with an ideological position (DW-NOMINATE Score), it turned out that ideology became an even better indicator for predicting members' veto overriding decisions. The bottom line is, in overriding presidential veto, the Democratic and the Republican Party formed a bipartisan coalition and pushed for the Chinese Exclusion for the next 10 years.

Another test of vote switching confirmed that it was Republican members who changed their voting decisions before and after President Arthur's veto. The dichotomous dependent variable is 1 for vote switching into anti-Chinese, and 0 for otherwise. The result shown in Table 2.4 indicates that the GOP members collectively changed their positions in the process of veto overriding. More specifically, of 147 Republicans, 36 members (24.5 percent) shifted their positions into anti-Chinese. And, 27 of those 36 position-switching members (75 percent) came from Mid-West and Mid-Atlantic areas such as Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York. By contrast, only 14 percent of all Democratic members switched their voting decisions to ban Chinese laborers.

IV. Discussion

Political parties provide their congressional members with diverse electoral and institutional advantages. Among those benefits is an informative value of the party label, which presents voting cues to the electorate. A party label, like a brand name in a consumer market, represents a common set of a party's policy choices (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, Cox and McCubbins 1993). Although a number of behavioral research find voters poorly informed about politics, the electorate often uses partisan brand names as heuristics in judging party performance in Congress. As a consequence, members of Congress try to construct a favorable party label or image through credible policymaking in the legislature.

Building a reliable party position creates a collective action problem for party members (Olson 1965). Sinclair (1999, 423) points out that "lawmaking is a complex and time-consuming enterprise and one that, if successful, produces a collective good." Once passed, legislation does not necessarily exclude free-riding party members from the electoral benefit. Cox and McCubbins (1993, 123) also write that "the party's reputation, based on its records (p), is a public good for all legislators in the party." Once Congress approves the legislation, all party members, regardless of their contributions to lawmaking, enjoy the benefits the party derives from legislative success. Thus, members of Congress often want to ride free in complex lawmaking processes of a party's position-making.

For election campaigns, members of Congress face another dilemma. Incumbent members are "running scared" for re-election (Jacobson 1987), anticipating the electoral

fallout from their legislative behavior and record. They are worried that "wrong" votes in Congress might come back to haunt them in campaigns.[46] The potential for roll-call voting decisions to broaden into a campaign controversy creates a tricky political calculus for those cross-pressured legislators. Indeed, changing constituency preferences sometimes conflict with unchanging party positions.

As a result, the incumbent party members calculate the costs and benefits of their vote choices, weighing constituency interests and party positions. What is critical here is the fact that party members face different kinds of pressures, and derive different benefits, from their constituency and from party membership. Consequently, some members stick by their party's position while others break with their party leadership.

Because party members do not want to completely destroy the electoral value of their party, however, "sticking-or-breaking" decisions (Fenno 1978) lead legislators to behave strategically. Party members who defect diminish party unity. Damaged harmony inside the party hurts the image and credibility outside the party. Under these circumstances, I argue that party ranks-and-file members devise a "neither-confirm-nor-deny" strategy.[47] Some party members neither completely confirm their defection from

[46] Mayhew (1974, 62) also points out that "the electoral requirement is not that he make pleasing things happen but that he make pleasing judgmental statements." In addition, Jones (2003, 853), analyzing position-avoidance by senators, reiterates this point by saying that "according to Mayhew, whatever the form of position taking (speeches, letters, newsletters, interviews, press releases, roll-call votes), the electorally significant aspect is how pleasing the position is to one's constituents, not any particular legislative outcome. Where governmental responsibility for outcomes is widely diffused as in the U.S., it is only natural for constituents to base their judgments largely on positions as opposed to outcomes."

[47] Top government officials often use the phrase of "neither-confirm-nor-deny," when they do not want to reveal their possession of, saying, a nuclear weapon. In essence, given the status-quo coalition still dominant in Congress, the significance of the position-taking voting and coalition-building is as much political as it is legislative.

the party nor deny their disaffection from the party. Cross-pressured party members rely on position-taking strategy, an effort to satisfy both the constituency and the party altogether.

As in the case of congressional endorsement of the Chinese exclusion in 1882, some Republican members cast position-taking votes to confirm their alliance with constituents, before they follow the party position.[48] Then, for the passage of a final bill, a large number of cross-pressured ranks ultimately coordinate with their party position. What they intend to achieve is to hold onto the benefit of being a party member without necessarily distancing themselves from the constituency position. Given that one can find a strong party influence in the House on final passage voting, the party ranks-and-file members make the best use of the intermediate and procedural votes for getting their voting records right.

In the long-term, position-taking strategy by legislators often facilitates a party's position switch. Indeed, essential to legislators' courtship of the constituency is their roll-call voting records. Party members' cumulative position-taking votes ultimately pave the way for policy change in Congress. Once the Chinese Exclusion Act passed in 1882, the Republican members, having been busy with position-taking strategies, gradually shifted their positions towards anti-Chinese. In the end, in the passage of the National Origin Act of 1924, as a climax movement against immigrant workers, the GOP members

[48] Through the process of position taking in American politics, the so-called "ends-against-the-middle" coalition often occurs. Extreme conservatives and staunch liberals sometimes join together, for different political reasons, to take positions against the status quo supported by moderate and median party members. For the examples of the ends-against-the-middle-coalition, see Campbell (1982), Poole and Rosenthal (1997), and Nokken (2003)

outvoted the Democrats in their opposition to foreign laborers in the middle of hard economic times.

Table 2.1 Party Platforms on Chinese Immigrants, Selective Planks from 1872 to 1884

Year	The Republican Party	The Democratic Party
1872 Convention	We recognize all men before the law, and hold that it is duty of Government in its dealings with the people to meet out equal and exact justice to all of whatever nativity, race, color, or persuasion, religious or political.	Complete liberty and exact equality in the enjoyment of all civil, political, and public rights should be established and effectually maintained throughout the Union, by efficient and appropriate State and Federal legislation. Neither the law nor its administration should admit any discrimination in respect of citizens by reason of race, creed, color, or previous condition of servitude.
1876 Convention	It is the immediate duty of congress fully to investigate the effects of the immigration and importation of Mongolians on the moral and material interests of the country.	We denounce the policy which thus discards the liberty-loving German and tolerates the revival of the coolie-trade in Mongolian women for immoral purposes, and Mongolian men held to perform servile labor contracts, and demand such modification of the treaty with the Chinese Empire, or such legislation within constitutional limitations, as shall prevent further importation or immigration of the Mongolian race.
1880 Convention	The Republican Party, regarding the unrestricted immigration of the Chinese as a matter of grave concernment … would limit and restrict that immigration by the enactment of such just, humane and reasonable laws and treaties as will produce that result.	No more Chinese immigration, except for travel, education, and foreign commerce, and that even carefully guarded.
1884 Convention	We denounce the importation of contract labor, whether from Europe or Asia, as an offense against the spirit of American institutions; and we pledge ourselves to sustain the present law restricting Chinese immigration, and to provide such further legislation as is necessary to carry out its purposes.	We do not sanction the importation of foreign labor, or the admission of servile races, unfitted by habits, training, religion, or kindred, for absorption into the great body of our people, or for the citizenship which our laws confer. American civilization demands that against the immigration or importation of Mongolians to these shores our gates be closed.

Source: *National Party Conventions, 1831-1996*. (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly)

Figure 2.1. Partisan Anti-Chinese Votes in the House over Key Legislations from 1879 to 1924



Figure 2.2. Sectional Anti-Chinese Votes in the House over Key Legislations from 1879 to 1924



Figure 2.3 Partisan Anti-Chinese Votes in the Senate over Key Legislations from 1879 to 1924



Figure 2.4 Sectional Anti-Chinese Votes in the Senate over Key Legislations from 1879 to 1924



Table 2.2 Logit Analysis of the House Roll-Call Votes for the Fifteen Passenger Bill in 1879

Variables	**Support of the Fifteen Passenger Bill in 1879**
Vote margin	-0.007 (.008)
Years in Congress	0.017 (0.027)
Democratic Party	1.076 (0.297) ***
	(+27%)
New England	-1.453 (0.632) **
	(- 36%)
Population per mile	0.000 (0.000)
Foreign-born	-0.011 (0.015)
Manufacturing output	0.000 (0.000)
Wheat output	-0.000 (0.000)
constant	-0.126 (0.349)
Log-Likelihood	-169.27
Correctly predicted	67.04 %
Psedu-R^2	0.09
N	270

(1) *** significant at 0.01; ** significant at 0.05; * significant at 0.1
(2) Dependent variable is the legislator's position on the Fifteen Passenger Bill in 1879:
1 = support (meaning anti-Chinese), 0 = otherwise
(3) +27% and -36 % are changes in probability calculated by marginal effects.

Table 2.3 Probit Analysis of the House Votes on the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882: Before and After Presidential Veto

Variables	**Before Presidential Veto (20-year exclusion)**	**After Presidential Veto (10-year exclusion)**
Vote margin	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)
Years in Congress	0.007 (0.016)	0.004 (0.017)
Democratic Party	0.634 (0.182) ***	0.353 (0.188) *
New England	-1.068 (0.387) ***	-0.464 (0.326)
Population per mile	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Foreign-born	0.011 (0.009)	0.000 (0.009)
Manufacturing output	-0.000 (0.000) *	-0.000 (0.000)
Wheat output	-0.000 (0.000) **	-0.000 (0.000)
constant	0.254 (0.218)	0.610 (0.220)
Log-Likelihood	-161.53	-157.67
Correctly predicted	65.9%	70.7%
Psedu-R^2	0.13	0.04
N	270	270

(4) *** significant at 0.01; ** significant at 0.05; * significant at 0.1
(5) Dependent variable is the legislator's position on the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882: 1 = support (meaning anti-Chinese) and 0 = otherwise

Table 2.4 Logit Analysis of Vote Switching: From No Exclusion to Exclusion for Overriding Veto

Variables	**From No Exclusion to Exclusion:** ***Overriding Veto***
Vote margin	0.002 (0.009)
Years in Congress	-0.026 (0.036)
Republican Party	0.671 (0.358) *
New England	0.216 (0.569)
Population per mile	-0.000 (0.000)
Foreign-born	-0.014 (0.018)
Manufacturing output	0.000 (0.000)
Wheat output	-0.000 (0.000)
Constant	-1.640 (0.397)
Log-Likelihood	-132.20
Correctly predicted	80.0%
Psedu-R^2	0.03
N	270

(6) *** significant at 0.01; ** significant at 0.05; * significant at 0.1
(7) Dependent variable is the legislator's vote switching from no exclusion to exclusion:
1 = vote switching into exclusion and 0 = otherwise

Figure 2.5 Vote-Switching Members in Veto Overriding: *Where did they come from?*



Chapter Three: From "guns-*and*-butter" To "guns-*or*-butter":
Partisan Politics of Defense Spending in the post-Vietnam War

> *"I believe we can do both. We are a country which was built by pioneers who had a rifle in one hand and an ax in the other. We are a nation with the highest GNP, the highest wages, and the most people at work. We can do both. And as long as I am president, we will do both."*
>
> Lyndon B. Johnson
> *The State of the Union Address of 1966*

> *"Too much that is now spent on defense not only adds nothing to our strength but makes us less secure by stimulating other countries to respond."*
>
> The Democratic Party Platform of 1972

Bipartisanship has been vital for the making of national security policy in America. In the early post-World War II period, both parties reached consensus on the "Cold War internationalism" (Gaddis 1982, Holsti and Rosenau 1984, Lindsay 1991, Trubowitz 1998, Fordham 1998, Friedberg 2000). Congressional members agreed to support containment policy against the communist countries and pursue engagement policy towards new democracies. Indeed, the American security policymaking process came to be portrayed as the politics that stopped at the water's edge.[49]

[49] In the middle of the World War I, President Wilson also declared that "politics is adjourned," but both parties continued their partisan warfare and the Republicans kept attacking Wilson for his war tactics and domestic policy issues. On the other hand, at the start of the Cold War, Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, the Republican leader on foreign policy issues, asserted that "politics should stop at the water's edge" and constructed bipartisan Cold War foreign policies with the Truman administration (Gould 2003).

To achieve bipartisan consensus on national security often means that political parties need to adapt to new policy choices. In the midst of creating the so-called "Cold War Consensus," Republicans discarded their traditional isolationism. Democrats also abandoned their long-established anti-statism (Frye 1975, Hogan 1998). Only after both parties shifted their previous policy stance were they able to endorse the idea of congressional deference. That is, members of Congress would delegate powers and defer to the executive branch and the nation's senior military leadership for the matter of national security.

In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, this "Cold War liberalism" collapsed (Gaddis 1982, Rohde 1991, Johnson 2006).[50] The lengthy and disastrous war in Southeast Asia led a significant number of legislators to abandon their pro-defense positions. With the American public increasingly hostile to the war, the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) appropriation bills became a major source of national controversy. The ABM debate in Congress was described as "the only occasion since the World War II on which a substantial part of the public and their representatives in Congress questioned the wisdom of the Defense Department on a major weapons issue."[51] Bernstein and Anthony

[50] The Cold War liberalism endorsed a policy position of guns-and-butter as attainable together. President Johnson and congressional Democrats waged the two-front wars, one against Vietnam and the other against poverty at home (Milkis and Nelson 1999). Liberal Democrats faithful to the "Great Society" programs, however, came to discern a tradeoff between defense expenditures and welfare spending. As a result, liberal members of Congress since the early 1970s have essentially came to support the increase in welfare spending and the reduction of defense budget.
[51] *Congress and the Nation*, Vol.II (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1969), p.869.

(1974, 1198) claimed that "the ABM issue caused more extensive debate in the Senate than did any other national security issue since 1945."[52]

Many congressional members broke with their party positions on AMB spending. Although the Nixon administration decided to continue the research for and procurement of anti-ballistic missiles, vote switching by members of Congress signified the nation's search for the balance between guns and butter.[53] In the 91st Congress (1969-1970), many House members disavowed their previous pro-ABM positions. They changed into a formidable anti-ABM voting bloc. More specifically, 53 continuing members of the House-- 10 Republicans and 43 Democrats -- switched from the pro-ABM position to the anti-ABM position over a period of just one year (1968 to 1969).

Many political scientists and historians have explored how congressional members addressed this symbolic ABM controversy (Jeffers 1970, Frye 1975, Lindsay 1990, Johnson 2006). Mayhew (1974, 67) identified the ABM vote as a rare "showdown

---

[52] As initially designed by the Johnson Administration, the ABM system was supposed to protect urban areas in America from a possible Soviet anti-ballistic missile attack (Halperin 1972). The cost of the ABM system proposed by Johnson Administration was around $4-6 billion. Figures for a full-scale Russia-oriented system were put at $20-60 billion. On March 1969, a newly elected President Nixon announced a proposal for a "substantially modified" version of Johnson's Sentinel antiballistic missile (ABM) system (Jeffers 1970).[52] The opponents of the Pentagon and defense spending "made the ABM the symbol of opposition because it was deemed the most visible and vulnerable of defense programs."[52] The ABM controversy persisted until the ABM Treaty was signed on May 1972 by the United States and the Soviet Union to limit the ABM programs.

[53] In economics, the guns-or-butter model is a classic example of production possibility curve, in which government has to choose between two spending options; military spending versus social welfare. Although the origin of the phrase is not clear, according to the Columbia World of Quotations (Columbia University Press, 1996), in 1936, Hermann Goering of Nazi Germany mentioned that "Guns will make us powerful; butter will only make us fat." One recent biography of Lyndon B. Johnson by Irving Bernstein (1996) is also titled *Guns or Butter: The Presidency of Lyndon Johnson.* For this chapter, as widely used, "guns-and-butter" generally means a policy position viewing military budget and domestic spending not necessarily incompatible, whereas "guns-or-butter" denotes a trade-off relationship.

vote" in the Senate where single roll calls achieved a high salience among the public generally. Jeffers (1970) provided for detailed reports about the ABM debates in the Senate from President Nixon's announcement of his Safeguard ABM proposal through the 51-49 defeat of the Cooper-Hart amendment to ban ABM deployment on August 6, 1969. Frye (1975) pointed out that Congress took a major step toward a revitalized role in national security policymaking. Johnson (2006) focused on Senator Stuart Symington, a Democratic Senator from Missouri and explained how the pro-defense senator switched his position and became a leading opponent of the ABM systems.

This dissertation focuses on the House of Representatives and its members. In postwar politics, House members have been reported to be more hawkish than senators and more willing than senators to support the president's foreign policy and defense spending initiatives. The House members are allegedly more partisan and more vulnerable to constituency pressures than senators. Johnson (2006, 206) further comments that the congressional reforms of the 1970s made House members more active on the issue of foreign policy.

> "Meanwhile, the Watergate class pushed through a variety of reforms in the House, making it easier for individual members to bypass conservative committee chairs and influence foreign policy through action on the floor. A weakened Foreign Relations Committee and a House that allowed more individual initiative to affect policy set the stage for the lower chamber to emerge as the more powerful branch on international matters − a dramatic shift from the Cold War norm, and one that ultimately weakened the legislature's ability to influence foreign policy."

My analysis of House members' legislative choices reveals that there was no drastic ideological shift among incumbent members of Congress over the issue of national security. Instead, the blend of constituency cleavages and procedural incentives

allowed northern Democrats to break with their party. My principal claim is that greater anti-war sentiments among voters, combined with procedural reforms in Congress, facilitated the members' position change. The party leadership was still indecisive and southern Democrats continued to dominate the party's defense and military positions. When the politics of military spending opened a window of opportunity for liberal reform agendas on the House floor, liberal Democrats strategically defected from their party's position on defense spending in the post-Vietnam War period.

The ABM debates constitute a good testing ground for the study of legislator vote switching, party position shifts, and policy change in Congress. This chapter proceeds as follows. Section I provides a historical overview of congressional debates over defense spending in the post-World War II era. Section II examines the ABM controversy in Congress, with a focus on members' position-taking votes and coalition-building efforts. Section III suggests explanations for legislator position changes and then presents a series of hypotheses addressing constituency, ideology, and party dimension. In the next two sections, I show the results of empirical tests and conclude the chapter by calling for more attention to intraparty and procedural politics in order to better understand legislators' national security decision-making in Congress.

I. The Congressional History of Defense Spending in the Postwar Era

Partisan politics have long been at the heart of national security debates in America.[54] During the Franklin Roosevelt administration, the rural-urban divide in the Northeast affected the reshaping of partisan coalitions over American foreign and military policy (Trubowitz 1998). As the urban Northeast gradually elected a greater number of Democrats to Congress, FDR successfully crafted a North-South coalition on free trade and neutrality issues. By the time when France was defeated by Nazi Germany in May 1940, partisan cleavage over defense expenditures had almost disappeared. Almost all of Democrats including southern members came to strongly support their president's initiatives on defense spending.

As World War II approached, the Republican Party generally followed the direction of the Democratic president. It is important to notice that this period marked a turning point for southern Democrats who had vehemently opposed an assertive American foreign policy and military preparedness and now completely shifted their positions towards internationalism and a strong military.[55] Until the late 1980s when the difference between the northern and southern Democrats almost disappeared (Rohde 1991, 1994), the solid support for defense spending by the southern members of the Democratic Party had played a critical role in both party leaders' strategic calculation

[54] I provide in the Appendix the detailed accounts of congressional history of defense spending from 1890 to the outbreak of the World War II.

[55] With respect to the foreign policy position held by southern Democrats, Sinclair (1982, p.48) made a distinction between national defense and foreign aid in explaining expansion of political agendas during 1937-1952. Southern Democrats, according to Sinclair, strongly supported national defense in a belief that the U.S. should pursue clear-cut victory in wars cold or hot, but opposed "giveaways" to frequently unreliable and undeserving countries.

about the impact of party unity and the divide on foreign policy agenda-setting and position-taking (Bond and Fleisher 1990, Coleman 1996).

After the end of the World War II, partisan politics once again engaged in the debate over the nation's postwar policy direction and adjustment (Snyder 1991). On one side were those who envisioned the United States as a great military and economic power and the champion of democracy against the Soviet Union. In the other camp were those who invoked an older political culture that was isolationist, antistatist, and antimilitarist (Hogan 1998, Fordham 1998). Conservative Republicans such as Senator Robert Taft of Ohio entered postwar politics during the Republican-dominant 80th Congress in 1947 determined to dismantle the New Deal and avoid the possible nightmare of a "garrison state" (Lasswell 1941).

The main Republican voice on foreign policy, however, was Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, who himself shifted from his earlier isolationist position to support of the internationalism of FDR and Truman. As a result, the Republican Party rarely spoke with a coherent voice when the Truman administration crafted the containment policy against the Soviet Union in 1946-47.[56] With the internationalist Dwight Eisenhower grasping the presidential nomination backed by New York governor Thomas Dewey in 1952 and defeating the isolationist Robert Taft, a decade and a half-

[56] Senator Vandenberg demonstrated significant Republican support for Truman's foreign policy of Soviet containment by helping to approve the Marshall Plan through a skeptical Congress (Rae 1998, p.51). In fact, Truman-Vandenberg bipartisan relationship over the post-World War II American foreign policymaking was a huge contrast to the case of Wilson-Lodge partisan and personal disagreement over the post-World War I American foreign policymaking.

long pattern of eastern Republicans thwarting the party's Midwestern base continued over the foreign policy area (Gould 2003).

With respect to the level of defense spending, however, Friedberg (2000) finds it remarkable how small American defense budgets were during the first fifteen years of the Cold War. Friedberg also noticed how quickly the forces opposing higher military expenditures had reasserted themselves after the Korean War. During the early Cold War, fiscal constraint such as a downward political pressure on taxation and a balanced budget was the single most important factor pushing the United States toward a strategy of minimum deterrence and massive atomic capability without relying on conventional military forces.

The relative unity of the Democratic Party and bipartisanship over Cold War internationalism had persisted through the Kennedy military-buildup and Johnson's two-front war against Vietnam and poverty (Bernstein 1996, Milkis and Nelson 1999, Destler 2001). Democrats were largely confident in both guns and butter in the course of the early Cold War. The 1968 election of Nixon as a conservative Republican president, however, severely damaged Democratic Party cohesion over the choice between defense expenditures (guns) and welfare spending (butter).

As Nicol C. Rae (1998) smartly notices, public perception of the Republicans as tough on foreign policy allowed Republican presidents to be far more flexible and innovative in international affairs than Democratic presidents during the Cold War. This paradox is well expressed in the observation that "only Nixon can go to China." In addition, despite his own détente policy towards China and the Soviet Union, Nixon

constantly proposed more defense spending than Congress wanted to approve. To some extent, Nixon's avoidance of defense spending cuts was an electoral strategy designed to court the votes of southern whites (Black and Black 1992, Stein 1994, Bensel 1984, Abramowitz 1994).

In the end, during the 91st Congress (1969- 1970), the Republican Party and the Democratic Party once again reshaped their positions on the level of military spending and the direction of American foreign policy (Trubowitz 1998). As Coleman (1996) correctly notices, defense appropriation was the policy issue over which Democrats were most intensely split and divided during the 1970s. Table 3.1 contrasts party platforms from 1896 to 1960 over the defense spending issue. In addition, Figure 3.1 and 3.2 show how different the two parties have been in terms of average party support for military spending from the 51st through to the 100th Congress.

II. The Congressional Debates over the ABM System, 1968-1972

On July 29, 1968, the House, by voice vote, passed and sent to the Senate the fiscal year 1969 military construction appropriation bill (HR 18785). Passage of the bill occurred after the House had rejected by a 37-106 standing vote an effort by liberal members of Congress to delete $263.3 million from the bill for deployment of the "thin" Sentinel ABM defense and had defeated by a 32-350 roll call a motion to recommit the measure.

Liberal members of the House argued that the deployment of the ABM would bring an unanticipated consequence because the Soviet Union would respond with an increase in more sophisticated weapons system. They were also concerned that the ABM deployment "might scuttle delicate disarmament talks between the United States and the Soviet Union and contribute to a new arms race escalation."[57] Despite these concerns by liberal members, the House rejected a recommittal motion sponsored by a Republican, Rep. Robert H. Michel from Illinois, on a roll-call vote of 32-350. Some liberal Democrats voted for Michel's motion to recommit the bill.

In 1969, the costly ABM system, combined with the disastrous policies of the Vietnam War, fueled public and congressional concerns about the nation's defense policy directions. In its special reports on defense spending, the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1969)* states that:

> "United States defense programs and policies in 1969 became the target of rare congressional and public skepticism and hostility. Defense plans were questioned in a flurry of congressional investigations, criticized by individual members of Congress, the public and the press and attacked with unusual boldness by disarmament and peace pressure groups… The defense debate of 1969 was a major departure from past congressional clashes over military policy."[58]

Voters and their representatives raised questions about whether it was still viable to sustain both New Deal welfare spending and a high-cost defense budget (Bernstein 1996). The Vietnam War and stagflation from the late 1960s through the 1970s made them suspect that guns and butter might no longer be compatible. Diplomatic historian Walter LaFeber (2005) summarizes that the Johnson Administration gambled that

[57] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, Aug 2, 1968. p.2021
[58] *Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1969*, Special Reports, "Defense Spending, Policies Criticized in Congress," p.1011-1032.

American society could endure a vast array of domestic reforms, while fighting an extended war against an untiring enemy, but Johnson ultimately lost the "life-or-death bet." Congressional debates on the ABM system were at the heart of the controversy over how to redefine national security policies in the post-Vietnam and the post-New Deal era at the same time.

In the 91st Congress (1969-1970), when liberal Democrats had a Republican president in the White House, the ABM debates set a new stage for substantial vote switching by congressional members. After a bitter three-day debate, on October 3, 1969, the House passed a $21.3 billion authorization bill for military hardware and research having repeatedly rejected attempts to cut up the bill.[59] A final but controversial action on the bill and the ABM system was a recommittal motion proposed by Rep. O'Konski (R-WI), which would have deleted funds for both procurement and research on the ABM.

The motion to recommit the bill to committee intended to delete $345.5 million for procurement and $400.9 million for research for the Safeguard ABM system. Opponents of the ABM claimed that O'Konski's motion to cut research funds did not properly represent the position of any opponent. Even Republican leader Gerald Ford virtually admitted that the intention behind the motion to recommit was to ensure a substantial vote in favor of the President's ABM program.[60]

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[59] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,* Oct 10, 1969. p.1951.

[60] Rep. Morris Udall, a liberal Democrat from Arizona's 2nd congressional district where five military installations were located and Nixon obtained 49.2 percentage of district votes vis-à-vis 41.5 percentage by Humphrey mentioned that

> "Mr. Chairman, I regret that the motion to recommit is framed to prevent any clear or undistorted registration of my position on ABM. I have publicly opposed deployment of a full or limited ABM system, but have publicly favored continued research and development of system components. I intend to vote for the motion to recommit and

Liberal Democrats unsuccessfully tried to block a vote on the recommittal motion, when the House (on a 223-141 roll-call) voted for a motion by L. Mendel Rivers. Representative Rivers, a South Carolina Democrat chairing the Armed Services Committee, ordered the previous question on the motion to recommit and thereby tried to cut off debates. Indeed, this vote was one of the fifteen key votes used by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) to measure member ideology and voting records. ADA suggests that to oppose the Rivers' motion had the effect of a 10 percent cut in the military procurement legislation.[61]

Some of the opponents of ABM said that they had not voted for the motion to recommit because it was too extreme and not representative of their positions. Representatives Bolling (D-MO), Dingell (D-MI), and Pike (D-NY), all strong opponents of the ABM system and a defense spending increase, voted nay to the O'Konski recommittal motion, taking positions that they would not necessarily oppose the research spending for the ABM. Conversely, liberal Democrats including Cohelan (D-CA), Eckhardt (D-TX), Fraser (D-MN), Moorhead (D-PA), Obey (D-WI), Stokes (D-OH), Vanik (D-OH), and Udall (D-AZ) voted for the recommittal motion to delete any government spending for the ABM. Table 3.2 shows the breakdown of three roll-call votes over the ABM system on October 3, 1969.

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make this statement so that my position will not be misunderstood. When the military appropriation comes before us, I shall vote, if given an opportunity, to appropriate research and development funds for ABM, but against funds for procurement." (*Congressional Record,* October 3, 1999, p.28487)

[61] The House also rejected the O'Konski motion on a 92-271 roll call vote.

From 1970 through 1972, the voting showdown continued when anti-ABM northern Democrats confronted pro-ABM southern Democrats along with Republicans. The ABM debates in 1970 were resolved with many standing votes, with not a single roll-call vote tallied over a number of amendments to reduce ABM spending. Charles Whalen of Ohio, one of the ten GOP members who switched positions from pro-ABM in 1968 to anti-ABM in 1969, waged congressional fights against the ABM system.

> "Early in 1970 four like-minded members of the Armed Services Committee, representatives Otis G. Pike (D-NY), Lucien N. Nedzi (D-MI), Robert L. Leggett (D-CA), and Robert T. Stafford (R-VT), joined me on several occasions in my office to dissect the Military Procurement Authorization Bill, HR 17123, which was then before our committee. The press eventually dubbed this coalition the Fearless Five, although at times many viewed us as the Foolish Five."[62]

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, which came into effect during the 92nd Congress (1971-1972), opened a window of opportunity for easier position-taking votes (Whalen 1982, Kravitz, 1990, Binder 1997, Bach and Smith 1988, Smith 1989, Schickler 2001, Roberts and Smith 2003). Ending the secrecy surrounding members' votes on floor amendments in the House, the provision of recoded votes "made the floor a much more effective arena for rank-and-file participation while curbing the influence of chairmen" (Schickler 2001, 215).[63] Kravitz (1990, 378) from Congressional Research Service also pointed out:

> "By far the most significant antisecrecy provision in the act dealt with disclosure of House members' votes in Committee of the Whole. The House often makes its most

[62] Whalen (1982, 36)

[63] Republican reformer Charles Whalen of Ohio (1982, 35), once again, illuminated how critical the rule change was for legislative politics and policy outcomes. "One of the most significant rule changes in the history of the House is how the Democratic Study Group termed the House's decision in 1970 to permit twenty members to request a record vote on any amendment offered in the Committee of the Whole."

> important policy decisions in that committee, but for 180 years its precedents had forbidden the recording of names in these votes. Under the new rule, each member's name and vote was to be recorded upon the demand of 20 or more members."

In 1971, under the new rule of recorded votes, Robert L. Leggett, a liberal Democrat from California sitting on the Armed Services Committee, became a leading opponent of ABM spending. The California congressman proposed an amendment to a $21.9 billion military procurement authorization bill (HR 8687), seeking to cut funds for expansion of the ABM system. The House members rejected the Leggett amendment by 129-267 recorded teller votes.

Congressman Leggett, again in 1972, offered an amendment to HR 15495 authorizing $21.3 billion for procurement, research and development of weapon systems for fiscal 1973 (*CQ Weekly Report*, July 1, 1972. p.1625). His proposal sought to reduce by $350 million from a total of $486 million the procurement of missiles for the Safeguard ABM system and argued that the U.S. was rushing ahead on the Safeguard ABM system without consideration of cost or its implications. The House members on the floor rejected the Leggett amendment by 116-258 roll-call votes. Table 3.3 details the ABM bills and votes.

III. Explanations for Vote Choices and Changes over the ABM Debates

The Ideology Explanation

> *Members with liberal ideology are more likely to vote against the ABM appropriations and switch their positions into anti-ABM.*

Several factors explain why party members switched their positions. First, Bernstein and Anthony (1974) suggest that ideology drove senators' position-taking votes on the ABM system. Regardless of party commitment or economic benefits in their states, the more liberal the senator, the more likely he or she was to vote to disapprove the ABM spending. With respect to vote changes, Bernstein and Anthony also claimed that virtually all position switches between 1968 and 1970 were made by some senators, who tried to bring themselves more into accord with their ideology. McCormick and Black (1983, 45) concluded that "over the last decade, ideology has enjoyed considerable favor as an explanation of congressional voting behavior on foreign policy issues."

My study of legislative behavior in Congress illuminates the evolving character of ideology for national security policy over time. Prior to the 1970s, liberal members of Congress frequently sided with Democratic presidents who pursued the policy of "guns-and-butter." Their ideological conviction was that defense spending and welfare programs were both desirable and attainable. In the wake of the anti-war movements and congressional reforms of the early 1970s, however, the same liberal ideology shifted its focus into a tradeoff relationship between guns and butter. The liberal approach to the role of government shifted toward being in favor of more spending for welfare programs while downsizing the defense budget.

Conservative ideology evolved to no lesser extent. During the Eisenhower government, the Republican Party and its conservative members of Congress were so concerned about the budget deficit that they vigorously resisted any government spending increase, including military spending. During the 1960s and later on, the same

conservatism came to serve as an ideology for supporting national security and defense as top priorities.[64] In the name of conservative ideology, "deficit hawks" from the Republican Party transformed themselves into "defense hawks" over national security issues.

The literature on congressional politics of national security has no shortage of emphasis on legislators' ideology as a key factor for their voting decisions. That is, the more conservative a legislator, the more likely he or she is to vote for a defense spending increase. I use the ratings of Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) for members of Congress to measure legislator ideology. ADA scores are calculated by evaluating members according to the percentage of time they vote for the policy position supported by ADA on the twenty or so bills considered most important in each chamber.[65]

Constituency Pressure Explanation

> *a. Members from electorally competitive and ideologically liberal districts are more likely to position themselves against the ABM spending bills.*
>
> *b. Members from districts with higher unemployment rates are more likely to vote against the ABM because of constituency pressures to fund "butter" rather than "guns."*

[64] For a good review of transformation among the Republican members of Congress during the Vietnam War, see Dietz (1986)

[65] American Security Council (ASC) also provides the "hawkishness index" every year since 1969 by checking whether legislators vote with their policy preferences in national security arena (Lindsay 1991). The hawkishness index by ASC, however, is not comparable over time, because the index does not distinguish between the different meanings of legislation in different time.

Other scholars have examined the role of constituency influences.[66] The general consensus is that constituency benefits do not necessarily correlate with defense voting (Lindsay 1991). Political scientists claim that the ABM case is no exception in the sense that state economic benefits from the ABM programs do not explain their senators' voting on the issue (Bernstein and Anthony 1974). Liberal senators from states greatly benefiting from the ABM appropriations were as prone to vote against the ABM as were liberals from low-benefit states. In short, the literature suggests that senators cast their votes on national security and defense spending largely based on their ideological preferences, not on the basis of the economic benefits that their home states would accrue from increased military spending.

Congressional scholars have long confirmed that constituency pressures affect members' voting decisions (MacRae 1952, Miller and Stokes 1963, Mayhew 1974, Fenno 1978, Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987, Bartels 1991, Adler and Lapinski 1997, Jenkins, Schickler and Carson 2004, Theriault 2005). To measure constituents' preferences on the ABM spending bills, I use 1968 presidential election results that provide a direct and orderly picture of constituents' political preferences. District-level presidential vote share indicates the partisan and ideological predispositions of each congressional district; from very conservative (votes for Wallace) to conservative (votes

[66] "Parochial" account is, as Lindsay (1991, 7) suggests, that "members evaluate weapons systems in terms of how programs affect the local economic and social concerns of constituents." For example, L. Mendel Rivers, a South Carolina Democrat and autocratic chair of the House Armed Services Committee from 1965 to 1970, represents parochial or pork barreling style of defense policy decisions on the Hill." The Charleston Congressman was "most concerned with representing the military before Congress and receiving tangible rewards for himself and his district in return" (Johnson 2006, 159).

for Nixon) to liberal (votes for Humphrey). Liberal constituents, measured by larger votes cast for Humphrey, are hypothesized to oppose the Vietnam War and the defense spending increase for the ABM system. As a result, liberal districts are more likely to push their representatives to vote against the ABM appropriations bills than conservative constituents.[67]

Although constituency pressures are critical for members' voting decisions, those pressures might be not the same if members face different level of electoral competitiveness. Electoral security might provide legislators with some degree of independence in translating voter preferences into legislative choices. One of the recurring subjects in congressional studies is the "marginality hypothesis" by which Fiorina (1973, 479) earlier meant that "legislators elected by narrow margins pay closer attention to constituency interests than colleagues with plenty of votes to spare play" (see also Sinclair 1976, Kuklinski 1977, Sullivan and Uslaner 1978, Cohen and Brunk 1983, Griffin 2006). I employ a member's most recent victory margin to measure how secure or vulnerable a legislator is to constituency pressure during the ABM debates in Congress. If a member of the House from a liberal district has narrowly defeated his challenger in the 1968 congressional election, the legislator is assumed to say nay to the ABM.

Also, district economic interests are tested as determinants for members' vote decisions over the ABM. Members of Congress often take positions to explain their

[67] Jenkins, Schickler and Carson (2004) clearly suggest some distinct advantages of using district-level presidential vote share as a valid measure in tracking how members of Congress vote. They claim that, compared to census-based economic and demographic data, it measures a direct political preference of constituent (Jacobson 2000, Ansolabehere et al 2001). Also, separate from the congressional vote as "dependent variable" in my dissertation, district-level presidential vote provides a decent placement of ideological preferences among the constituency.

votes back in their districts.[68] Most studies on congressional voting behavior in defense spending found little effect from districts' economic benefits from weapons systems (Bernstein and Anthony 1974, Fleisher 1985, Lindsay 1990). Scholars have tried but failed to see the linkage between parochial interests benefiting districts or states and members of Congress or senators voting for defense spending bills.

I argue, on the contrary, that given the trade-off relationship between guns and butter, constituency pressures based on economic benefits of the defense programs should be measured not only by members' pro-defense votes but also by anti-defense votes. Economic disadvantages under a limited budget size often would move members to vote

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[68] Lowi (1964, 690) defines distributive policies as "policies in which the indulged and the deprived, the loser and the recipient, need never come into direct confrontation." According to Lowi, defense procurement, research and development are an example of distributive policy. Until the disastrous Vietnam War, congressional decisions on defense spending were mostly distributive in nature and termed particularly as "military Keynesianism" by Mintz and Hicks (1984). Defense spending with a focus on naval construction during the FDR administration was a form of the New Deal program to relieve unemployment rates in the Great Depression. As Arnold (1990, 93) points out, "Even when the logic of specific policies is questionable, the power of the label 'defense' to help sell new policies is unquestionable."

As U.S. military involvement in Vietnam expanded, the policy choices of "how much" and "where" to spend defense budget became increasingly controversial (Russett 1969, Mayer 1991, Markusen et al 1991, Stein and Bickers 1995, Trubowitz 1998, McCarty 2000, Rundquist and Carsey 2002). Russett (1969), in his seminal work on a tradeoff character of defense, posed an influential question of "who pays for defense." The character of defense spending decisions became increasingly more redistributive than distributive during the 1970s. Redistributive politics involving defense spending invited conflicting interests from various political actors and groups who began to notice the tradeoff relationship between defense spending and welfare programs. The Senate minority leader Everett Dirksen from the Republican Party, in his 1967 year-end report for the first session of the Ninetieth Congress, also questioned Johnson's guns-and-butter approach for the nation:

> "The State of the Congress today is one of vexation and deep-seated concern as we look about us here at home. We see an Administration wholly blind in its belief that the enormous costs of the war in Vietnam can and will be borne by our people while at the same time the Administration seeks unrestrained license to promote and finance multi-billion dollar social programs."
> (U.S. Congress, Senate, *A Record of Press Conference Statements for the Republican Leadership of the Congress,* S. Doc.61, 90th Cong., 1st session., 1967, pp.24-27

against defense spending programs, a factor which has been frequently overlooked in the analysis of congressional voting behavior over defense spending.[69]

In the course of the Vietnam War and the economic downturn of the 1970s, the northern Democrats realized that they had few incentives to support a unified party position in favor of national security and defense spending at the expense of their district interests and their electoral fates (McCormick 1989, Rohde 1991, 1994a, 1994b). If economic interests at congressional districts differ from party positions at the national level, I assume that members prioritize district interests over national party positions.

I address urban population percentage and unemployment rates in districts as proxies for constituency demands for "butter" policies. Then, I test how constituents' economic interests are represented through legislators' vote decisions. The impacts of urban population percentage and unemployment rates on ABM votes will reveal whether constituents revise their understanding of the relationship between defense budget and welfare spending and see it as a trade-off (Mintz and Hicks 1984).

Party Explanation

> *If MC is a northern Democrat or a member of the Democratic Study Group, he or she is more likely to vote against ABM spending or switch voting decision into anti-ABM during the 1968-1972 periods.*

[69] Lindsay (1991, 869) points out that "members' susceptibility to parochialism may vary with external factors: members may vote parochially if unemployment is high in their constituency, if they hold marginal seats, if their constituencies are poor, or in the case of senators if they are up for reelection at the end of that Congress."

Partisan affiliation has been also introduced as a critical vote determinant for congressional members on foreign policy agendas (Asher and Weisberg 1974, Matthews and Stimson 1975, Rohde 1991, 1994a, Trubowitz 1992, 1998, Coleman 1996, Fordham 1998, James 2000, Fry 2002). Members are often faced with different party positions in Congress such as being members of a presidential party versus an out-party or being members of a majority party versus a minority party. Different partisan affiliation might lead members to differently understand policy implications of similar votes over foreign policies.

Presidential party members, for instance, tend to vote for presidential positions on national security and foreign policies (Wildavsky 1966, Mueller 1973, Asher and Weisberg 1974). Majority party members in a divided government, on the contrary, often position themselves against the president's foreign policies (Sundquist 1989, Bond and Fleisher 1990, Mayhew 1991, Trubowitz 1998, Epstein and O'Halloran 1999). Bernstein and Anthony (1974, 1203), however, conclude again that "the position a senator adopted on the ABM issue has been shown to reflect his ideology, not his party commitment."

Prior to the 91st Congress (1969-1970), Democrats with their president in the White House were largely united on the issue of the Vietnam War and guns-and-butter choices. The main force of the bipartisan coalition until the Vietnam War, as Trubowitz (2005, 2) specifies, was "an alliance between Democrats and eastern Rockefeller Republicans in favor of a grand strategy combining the principles of forward defense, liberalized trade and collective security."

When Nixon's first Congress convened in 1969, the political context changed dramatically.[70] The Republican Party, having been consistently anti-communist, had its president controlling American foreign policies and had its members highly united on a conservative agenda in Congress. As for the Democratic side, northern Democrats began to defect from their original positions of support for defense spending during the Cold War Consensus.

Liberal members from the non-South region largely switched their positions into opposing military expenditures. Rohde (1994a, 90) observes:

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[70] One of the changes in the policy environment has been institutional. It is widely acknowledged that major wars and economic crises in the twentieth century greatly empowered the president as crisis manager vis-à-vis the Congress perceived to be slow for action (Schlesinger 1973, Greenstein 1988, Neustadt 1990, Milkis 1993, Nelson 1999). Congress has tried to regain assertive power over the expansion of presidential authorities during or after wars. The Vietnam era was no different. Institutional battles largely occurred over the issues of military spending acceleration in the middle of war or cutback in post-war (Sundquist 1981, Gaddis 1982, Fisher 1991, Hogan 1998, Fordham 1998, Schickler 2001, Marshall and Prins 2002).

Coping with presidential aggrandizement, however, congressional members and their parties sought to boost congressional policymaking capacity through institutional innovations. Recentralizing appropriations during the period of 1920-1922, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 and 1970, and the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 are among the congressional attempts to safeguard congressional influence (Schickler 2001).

As a direct consequence of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, a recorded teller vote could be taken on a proposed amendment in the Committee of the Whole, if only twenty members requested it (Smith 1989, Rohde 1991, Binder 1997, Oleszek 2001, Roberts and Smith 2003). Then, there was a substantial increase in the proportion of presidential-position votes on foreign policies that were taken on amendments (Rohde 1994b).

The Democratic Study Group, a liberal caucus within the Democratic Party observed this roll-call reform as "one of the most significant rule changes in the history of the House."[70] Rep. Richard Bolling, according to Smith (1989, 26-28), "was close to the mark in predicting a major change in the way the House conducted its business on the floor:" A congressional report also confirms that:

> "Bolling believed that past practice had been working to the advantage of a conservative minority faction. New rules that encouraged better attendance and promoted accountability would, in his view, enhance control of policy outcomes by the liberal majority of the Democratic Party."
> (U.S. Congress, House, Democratic Study Group, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., *Special Report: Reform in the House of Representatives,* no.95-18 (Nov. 6, 1978), p.5)

> "Of all the issues in the international affairs area, none better illustrates the transition from bipartisan deference to the president to partisan congressional assertiveness than the annual authorization of defense procurement."

Table 3.4 provides the details of vote changes, respectively, by Republicans, Democrats, northern Democrats, and southern Democrats over the ABM system from 1967 to 1972.

Southern Democrats traditionally in favor of military spending continued to vote for defense appropriation bills so that the Democrats were largely split on the issue of how to balance defense spending and the welfare budget.[71] Coleman (1996, 117) confirms that "between 1968 and 1978 Democrats were most intensely divided over defense issues, particularly defense authorizations." Figure 3.3 shows how northern Democrats became increasingly hostile to ABM appropriations in Congress, while southern Democrats remained largely united and stable in supporting the ABM system.

As noted earlier, northern Democrats seemed to use the defense spending issue not only to score political points with their constituents, but also to promote their positions and liberal ideas within the Democratic Party, which was still dominated by southern Democrats. As Rohde (1991, 1994a, 1994b) points out, liberal Democrats believed that institutional arrangements largely based on the seniority system were unfairly biased against their policy preferences. In addition, by the end of the Johnson Administration, not only domestic policy but also foreign and defense policy issues became the locus of intraparty conflict.

The party dynamics hypothesis aims to examine Rohde's claims that "Northern Democrats dropped out of the defense consensus and sought to use the revitalized floor

[71] For a good review of traditional and historical pro-military positions held by southern Democrats, see Joseph A. Fry (2002)

amendment process to change policy" (1994b, 126). I suggest that although defense spending was a wedge issue splitting the Democratic Party, northern Democrats risked their national party position on defense policy for the sake of their factional interests in legislative processes. I also identify and incorporate into the model the membership list of the Democratic Study Group (DSG), a liberal caucus within the Democratic Party, which promoted liberal agendas (Rohde 1991).[72]

Although an absolute majority of DSG members were identified as northern and urban Democrats, there were some exceptions as well. Those were Rep. Bob Eckhardt of Texas, Rep. William Alexander of Arkansas, Rep. Dante Fascell of Florida and Rep. Ed Edmondson of Oklahoma. It is worth exploring and comparing the impacts of DSG members and northern Democrats on the ABM voting decisions to examine whether vote switching by members occurred beyond regional concerns in Congress.[73]

As for the Republicans as minority party members in Congress, partisan strategies to build favorable positions that appeal to swing voters in national elections are hypothesized to affect members' policy positions. In his analysis of regulatory policy decisions in Congress, James (2000, 267) points out that "to retain the presidency as a much-desired party resource, rank-and-file party members repeatedly fell in line behind choices that repudiated their own strongly held policy preferences." I examine whether this logic is applied to rank-and-file members of the Republican Party when they vote on the ABM spending bills, for which President Nixon had announced his support two

[72] For the membership list and detailed accounts of DSG, see *CQ Weekly Report*, October 10, 1969, p.1940-1945.
[73] Rohde (1991) provides a systematic analysis of DSG impacts on leader-member relations within the Democratic Party.

months after his inauguration. Table 3.5 identifies who switched their voting decisions over a one-year period from 1968 to 1969.

IV. Results

Table 3.6 reports the results of the probit regression analyses of members' roll-call votes. The first model includes all the explanatory variables except for the interactive terms. Interactive terms such as Humphrey*Challenger and Democratic*Leader are added into the second model. One can categorize all the independent variables into three groups of explanations: members' voting history, constituency pressures, and party influences. The second model with interactive terms is designed to show the distinct roles of competitive liberal districts and Democratic leaders in inducing members to vote against the ABM appropriation bills.

Above all, the roll-call voting analysis confirms the literature on voting stability by members of Congress. Table 3.6 clearly shows that vote history in time *t-1* (1968) heavily influences members' vote decisions in time *t* (1969). All models present that members' vote choice in 1968 significantly led them to cast votes the same way in 1969. If a member was supportive of the ABM system in 1968, he was quite likely to endorse ABM appropriation bills in 1969. When a member critical of defense spending voted against the weapons system in 1968, he was more likely to oppose ABM spending in 1969. A substantive interpretation shown in figure 3.4 suggests that the probability of a member standing by his or her initial position in 1969 increases by almost 49 percent.

Although members of Congress show a great degree of voting consistency, the 91st Congress during the Nixon administration, however, observed a number of new vote determinants emerging and affecting legislative choices over defense spending. Representing a liberal and competitive district, a legislator is more inclined to vote against ABM spending in 1969. The interactive term (Humphrey*Challenger) achieved conventional levels of statistical significance. Feeling the pressure from their liberal constituents, legislators began to address their defense budget vote differently.

With respect to the question of "guns-or-butter," the higher unemployment rate in districts was incorporated into the model as a gauge for members' response to the tradeoff relationship. As expected, congressional members from the districts struggling for job opportunities were more likely to vote against the ABM spending, all other things being equal. Some legislators came to discard the traditional view of both guns and butter being attainable and began to consider the tension between defense budget and welfare spending from a tradeoff perspective.

Figure 3.4 shows substantive significance of explanatory variables analyzed in the probit regression. It confirms the significance of unemployment rate in explaining members' position taking on the ABM issue. More specifically, when unemployment rates in districts change from 0.55 percent (minimum) to 6.07 percent (maximum), the probability of a member voting against ABM spending increases by 36 percent.

Also interesting in constituency effects is the districts' military population and its impact on members' voting on the ABM. The coefficients of military population variable in the models are positive, indicating that the greater the military population within a

district, the more likely a member is to vote against the ABM. Although the military population factor does not survive in a model with the ideology variable included, the negative effect of military population on member vote choice on the ABM bill is statistically significant in the second model. A temporary verdict is that the number of military personnel and employees in congressional districts does not necessarily secure a hawkish position toward one of the most expensive weapons systems in US history.

Finally, the results from table 3.7 and figure 3.5 largely substantiate the evidence of cross-pressured members and their vote change. While a majority of Democrats were still supportive of defense spending in the 91st Congress, members from the Northeast or from the liberal Democratic Study Group voted significantly different from their party position. In all models tested, signs of northeast coefficients are positive so that members from northeast areas are more likely to oppose the ABM than non-northeast members in Congress.

Thus, results verify the importance of members' geographical representation in casting their votes over the ABM controversy. There is only an eight percent increase in the probability for a vote against the ABM in 1969, when a non-northeast member (minimum value) is compared to a northeast legislator (maximum value). In addition, an almost thirty percent probability jump is found for vote change into anti-ABM in 1969, when the legislator is a member of the Democratic Study Group.[74]

[74] Table 3.8 and 3.9 demonstrate the importance of members' ideology in predicting their voting behavior over the ABM spending bills. Out of fifteen bills related to the ABM controversy, Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) selected the Defense Procurement Authorization. ADA chose Mendel Rivers' motion to move the previous question by O'Konski as a key legislation. Opposing the motion, according to ADA, has the effect of supporting a 10% cut in the military

In sum, constituency pressures and factional struggles within the Democratic Party influenced party members' vote choices and changes over the critical foreign and defense policy issue. Neither stable patterns of congressional voting behavior nor deferential voting to the executive branch over the foreign and defense policy can properly account for the case of the ABM. Conversion of voting choice by legislator has been rare in congressional history, but vote switching by the incumbent Democrats was a phenomenon throughout the ABM debates.[75]

V. Conclusion

In the House, where members of Congress face elections every two years, the incentive for "position taking" is high. Making a bill into legislation often takes a long time and goes through complex negotiation processes in Congress (Davidson and Oleszek 2004, Oleszek 2001). House members sometimes just need short-term evidence that they are in tune with the constituents, not "out of step" with the district interests (Canes-

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procurement legislation. As described earlier, liberal Democrats opposed the motion but failed to block Rivers' motion to cut off debate.

The results of table 3.8 and table 3.9 evidently show that members' ideological stance is a strong indicator about where they would stand over the ABM controversy. What is worth emphasizing, however, is that members' ideology gauged by ADA scores is a valid independent variable, only to the extent to which the multicollinearity problem does not dominate explanatory powers of other variables. Although the model with ADM scores included analyzed votes over the O'Konski motion to recommit, some elements of ADA scores seem to be included both in dependent and independent variables. Indeed, ADA scores were obtained from members' roll-call vote choices in Congress, so ADA scores might have washed out the significance of other constituency factors in the model.

[75] *Vital Statistics on Congress, 2001-2002*, by Ornstein et al confirms that during the entire periods of 1954-2000, the 1968 election saw the lowest number of House seats replaced by party (only 11 seats), except for the 1988 election with 9 seats replaced.

Wrone, Brady and Cogan 2002).[76] The bottom line is that legislators consider not only substantive policy changes but also symbolic position taking in legislative processes. In essence, Johnson (2006, xxiv) suggests:

> "Only by recognizing the importance of procedural initiatives that superficially seemed devoid of policy content can we appreciate the myriad ways in which the legislature affected the conduct of the Cold War."

Empirical findings of this chapter illustrate that cross-pressured members of the Democratic Party sided with their constituency and voted against the ABM in legislative processes. The ABM debates in Congress highlight the need for a better understanding of partisan infighting and members' position-taking strategies to paint a complete picture of policy change in Congress. Average party support levels indicate where parties collectively stand on policy issues, but do not necessarily reveal whether individual members have maintained or changed their voting choices. This chapter has taken on the contentious issue of defense spending symbolized by the ABM controversy.

The short-term impact of position taking by those members was not substantial enough to repeal the ABM system. The anti-ABM movement did not instantly make House members defy the defense committees on other nuclear weapons programs (Lindsay 1991). But, the long-term effect of vote switching by a group of lawmakers was quite significant. Conversion of northern Democrats into a "guns-versus-butter" position during the 91st Congress (1969-1970) ushered in the breakdown of the "Cold War

[76] On the passage of one of the toughest border security measures in more than a decade, for example, Rep. Howard L. Berman of California said that "conservatives are supporting the House bill solely to gain political points, not out of any belief that it would become the law." Rachel L. Swarns, "Tough Border Security Bill Nears Passage in the House." *The New York Times,* December 14, 2005

Consensus" that was built on the premise of a large defense budget. Trubowitz (1998, 185, 295n) confirms that "the domestic bases of Cold War internationalism changed in the late 1960s and early 1970s" and "with respect to the realignment, the pivotal House appears to be the 91st (1969-1970)." Johnson (2006, xx) also noticed that the congressional battle against the anti-ballistic missile program was the "first full-fledged congressional challenge to a Pentagon weapons system."

Focusing on the Democratic Study Group (DSG), Stevens, Miller, and Mann (1974) essentially pointed out that during the 91st Congress, a "startling reversal of trends" occurred among DSG members to dissent from presidential dominance of foreign policies.[77] Coleman (1996) and others noticed that congressional Democrats became most intensely divided over the level and location of military spending in the post-Vietnam Congress. With liberal northern Democrats pitted against conservative southern Democrats, national security and military spending became a wedge issue among the Democratic members of Congress.[78] Liberal Democrats viewed a vote against defense spending as a vote against southern-conservative-senior members within the party.

Only the Reagan military build-up in the 1980s led southern Democrats to ultimately stand together with their northern colleagues in opposing the Republican president's "Star Wars" against the "Evil Empire." Even in the recent elections of 2002 and 2004, the Republican Party effectively played the "national security card" to damage

[77] Mayhew (1974, 132) clearly points out that "in a large class of legislative undertakings, the electoral payment if for positions rather than effort."
[78] Rohde (1991) and other congressional scholars notice that northern and southern Democrats became similar in their policy positions towards national security and defense in the 1980s.

the reputation of the Democratic Party. Democrats still struggle to shed the party's image as "soft and divided on national security."[79]

My analysis of vote changes over the ABM debates confirms that northern Democrats and members of the liberal Democratic Study Group were the main forces who changed their positions. They tried to reverse the decision of national security policy. Vote switching by liberal northern Democrats were far short of the voting counts needed to affect the substance of policy changes. But, little chance of policy change did not discourage liberal members from switching their votes. They scored political points in the short term and secured policy change in the long run.

The newly established voting pattern in Congress -- pro-defense by Republicans and southern Democrats versus anti-defense by northern Democrats -- persisted throughout the 1970s. The increasing dominance of northerners and concomitant decline of southerners within the Democratic caucus during the 1980s eventually united Democrats in their opposition to a huge defense budget as part of the Reagan military buildup. In sum, congressional members' position change started with position-taking and ended with policy change over national security issues in the legislature. In his thorough analysis of the Cold War and Congress, Johnson (2006, 241) concludes that

> "Beginning with the ABM fight in 1969, a sizeable bloc of Senate liberals, eventually joined by ideological comrades from the House, attempted to use congressional power to remake American foreign policy, abandoning what they saw as the rigid, military-

[79] David Stout, "Senate Rejects Democratic Efforts on Iraq" *The New York Times*, June 22, 2006. David Stout of the New York Times reports that "On the Senate voting on troops withdrawal from Iraq, the Senate voted today against measures calling for the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, after a long and emotional debate that was in some ways reminiscent of the Vietnam War era. The votes, 86 to 13 on one measure and 60 to 39 on the second, reflected not only deep divisions between Republicans and Democrats but within the Democratic ranks as well."

centered anti-Communism of the Cold War era and adopting instead an approach focused on promoting human rights and democracy overseas."

Figure 3.1. House Democratic and Republican Support for Defense Spending, from 1890 to 1988



Source: calculated by the author, from *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, various years.

Figure 3.2. Mean Support Difference between House Republicans and Democrats, from 1890 to 1988



Source: calculated by the author, from *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, various years.

Table 3.1 Party Platforms on Defense Spending, Selective Planks from 1896 to 1960

The Republican Party	The Democratic Party
Our foreign policy should be at all times firm, vigorous, and dignified, and all our interests in the western hemisphere should be carefully watched and guarded. **We, therefore, favor the continued enlargement of the navy, and a complete system of harbor and sea-coast defenses.** (1896 Convention)	**We oppose militarism**. **This republic has no place for a vast military establishment,** a sure forerunner of compulsory military service and conscription. When the nation is in danger, the volunteer soldier is his country's best defender. (1900 Convention)
We … favor legislation which will encourage and build up the American merchant marine, and we cordially approve the legislation of the last Congress which created the Merchant Marine Commission to investigate and report upon this subject (1904 Convention)	**We denounce the ship subsidy bill recently passed by the United States Senate as an iniquitous appropriation of public funds for private purposes and a wasteful, illogical and useless attempt** to overcome by subsidy the obstructions raised by Republican legislation to the growth and development of American commerce on the sea. (1904 Convention)
We must have a Navy so strong and so well proportioned and equipped, so thoroughly ready and prepared, that no enemy can gain command of the sea and effect a landing in force on either our Western or our Eastern coast. (1916 Convention)	**We therefore favor the maintenance of an army fully adequate to the requirements of order, of safety, and of the protection of the nation's rights, the fullest development of modern methods of sea-coast defense.** (1916 Convention)
There must be no further weakening of our regular army and we advocate appropriations sufficient to provide for the training of all members of the national guard, the citizen's military training camps, the reserve officers' training camps. (1924 Convention)	**We demand a strict and sweeping reduction of armaments by land and sea**, so that there shall be no competitive military program or naval building. (1924 Convention)
We urge prompt and drastic reduction of public expenditures and resistance to every appropriation not demonstratably necessary to the performance of government, national or local. (1932 Convention)	Weakness and unpreparedness invite aggression. We must be strong that no possible combination of powers would dare to attack us. **We propose to provide America with an invincible air force, a navy strong enough to protect all our seacoasts and our national interests, and a fully equipped and mechanized army.** (1940 Convention)
We pledge that America shall not become a member of the League of Nations or the World Court nor shall America take on any entangling alliances in foreign affairs. (1936 Convention)	**We advocate the effective international control of weapons of mass destruction,** including the atomic bomb, and we approve continued and vigorous efforts within the United Nations to bring about the successful consumption of the proposals which our Government has advanced. (1948 Convention)
We are proud of the part that Republicans have taken in those limited areas of foreign policy in which they have been permitted to participate. We shall invite the Minority Party to join us under the next Republican administration in stopping partisan politics at the water's edge. (1948 Convention)	Political considerations of budget balancing and tax reduction now come before the wants of our national security and the needs of our Allies. **The Republicans have slashed our own armed strength, weakened our capacity to deal with military threats**. (1956 Convention)
We *have* the strongest striking force in the world and a magnificent supporting land force in our Army and Marine Corps. (1956 Convention)	**Our military position is measured in terms of gaps -- missile gaps, space gap, and limited-war gap**. (1960 Convention)

Source: *National Party Conventions, 1831-1996*. (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly)

Table 3.2 Intermediate Votes vs. Final Passage over the ABM controversy, October 3, 1969, the 91st Congress

	Roll Call No.91 (Intermediate Vote)	**Roll Call No.92 (Intermediate Vote)**	**Roll Call No.93 (Final passage Vote)**
Who	Rep. L. Mendel Rivers (D-SC) Chair, Armed Services Committee	Rep. O'Konski (R-WI)	Military Procurement Final Passage
When	Oct 3, 1969	Oct 3, 1969	Oct 3, 1969
For what	To order the previous question on the motion to recommit H.R. 14000, military procurement authorization for fiscal 1970	To recommit H.R. 14000, with instructions to eliminate money for research and development for the ABM system	To pass H.R. 14000, military procurement authorization for fiscal 1970
Votes	Yea 225 ***Nay 142 (Anti-ABM)***	***Yea 94 (Anti-ABM)*** Nay 275	Yea 322 ***Nay 47 (Anti-ABM)***
Party Breakdown	Democrat 95 108 Northern Dem 28 105 Southern Dem 67 3 Republican 128 33	Democrat 78 123 Northern Dem 76 55 Southern Dem 2 68 Republican 15 147	Democrat 157 39 Northern Dem 92 38 Southern Dem 65 1 Republican 154 5
The Number of Anti-ABM votes	Democrat 108 ***Northern Dem 105*** Southern Dem 3 Republican 33	Democrat 78 ***Northern Dem 76*** Southern Dem 2 Republican 15	Democrat 39 ***Northern Dem 38*** Southern Dem 1 Republican 5

Note: Characters of Three Roll-Call Votes and Anti-ABM positions = RC 92 (strongly Anti-ABM) > RC 91 (fairly Anti-ABM) > RC 93 (pro-ABM)

Table 3.3 House Votes on the ABM, 1967-1972 (From the 90th Congress through 92nd Congress)

Date	Bill Description	Outcome
May 9, 1967	RC51 HR9240 ***(Pro-ABM)*** Procurement Bill including research funds for ABM	***Confirmed 401-3*** R 173-0 D 228-3 ND 141-3 SD 87-0
July 29, 1968	RC407 HR 18785 ***(Anti-ABM)*** Michel (R-IL) motion to recommit HR18785, the Military Construction Appropriation Act of 1968 to the committee on appropriations	***Rejected 32-350*** R 8-153 D 24-197 ND 23-118 SD 1-79
Oct 3, 1969	RC92 HR14000 ***(Anti-ABM)*** O'Konski (R-WI) motion to recommit the bill to the committee with instructions to delete $345.5 million for procurement and $400.9 million for research in the bill for Safeguard antiballistic missile system	***Rejected 92-271*** R 15-147 D 78-123 ND 76-55 SD 2-68
May 6, 1970	RC233 HR17123 ***(Pro-ABM)*** Military Procurement and Research Bill	***Confirmed 326-69*** R 159-14 D 167-55 ND 85-54 SD 82-1
June 16, 1971	RC83 HR8687 ***(Anti-ABM)*** Leggett (D-CA) amendment limiting ABM funding to that needed for completion of sites at Grand Forks, N.D. and Malmstrom, Mont and cutting funds by $102 million	***Rejected 129-267*** R 29-140 D 100-127 ND 94-54 SD 6-73
June 27, 1972	RC475 HR15495 ***(Anti-ABM)*** Leggett (D-CA) amendment to reduce by $350 million the fiscal 1973 authorization for the Safeguard antiballistic missile (ABM) system	***Rejected 116-258*** R 13-144 D 103-114 ND 98-49 SD 5-65

Source*: Congressional Quarterly Almanac, various issues*

Table 3.4 House Vote Changes over the ABM program, 1967-1972

	ABM *Pro*	ABM *Anti*		ABM *Pro*	ABM *Anti*		ABM *Pro*	ABM *Anti*		ABM *Pro*	ABM *Anti*
GOP			**DEM**			**ND**			**SD**		
1967	*173*	*0*	**1967**	*228*	*3*	**1967**	*141*	*3*	**1967**	*87*	*0*
GOP			**DEM**			**ND**			**SD**		
1968	*153*	*8*	**1968**	*197*	*24*	**1968**	*118*	*23*	**1968**	*79*	*1*
GOP			**DEM**			**ND**			**SD**		
1969	*147*	*15*	**1969**	*123*	*78*	**1969**	*55*	*76*	**1969**	*68*	*2*
GOP			**DEM**			**ND**			**SD**		
1970	*159*	*14*	**1970**	*167*	*55*	**1970**	*85*	*54*	**1970**	*82*	*1*
GOP			**DEM**			**ND**			**SD**		
1971	*140*	*29*	**1971**	*127*	*100*	**1971**	*54*	*94*	**1971**	*73*	*6*
GOP			**DEM**			**ND**			**SD**		
1972	*144*	*13*	**1972**	*114*	*103*	**1972**	*49*	*98*	**1972**	*65*	*5*

Source*: Congressional Quarterly Almanac, various issues*
Note:

1) GOP = Republicans, DEM = Democrats, ND = Northern Democrats, SD = Southern Democrats
2) House votes counted for 1967 and 1970 are on the final passages of the military procurement bills including the ABM appropriations.
3) House votes counted for 1968, 1969, 1971, and 1972 are on the amendments or the motions to recommit regarding the ABM deployment.

Figure 3.3 Northern Democrats vs. Southern Democrats: Party Split over the ABM system



Table 3.5 Vote switching over the ABM program: *1968 vs. 1969*

	Vote Change From pro-ABM in 1968 To anti-ABM in 1969	*Vote Change* From anti-ABM in 1968 To pro-ABM in 1969	*No Vote Change* anti-ABM in 1968 anti-ABM in 1969
Republican	McCloskey (R-CA) Gude (R-MD) Conte (R-MA) Heckler (R-MA) Riegle (R-MI) Button (R-NY) Horton (R-NY) Whalen (R-OH) Burton (R-UT) O'Konski (R-WI) **(10)**	Michael (R-IL) Skubitz (R-KA) Lukens (R-OH) Schneebeli (R-PA) **(4)**	Morse (R-MA) Reid (R-NY) Mosher (R-OH) **(3)**
Northern Democrat	Udall (D-AZ) Moss (D-CA) Waldie (D-CA) Anderson (D-CA) Hawkins (D-CA) Corman (D-CA) Evans (D-CO) St.Onge (D-CT) Matsunaga (D-HI) Mink (D-HI) Yates (D-IL) Madden (D-IN) Brademas (D-IN) Culver (D-IA) Hathaway (D-ME) Boland (D-MA) McDonald (D-MA) O'Neil (D-MA) Conyers (D-MI) Diggs (D-MI) W. Ford (D-MI) Blatnik (D-MN) Karsten (D-MO) Howard (D-NJ) Thompson (D-NJ) Rodino (D-NJ) Minish (D-NJ) Daniels (D-NJ) Addabbo (D-NY) Brasco (D-NY) Carey (D-NY) Dulski (D-NY) Barrett (D-PA) Nix (D-PA) Byrne (D-PA) Eilberg (D-PA) Green (D-PA) Moorehead (D-PA) Rooney (D-PA) St.Germain (D-RI) Tiernan (D-RI) Meeds (D-WA) Hicks (D-WA) **(43)**	Brown (D-CA) **(1)**	Burton (D-CA) Cohelan (D-CA) Edwards (D-CA) Rees (D-CA) Roybal (D-CA) Fraser (D-MN) Helstoski (D-NJ) Halpern (D-NY) Rosenthal (D-NY) Farbstein (D-NY) Ryan (D-NY) Scheuer (D-NY) Gilbert (D-NY) Bingham (D-NY) Ottinger (D-NY) McCarthy (D-NY) Ashley (D-OH) Eckhardt (D-TX) Adams (D-WA) Hechler (D-WV) Kastenmeier (D-WI) Reuss (D-WI) **(22)**
Southern Democrat	Fascell (D-FL) **(1)**		
Democratic New Member	Mikva (D-IL) Harrington (D-MA) Burlison (D-MO) Lowenstein (D-NY) Chisholm (D-NY) Koch (D-NY) Stokes (D-OH) Vanik (D-OH) Yatron (D-PA) Gaydos (D-PA) Obey (D-WI) **(11)**		
Republican New Member	Weicker (R-CT) Coughlin (R-PA) **(2)**	Beall (R-MD) Hastings (R-NY) **(2)**	
Total	**67**	**7**	**25**

Source: *Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1968, 1969*

Table 3.6 Probit Analysis of Continuing Members' Position-taking: *Voting Anti-ABM in 1969, 91st Congress (1st Session)*

		(A)	(B) with interaction terms
Vote history			
	Anti-ABM in 1968	1.657 (0.36) ***	1.636 (0.38) ***
Constituency			
	Humphrey Vote	0.051 (0.01) ***	0.021 (0.02)
	Challenger	0.013 (0.01)	-0.054 (0.04)
	Humphrey*Challenger		0.001 (0.00) *
	unemployment rate	0.234 (0.16)	0.274 (0.16) *
	military population	0.097 (0.06) *	0.091 (0.06) *
	urban population	-0.003 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)
	Northeast	0.542 (0.22) ***	0.477 (0.22) **
Party			
	Democrat	-1.021 (0.42) ***	-1.153 (0.43) ***
	Democratic Study Group	1.811 (0.39) ***	1.869 (0.39) ***
	Leader	0.207 (0.32)	-0.007 (0.53)
	Democratic*Leader		0.374 (0.68)
	Constant	-4.587 (0.95) ***	-2.885 (1.23) ***
log-likelihood		-98.42	-96.77
pseudo R^2		0.49	0.50
percent correctly predicted		88.9%	88.1%

(4) N=377. *** significant at 0.01; ** significant at 0.05; * significant at 0.1
(5) Dependent variable is the legislator's position on the ABM system in 1969 (1 = opposes, 0 = otherwise)

Figure 3.4 The Substantive Significance of the Explanatory Variables: *Probability of Voting Anti-ABM in 1969 by Continuing Members*



Table 3.7 Probit Analysis of Vote Switching by Continuing Members: *Voting Pro-ABM in 1968 vs. Voting Anti-ABM in 1969*

		(A)	(B) with interaction terms
Constituency			
	Humphrey Vote	0.040 (0.01) ***	0.023 (0.02)
	Challenger	0.015 (0.01)	-0.022 (0.04)
	Humphrey*Challenger		0.000 (0.00)
	unemployment rate	0.240 (0.15)	0.259 (0.15) *
	military population	0.128 (0.05) ***	0.124 (0.05) ***
	urban population	-0.004 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)
	Northeast	0.480 (0.21) **	0.442 (0.21) **
Party			
	Democrat	-0.831 (0.40) **	-0.915 (0.41) **
	Democratic Study Group	1.486 (0.37) ***	1.521 (0.37) ***
	Leader	0.445 (0.32)	0.249 (0.53)
	Democratic*Leader		0.317 (0.65)
	Constant	-4.235 (0.91) ***	-3.242 (1.23) ***
log-likelihood		-106.32	-105.67
pseudo R^2		0.32	0.33
percent correctly predicted		88.6%	87.3%

(6) N=377. *** significant at 0.01; ** significant at 0.05; * significant at 0.1
(7) Dependent variable is the legislator's vote switch from support (1968) to opposition (1969) over the ABM system (1 = vote switch, 0 = otherwise)

Figure 3.5 The Substantive Significance of the Explanatory Variables: *Vote Switching From Pro-ABM in 1968 to Anti-ABM in 1969*



Table 3.8 Probit Analysis of Voting Anti-ABM in 1969: Ideology (ADA scores) included

		Model (C) with Ideology
Vote history		
	Anti-ABM in 1968	1.276 (0.46) ***
Constituency		
	Humphrey Vote	0.018 (0.03)
	Challenger	-0.026 (0.05)
	Humphrey*Challenger	0.001 (0.00)
	unemployment rate	0.354 (0.19) *
	military population	0.054 (0.06)
	urban population	-0.002 (0.01)
	Northeast	0.230 (0.26)
Ideology		
	ADA score	0.038 (0.01) ***
Party		
	Democrat	-1.264 (0.47) ***
	Democratic Study Group	0.851 (0.42) **
	Leader	0.691 (0.58)
	Democratic*Leader	-0.344 (0.75)
	Constant	-4.339 (1.76) ***
log-likelihood		-74.00
pseudo R^2		0.62
percent correctly predicted		93.1%

(8) N=377. *** significant at 0.01; ** significant at 0.05; * significant at 0.1
(9) Dependent variable is the legislator's position on the ABM system in 1969:
1 = opposes, 0 = otherwise

Table 3.9 Probit Analysis of Vote Switching from 1968 to 1969: Ideology (ADA scores) included

		Model (C) with ideology
Constituency		
	Humphrey Vote	0.024 (0.02)
	Challenger	0.010 (0.04)
	Humphrey*Challenger	0.000 (0.00)
	unemployment rate	0.297 (0.17) *
	military population	0.122 (0.06) **
	urban population	-0.003 (0.00)
	Northeast	0.317 (0.23)
Ideology		
	ADA score	0.024 (0.01) ***
Party		
	Democrat	-0.894 (0.42) **
	Democratic Study Group	0.687 (0.41) *
	Leader	0.670 (0.56)
	Democratic*Leader	-0.003 (0.68)
	Constant	-4.412 (1.54) ***
log-likelihood		-94.69
pseudo R^2		0.40
percent correctly predicted		87%

(10) N=377. *** significant at 0.01; ** significant at 0.05; * significant at 0.1
(11) Dependent variable is the legislator's vote switch from support (1968) to opposition (1969) over the ABM system: 1 = vote switch, 0 = otherwise

Chapter Four: Position Taking, but No Party Change:
Congressional Politics of Trade Policy toward China, 1989-2001

"We must remain engaged to protect Minnesota jobs and improve the situation in China. If we're not engaged there, we can't influence change."
Rep. Jim Ramstad (R-MN)

"Furthermore, there are 200,000 American jobs today that are directly linked to trade with China. Cutting off trade with China would be a congressionally mandated pink slip for U.S. workers."
Rep. Bob Matsui (D-CA)

"Granting China permanent NTR status might be economically rewarding, but it would be morally wrong."
Rep. Gene Green (D-TX)[80]

Since the opening of China in 1972, trade relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China have been marked by three decades of rapid growth. Total US-China trade rose from just $5 billion in 1980 to $231.4 billion in 2004. Today, China is America' second-largest source of imports and its fifth largest export market.[81] The most populous country in the world became the United States' third largest trading partner in 2004, behind only Canada and Mexico and well ahead of its fourth-largest partner, Japan.

[80] All quotes from *Congressional Quarterly Almanac of 2000*
[81] Congressional Research Service, "China-US Trade Issues," *CRS Issue Brief for Congress*, July 1, 2005.

The Carter administration's decision in 1980 to grant China most-favored-nation (MFN) status was a watershed for this rapid growth of trade. The Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 had prohibited the granting of MFN status to any non-market economy that did not allow free emigration.[82] President Carter, however, waived the Jackson-Vanik provision and initiated a free trade policy with China. Indeed, no US president since has faced any congressional check over the continued extension of MFN status to China.[83] Since 1980, the annual extension deadline comes due each July 3, but Congress has never passed a joint resolution to stop this process. Those congressional members that regard China as a lucrative market for American exporters continue to defer to the president's waiver of the Jackson-Vanik provision.[84]

In a sudden turn of events, however, the Tiananmen Square crackdown on June 4, 1989, led many members of Congress to reconsider the extension of free trade status for

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[82] On the Jackson-Vanik amendment, Johnson (2006, 199), in his exploration of Congress during the Cold War, points out that "the Jackson-Vanik amendment united human rights activists, hard-line Cold Warriors, and supporters of Israel in demanding a linkage between US-Soviet economic relations and the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel."

[83] On July 22, 1998, the 105th Congress passed legislation that replaced the term "most-favored-nation (MFN)" with the term "normal trade relations," or NTR. Normal trade relations (NTR) status means that imported goods to the US from that country are subject to the lowest American tariff rates.

[84] The character of US-China trade is that China exports cheap consumer products such as clothes, shoes, and electronics and car parts to the U.S., whereas the United States exports agricultural goods including soybean and cotton and manufactured goods like computers, electrical equipment and other electronic products to China. Although a number of issues still strain US-China commercial ties − a surging U.S. trade deficit with China ($162 billion in 2004), sloppy protection of U.S. intellectual property rights and China's alleged currency manipulation −, there is little doubt that the United States and China need each other more and more with respect to trade relations and business opportunities.

In essence, the granting of MFN status to China in 1980 ended up being a critical engagement policy in identifying China as a "strategic partner," as first defined by the Clinton-Jiang summit in 1997. Meanwhile, on the campaign trail in the fall of 2000, Republican candidate George W. Bush was critical of Clinton's China policy and pegged China as a "strategic competitor," not a "strategic partner." Once elected, and particularly following 9/11, however, President Bush completely stopped developing this notion of China as a "strategic competitor". (see also Tony Karon, "Bush China Policy Defaults to Engagement" *TIME Magazine*, July 21, 2001)

China (Mann 1998, Sutter 2001, Dumbaugh 2001). Witnessing the Chinese government's brutal massacre of pro-democracy demonstrators, the American public became highly disturbed by the repressive regime in China. The tragedy swiftly fired up the China debate on Capitol Hill. Members of Congress revisited US policy towards China and came to realize that the denial of free trade status for China could be a powerful legislative tool. The extension of China's MFN status until 2001 became a vehicle for both China-supporters and China-bashers to make a foreign policy point (Vogel 1997, Lieberthal 1997, Shoch 2001, Suettinger 2003).[85]

What is puzzling in the congressional debates on China policy is the fact that members of both parties often switched their roll-call votes.[86] This contradicts the tendency that congressional scholars have long confirmed of members rarely changing their votes on recurring issues. On this issue, however, such changes were frequent. Former senior lawmaker Henry Hyde (R-IL), for instance, changed his votes six times on the extension of MFN for China from 1990 through 2001. Likewise, Democrat Beryl Anthony and Republican Jay Dickey, the two House members elected from the fourth congressional district in Arkansas, shifted their voting positions seven times from 1989 through 2001.

[85] With China's accession to the World Trade Organization on December 2001, the annual extension of China's normal trade relations became unnecessary.

[86] Obviously, some members of Congress continued to stand by their initial vote choice throughout the period. For instance, senior lawmakers in the House such as F. James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) and Charles Stenholm (D-TX) never changed their anti-China and pro-China votes, respectively, over the eleven-year period. In addition, three different congressional members elected from Kansas' second district, Democrat Slattery and Republicans Brownback and Ryun, cast their pro-China votes every time over the same period. Regardless of partisanship and ideology, those three representatives from this district in Kansas kept endorsing free trade with China.

Why do some members not even hesitate to change their opinions about China, while others constantly stand by their votes? Moreover, did vote switching by individual members ultimately alter the two parties' stance over trade with China? This chapter explores the sources and processes of members' position taking over China policy from 1989 through 2001. I conduct roll-call vote analyses of House members over the joint resolution in Congress to disapprove China's MFN or NTR status. My principal argument is that legislators' vote switching largely stems from their motivations to take positions in line with constituency opinions and partisan strategies. Given that Congress as a whole was not likely to reverse president's trade policy towards China, members of Congress found the trade vote highly effective in articulating their concerns surrounding US policy toward China on Capitol Hill.

To ascertain the causes and consequences of position changes by party members, I derive several explicit hypotheses concerning electoral, institutional, and ideological dimensions. Then, I test them on the annual MFN renewal votes in Congress. Empirical analyses disclose, first of all, that congressional members translated their constituents' concerns into legislative votes. Manufacturing and agriculture business interests found their representatives quite supportive of China's MFN status. Blue-collar districts largely encouraged their representatives to disapprove the idea of free trade with China.

The second important finding is that the votes over free trade with China were not necessarily limited to the issue of trade. China MFN vote contained a band of issues fraught with critical consequences for party members. Voting positions over trade with China symbolized members' stances on many other critical issue areas, including human rights, religious freedom, the environment, anti-communism, and national security. What

facilitated members' position-taking strategies was that due to its procedural constraint and complexity, members found it hard to reverse free trade policy toward China through a congressional joint resolution. Thus, party rank-and-file members took their diverse and distinct positions from their parties as they needed to. In addition, voting decisions by rank-and-file members were also related to legislative strategies aimed at partisan goals. The strategy of humiliating the president in particular led congressional members to cast party line votes. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 demonstrate partisan differences over the extension of MFN status for China from 1989 to 2001.

Finally, I should note an important difference between my analysis of the China debate and the other case studies in this dissertation. The China trade dispute in Congress has somewhat different implication for party position shifts. In the course of congressional debates on the extension of free trade status for China, members of both parties have employed position-taking strategies, but neither the efforts of congressional Democrats nor the efforts of congressional Republicans have changed either party's brand name. Unlike the other case studies of immigration and defense spending, ultimate party position shifts did not occur in this period. As evidenced by the final passage voting over the permanent NTR (PNTR) for China in 2000, frequent vote switching by both Republicans and Democrats did not necessarily shift the two parties' overall trade policy positions.

In essence, China policy has been a divisive issue for both parties. Different party members and factions approached the China MFN debate quite differently. As a result, neither party has been able to play the card of wedge issue politics against the rival party. To the contrary, the PNTR voting in 2000 reaffirmed the existence of a traditional pro-

free trade bloc in the post-New Deal Congress. That is, a free trade coalition composed of the president, Republicans and conservative Democrats, defeated liberal Democrats, who tended to rally around "fair trade" protectionism (Shoch 2001).

This chapter proceeds as follows. Section I recounts congressional debates on China policy from 1989 to 2001. Section II suggests various hypotheses to test what constitutes and changes legislators' positions over China policy. Section III shows test results from the roll-call voting analyses from 1989 to 2001. I conclude my argument in section IV and discuss further research agendas for better understanding the role played by Congress in the US-China relationship.

I. Congressional Debates over US Policy towards China, 1989-2001

The aggregate level of partisan support and opposition regarding free trade with China shows some fluctuation. During the first two years of the Clinton presidency (1993-1994), congressional Democrats drastically increased their support for China's NTR extension. Supporting Clinton's position to endorse free trade with China, eighty-four percent of Democrats embraced a pro-China position in 1993, an about-face from 1992 when only less than one out of four Democrats supported President Bush's China policy.

Having lost their majority status in 1994, however, House Democrats gradually scaled back their support of China's MFN status, moving from 85.0 percent in 1994 to 52.9 percent in 1999. In 2000, with President Clinton placing his legacy on passage of a bill granting PNTR to China, Democratic members of Congress shifted to a less vigorous

opposition --- 73 yeas and 138 nays. This was comparatively less opposition than that expressed in their back-to-back defeats of Clinton's fast-track authority requests in 1997 and 1998. About thirty-five percent of Democrats joined Republicans in backing free trade policy towards China, a figure substantial enough for the House to pass Clinton's PNTR bill by a vote of 237-197 (Shoch 2001, 235).

The House Republicans also showed a somewhat inconsistent level of support on China's free trade. About fifty-one percent of GOP lawmakers voted against MFN status renewal for China in 1992. After the Republican takeover of Congress in 1995, however, an increasing number of Republicans cast pro-MFN extension votes (77.4 percentages). In addition, House Republicans supported free trade with China by an almost three-to-one margin (164 yeas and 37 nays) during the controversial PNTR debates in 2000.

Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show position changes by members of Congress from 1990 to 2001.[87] Unlike the conventional wisdom that members of Congress hardly change their voting decisions, a large number of legislators did reshape their positions on the recurring issue of free trade with China, one of the most critical American foreign policy agendas in the era of globalization and the US-China rivalry.

Setting up the China Debate and Disapproving China's MFN: 1989-1992

The critical issue of NTR renewal for China suddenly became a major congressional battle over China policy when the Chinese government's massacre of pro-democracy demonstrators took place on June 4, 1989. In 1990, Gerald Solomon, a

[87] During the 102nd Congress (1991-1992), the House passed a joint resolution disapproving MFN status for China, but the Senate never passed a relevant resolution of disapproval. In addition, the primary focus of the debate in 1991-1992 was not on whether to deny MFN status for China, but rather on whether to attach human rights conditions to China's MFN eligibility. (for more details, see Dumbaugh 2001, CRS Report for Congress, RS20691)

Republican congressman from New York, introduced H. Res. 647 to disapprove of the Bush administration's waiver of the Jackson-Vanik amendment for China, which had earlier been announced on May 24. Rep. Solomon argued that Congress should act "to send a message to the angry old men who are hiding out in the so-called Great Hall of the People."[88] The House passed not only Solomon's disapproval resolution by a bipartisan 247-174 vote, but also a bill placing human rights conditions on the MFN extension for 1991. This bill was sponsored by Representative Don J. Pease (D-Ohio) and amended by San Francisco Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi. The Senate, however, never acted on its own legislation or any of the House-passed bills or resolutions against trade with China.

The 102nd Congress (1991-1992) witnessed a climax of the MFN debate, with the House passing joint resolutions disapproving MFN status for China in both 1991 and 1992. The House also voted to override President George H.W. Bush's veto. The Democratic majority in Congress claimed that they had no choice but to take the lead in asserting a tougher China policy because President Bush, a former U.S. envoy to Beijing, was too gentle on China.

Congressional Republicans defended their president and accused Democrats of trying to embarrass him. They pointed out that Democrats were mistakenly pushing for the cancellation of MFN status, which was regarded as the best leveraging tool available for the United States in forcing the Chinese government toward reform. In 1991, however, the House passed, by a vote of 223-204, Solomon's resolution to revoke China's MFN status immediately upon enactment and adopted the conference report before the first session of the 102nd Congress ended.

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[88] *Congressional Quarterly Almanac of 1990*, p.768.

In the Senate, Majority Leader George J. Mitchell (D-ME) could not overcome loyalty to the White House among Republicans. His own party was also split by farm-state Democrats who feared losing the lucrative Chinese market, which bought more than $500 million of U.S. wheat products in 1990.[89] Democratic Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), the chairman of the Senate Finance Subcommittee on International Trade, worked closely with Minority Leader Bob Dole. The Montana senator took a leading role in opposing the placement of conditions on China's MFN status. With no hope of overriding a veto, the Senate did not act on the conference bill. The next year, the House again mustered enough votes (357-61) to override Bush's veto of conditional MFN status for China. But, the Senate upheld the presidential veto by a vote of 59-40, short of the two-thirds needed to override Bush's veto.

About-face among Democrats and Position Taking Repeated: 1993-1999

In 1993, President Clinton announced his plan to set human rights goals that China would have to meet before he would consider a renewal of MFN status. Then, two leading congressional critics of China --- Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell of Maine and California Democrat Nancy Pelosi --- gave up their hostile positions. Instead, they claimed that congressional action would be unnecessary.

In an about-face, Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) voted nay to the House joint resolution that disapproves China's MFN renewal. New York Republican Gerald B. H. Solomon again introduced the resolution. Making her case, Pelosi claimed that "it is

[89] Seven Senate Democrats voted against Senator Mitchell's bill to cut off MFN status within six months of passage if China failed to meet a series of stiff conditions: Sen. Baucus of Montana, Sen. Breaux of Louisiana, Sen. Burdick of North Dakota, Sen. Conrad of North Dakota, Sen. Exon of Nebraska, Sen. Johnston of Louisiana, and Sen. Shelby of Alabama. (*CQ Almanac* 1991, p.123)

very important to get a big vote behind the president so a very clear message is sent to the Chinese government that unless these conditions are met, no kidding, next year MFN is revoked."[90] The 105-318 vote in the House effectively gave the go-ahead signal to President Clinton's decision to extend China's MFN status for another year.

Although Clinton in 1994 came to discard his previous position to link China's human rights progress to the annual MFN status extension, congressional rules still enabled Democrats to rally behind their president. Under the so-called "king-of-the-hill" procedure, the last proposal, if adopted, prevails. Democratic members of Congress first took up and adopted a bill to codify Clinton's executive order renewing China's free trade status. This time, Representative Lee H. Hamilton, a moderate from Indiana and the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, sponsored the bill. Then, Pelosi offered her amendment to the Hamilton bill that denied the MFN status extension to products manufactured or exported by the Chinese army or state-owned enterprises.

As Republicans were united behind Clinton and Democrats highly divided (111-145), the Committee of the Whole rejected the Pelosi amendment, thus leaving the Hamilton proposal intact. Earlier on the same day, the House had overwhelmingly rejected (75-356) the Solomon-sponsored resolution to revoke MFN status for all Chinese products. In this unified government, congressional Democrats successfully saved their president's reputation and took their diverse position at the same time.

The Republican Revolution in the 1994 midterm elections reshaped the congressional debates about trade with China. GOP control of both chambers signified the importance of a new breed of Republican members in the congressional policymaking processes. The freshman class of Republicans under the "Contract with America"

[90] *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*1993, p.184

weighed economic nationalism (Conley 1999), fiscal responsibility (Broz 2005), and religious freedom (Karol 2005) more heavily in their voting decisions than did their senior colleagues. As a result, opponents of China's MFN status tried to woo support from those first-term Republicans, who were apparently less supportive of free trade than were traditional conservative GOP members.

Republican freshmen rallied behind Doug Bereuter (R-NE), the chairman of the House Foreign Relations Asia Subcommittee, when he drafted a bill to press China to "improve its human rights and trade practices and to curtail its military buildup and export of arms" (CQ Almanac 1995, 2-93). The House overwhelmingly passed this China Policy Act of 1995 by a 416-10 vote. Without any trade sanction provisions, however, the legislation was ultimately regarded as nothing but a symbolic gesture. Then, Frank R. Wolf (R-VA) offered a motion to table the joint resolution to disapprove China's MFN status and the House agreed to the motion by a 321-107 vote.[91]

From 1996 through 1999, congressional debates over China's NTR repeated a similar pattern. During the floor debates, China critics tried to immunize themselves against charges that they were soft on China. Anti-China lawmakers criticized the Chinese government for its military intimidation of Taiwan, the proliferation and sales of weapons, and abuses of human rights and religious freedom. The anti-China bloc urged colleagues to disapprove a presidential waiver of the Jackson-Vanik amendment for the grant of China's NTR status.

[91] During the 109th Congress, Congressman Frank R. Wolf (R-VA) is the co-chairman of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, a bipartisan organization of about two hundred House members that identifies and works to alleviate human rights abuses worldwide. In the 1995 congressional controversy over China's MFN status, Rep. Wolf tabled a resolution he himself had sponsored that would have revoked MFN status for China and instead called for the passage of the China Policy Act of 1995.

Although a majority of NTR supporters also made it clear that they did not necessarily endorse the Beijing regime, after a several-hour debate full of vocal criticism against Chinese leaders, the House continued to reject the idea of protectionism against China (141-286 in 1996, 173-259 in 1997, 166-264 in 1998, 170-260 in 1999). Democrat Charles Rangel from New York, a Korean War veteran, succinctly pointed out:

> "these Chinese, these communist bums, shot me over there in 1950. I do not like any communists…. But, I do not know whether the United States of America has to have a litmus test with who we trade with." *(CQ Almanac 1996, 9-10)*

Clinton's Permanent NTR and George W. Bush's Last Renewal: 2000-2001

In his final year in the White House, President Clinton made an all-out effort to win congressional support of China's permanent NTR status. He considered this China trade policy as one of his "legacy" issues (Shoch 2001, Suettinger 2003). In return for the Chinese government's drastic cut of tariffs, quotas and other trade barriers on U.S. exports to China in 1999, the Clinton administration agreed to support China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). On China's accession to the WTO, President Clinton remarked:

> "China's entry into the WTO … is about more than our economic interests. It is clearly in our larger national interest. It represents the most significant opportunity that we have had to create positive change in China since the 1970s… The path that China takes to the future is a choice China will make. We cannot control that choice, we can only influence it… We can work to pull China in the right direction, or we can turn our backs and almost certainly push it in the wrong direction. The WTO agreement will move China in the right direction." *(Suettinger 2003, 393)*

The Chinese government's efforts to join the institution governing global commerce, however, conflicted with the annual extension process of NTR status required by the Jackson-Vanik amendment. WTO rules obligate member countries to grant "permanent" NTR (PNTR) status for one another's trade products. With the full support of business leaders, as well as of the high-tech and agricultural sectors, President Clinton

appealed to his fellow Democrats in Congress to follow his leadership for the expansion of U.S. business and trade opportunities in China.

Congressional Quarterly Almanac (2000, 20-3) reported that Clinton's push for the PNTR status legislation came "at a particularly uncomfortable time for Democrats." When trying hard to take back control of the House, Democrats knew that the passage of PNTR for China (HR 4444) would upset the very constituents they desperately needed during the November election. Labor unions, human rights activists, and environmental groups, as well as conservative veterans groups and religious organizations, were all opposed to giving permanent grant of free trade status to China. Those opponents claimed that congressional approval of PNTR would not only constitute a bad trade policy costing thousands of quality American jobs, but would also abandon an effective leverage tool for pressing China on labor, human rights and national security issues.

Conversely, businesses, farmers, and export-oriented manufacturers vigorously supported free trade with China. Their argument in support of granting PNTR status to China was that the passage of the PNTR bill would not only open greater business and trade opportunities for American products and investments, but also engage Chinese leaders to enhance interdependence with the global community. Pro-business Democrats were largely supportive of free trade with China. Democratic members from districts with high-tech industries also took favorable positions towards free trade policy .

When members of Congress began to engage in this pivotal debate over trade policy toward China, House Minority Whip David E. Bonior (D-MI) turned out to be a leading opponent of PNTR, acting against his own party's president. Bonior, a long-time supporter of labor unions, was joined by the Republican chair of the House International

Relations Committee Benjamin A. Gilman of New York and the co-chair of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus Frank R. Wolf (R-VA). Both Gilman and Wolf have been influential critics of China's repression of human rights and religious freedom. On the side of supporting PNTR was the Republican leadership, including the Rules Committee Chair California Congressman David Dreier and Representative Bill Archer (R-TX), the Ways and Means Committee Chair. In addition, a large number of rank-and-file GOP members supported business interests and free trade policy.

The PNTR legislation, however, was a wedge issue for both parties. As the House approached the final vote on China's PNTR on May 24, 2000, more than 100 cross-pressured members had not yet made up their minds. As illustrated by the *2000 Congressional Quarterly Almanac,* Representative Martin T. Meehan (D-MA) was one of those cross-pressured legislators. For Rep. Meehan, free trade with China would help flourishing high-tech industries in his district of northwest Boston. At the same time, as the co-sponsor of campaign finance reform in Congress, he was also deeply concerned that PNTR status for China would ultimately render irrelevant external pressures on the country's handling of human rights and intellectual property rights.[92]

Ultimately, the House GOP leadership decided to incorporate the proposal written by Representatives Levin (D-MI) and Bereuter (R-NE) into the PNTR bill, greatly enhancing the prospects of final passage. The Levin-Bereuter proposal included the provision of "anti-surge safeguards" and won over as many as thirty wavering members. The provision would enable the president to increase tariffs and quotas to provide relief

[92] Other undecided and senior members were Representatives Charles B. Rangel of New York, the ranking Democrat on the Ways and Means Committee, and Henry J. Hyde (R-IL), the Republican chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. These members eventually embraced pro-China positions during the week of May 15, less than ten days before the final passage vote.

to specific domestic industries and workers, when the U.S. International Trade Commission regarded a surge of Chinese imports as threatening to disrupt the U.S. market. The final vote over the PNTR legislation was 237-197, with more than one-third of the House Democrats (73-138) joining nearly three-quarters of Republican members (164-57) to usher China into the new global economy. Table 4.1 and 4.2 present details of China vote outcomes.

II. Empirical Analyses: Position Taking versus Party Change

What makes legislators choose to support or oppose normal trade relation status with China? One factor might be economic (Epstein and O'Halloran 1996, Fordham 1998b, Brady, Goldstein, Kessler 2002, Milner and Judkins 2004): lawmakers who represented districts vulnerable to foreign trade were less inclined to support NTR extensions to China. For instance, given the character of imported goods from China, congressional districts with "textile" industry interests were more likely to see their representatives voting against the NTR extensions.

A second might be geopolitical and ideological (Trubowitz 1992, 1998, Fordham 1998a, Schiller 1999): knowing where lawmakers generally stand on US support for the security of Japan and South Korea might function as a good predictor of where they stood on engagement policy towards China such as the NTR extension. Conservative members are regarded as more "hawkish" than liberals in Congress. Uslaner (2000), however, suggests that taking into account the political influence of social and religious

conservatives on the Republican Party, especially after the 1994 election, the GOP's ideological credo for free trade began to fade.

A third might be institutional and partisan (Fiorina 1974, Asher and Weisberg 1978, Arnold 1990, Rohde 1991, Aldrich 1995): if a legislator was a member of the presidential party and the president supported free trade with China, the member was likely to have engaged in the politics of "protecting our president." To prevent the other party's strategic move to "embarrass their president", presidential party members tended to unite behind their co-partisan president. Also, factional interests and motivations might have led some members to act collectively in legislative processes. Members of the House New Democrat Coalition, for instance, voted together in the 107th Congress (2000-2001) to prove their positions supporting free trade through China's NTR extension.

The Constituency Pressure Explanation

What is noticeable about constituency pressures in the era of globalization is that constituents are more likely to view certain foreign policies as conflicting with their domestic interests. As a result, voters tend to hold their representatives more accountable than before for their foreign policy votes (Rohde 1994, Lindsay 1994, Trubowitz 1992, 1998).[93]

[93] Foreign policies used to be largely "foreign" to domestic conflicts. As a result, members generally voted in deference to the executive branch. Constituents back in districts now, however, have various understandings of foreign policy and observe whether their representatives on Capitol Hill vote in accordance with their own views on a foreign policy.

Pastor's (1983) finding in the congressional-executive trade policy interaction is a case in point. Pastor claims that legislators "cry" to avoid blame and take protectionism positions to represent constituency demands, but they "sigh" after the president and executive branch finally prevail and implement free-trade policies for national interests. As Nokken (2003) points out, the

Obviously, trade with China made various economic interests at stake in the members' voting decisions (Schiller 1999, Hasnat and Callahan 2002). I consider farm and manufacturing interests in trade policy towards China. My test is about the relevance of congressional districts' "farmer" population percentages and "manufacturing" employment percentages in explaining legislators' position shifts over the NTR extension. Legislators representing the agricultural and manufacturing industries are hypothesized to address China's NTR renewal as a "free-trade" vote in general. To the contrary, if a legislator is from a district with a high percentage of blue-collar workers and significant unemployment rates, the member is hypothesized to be more likely to blame China for unfair competition and thus vote against free trade with China. I assume that members from those districts view the China NTR legislation as an opportunity to cast an "anti-globalization" vote (Baumgartner et al 2001, Jackson and Engel 2003, Victor 2003).

In addition, I test whether members from districts with a large military population would see the NTR extension decision as a vote over "China containment" policy. Legislators might believe that granting NTR status to China is an "engagement" policy toward the country, whereas denying China NTR status is an effective "containment" policy meant to blunt the potential of China rising as a military rival. President Clinton also spoke from a strategic and geopolitical perspective in his communications and speeches on the issue of China's entry into the WTO (Suettinger 2003). For the tests of

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battle over NTR extension to China seems to have had many factors in common with Pastor's "cry-sigh-syndrome." Members used China's NTR debates and votes to ventilate constituents' complains and concerns about that country, from human rights abuse to religious repression to weapons sales. Many members, however, voted against China's NTR extension with the full knowledge or even confidence that their votes would not affect the policy outcome, which was to stay the free trade course.

constituency pressures from economic to geopolitical perspectives, I use Scott Adler's congressional district data.

The Ideology Explanation

The literature on Congress and foreign policy includes no shortage of scholarly works pointing to legislator ideology as the key determinant for in voting decisions. The more conservative a legislator is, the more likely he or she is to vote for "hawkish" policies. I rely on DW-NOMINATE Scores provided by Poole and Rosenthal (1997) to gauge the impact of ideology on members' voting decisions and changes in such decisions over time.[94]

What is also interesting over the issue of China's NTR extension is the emergence of an "ends-against-the-middle" voting coalition (McRae 1970, 51; Poole and Rosenthal 1997, Nokken 2003). Those members of Congress with extreme ideological convictions tend to be most vocal against pro-China policy on Capitol Hill, thus establishing a strange congressional coalition composed of both liberals and conservatives. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) illustrate an odd alliance between conservative Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina and liberal Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts over foreign policy toward Central America.

Liberals and conservatives have different motivations for their bipartisan voting coalition against China. Some liberal legislators opposed the granting of NTR to China

[94] The American Security Council (ASC) has also provided the National Security Index (NSI) every year since 1969 by checking whether legislators vote with their policy preferences in the national security arena (Lindsay 1990, 1991). The NSI index, compiled as the "hawkishness" ratings of legislators, cannot be compared long-term, however, due to different sets of votes occurring over time and across chambers. The NSI index and DW-NOMINATE Scores, however, provide almost identical empirical findings.

on the grounds that the Chinese government should have been punished for its empty efforts at promoting human rights and improved environmental conditions in China. Some conservative members voted to revoke China's NTR status because they believed that they had to press China to protect religious freedom in the most populous country in the world.

A particularly strange partnership of China critics formed in the Senate, where Charles E. Schumer, a liberal Democrat from New York, teamed up with Lindsey Graham, a conservative Republican from South Carolina.[1] Together, they co-sponsored a measure that would impose a 27.5 percent tariff on Chinese imports if China does not revalue its currency. On March 2006, the Chinese government even invited these two senators to Beijing to present their side of the undervalued currency debate.[95]

I categorize members by their DW-NOMINATE Scores to find out who were at the more ideological extremes and to see whether those members with polarizing ideologies vote together against China. Following Poole and Rosenthal, DW-NOMINATE Scores range from -1 (most liberal) to +1 (most conservative). I regarded members with DW-NOMINATE Scores of greater than +0.5 (conservative) or less than -0.5 (liberal) as having strong ideological tendencies. For example, James Sensenbrenner (+ 0.755 in 2000), a conservative from Wisconsin, and Michigan Congressman John Conyers (-0.751 in 2000) fit this classification. By contrast, if a member's score was within the range of plus or minus 0.2 (between + 0.2 and - 0.2), I classified them as moderates. Fleisher and Bond (2004) used the same categorization. In short, the more ideologically extreme the member, the more likely he or she was hypothesized to cast

[95] Joseph Kahn. 2006. "China tries to win over pro-tariff senators" *The New York Times*, March 24, 2006.

position-taking votes against China and the less likely to change his or her position on China's NTR extension.

The Partisan and Procedural Explanation

Legislative procedures often shape members' position-taking strategies, which in turn reshape the legislative outcome for the extension of China's free trade status. Members of Congress not only comply with constituency pressures and interest group demands but also weigh in strategic choices and procedural contexts when they make their roll-call voting decisions over China policy. Nokken (2003), in particular, points out that if members of Congress had truly wanted to restructure the trade policymaking process toward China, they should have introduced new legislation enabling a new voting coalition to form on this issue.

Until the debate on PNTR in 2000, however, members of Congress had chosen to stick to the joint resolution measures. In fact, once the president issues the annual extension of China's free trade status, it becomes highly unlikely that Congress will revoke the president's decision. Suettinger (2003, 461) explains why:

> "By statute, a disapproval resolution must be reported out of committee within 30 days of the June 3 deadline for extending MFN (NTR). It is not amendable and debate is limited to 20 hours, while the resolution must be approved by August 31."

Under these procedural constraints, − or opportunities − party members are inclined to be more interested in position-taking strategies than in coalition-building movements. Instead of fighting and negotiating for separate legislation addressing diverse and controversial China issues, members of Congress could easily score political points by casting their own votes to express their positions about China. Voting on trade

policy toward China provided members with a rare legislative opportunity to publicly state various concerns related to China.

Finally, it is worth noting that the debate over trade with China during the 1990s had proceeded during an era of partisan gridlock and a polarized Congress (Binder 1996, 2003, Coleman 1996, Fleisher and Bond 2001, Theriault 2004). Gilmour's (1995) terms of "strategic disagreements," as a result, are relevant for the understanding of US policy towards China from 1989 to 2001 (Rohde 1991, Gilmour 1995, Shoch 2001, Layman and Carsey 2002, Roberts and Smith 2003, Lee 2006). A party's position over China policy largely depends on which party controls the White House and which party is a majority coalition in Congress.

More specifically, Democrats, in an about-face, gave up their opposition to China's free trade status in 1993 to support their president in the White House. Just a year before 1993, with a Republican in the oval office, congressional Democrats were strongly opposed to China's MFN status. Just two years after 1993, however, the same Democrats once again became hostile to free trade with China after losing control of Congress . So, my test here centers on the hypothesis that legislators are more likely to oppose the granting of NTR to China if the White House is occupied by a president from the other party.

III. Results

For testing the diverse hypotheses about members' continuous position taking, I first constructed a pooled dataset. It is composed of those members who had been

members from Congress *t-1* to Congress *t*. The dependent variable is 1 if a continuing member stood by his or her positions taken from the previous Congress (Congress in *t-1*). And, it is coded 0 if the member switched his or her position from Congress *t-1* to Congress *t*. The form of continuous position taking is twofold: either both pro-China in *t-1* and in *t* or both anti-China in *t-1* and in *t*.[96] Table 4.3 presents the results of conditional logistic regression analyses for the House from 1990 to 2001.

Table 4.3 shows a diverse pattern of position taking by party members over trade policy towards China. Independent variables such as blue-collar workers, farmers, and manufacturers turn out to be statistically significant factors for members' position-taking votes in Congress. More specifically, the greater the number of blue-collar workers in a district, the more likely the member of Congress was to shift voting positions. This result seems to have a great deal to do with the indirect impact of blue-collar workers on the Democratic Party. On the one hand, Democrats tend to represent more low-income workers than Republicans do. On the other hand, Democrats had experienced a diverse set of party statuses, including holding the presidency while being a minority in Congress, during the 1990s. Particularly when the Clinton administration pressed free trade policy towards China as its legacy issue, Democrats arguably could not be united in their opposition to China's MFN extension.

This is clearer when considering how significant and consistent agricultural and manufacturing interests were in explaining members' favorable and stable voting patterns. The results confirm that members from districts with a large number of farmers or manufacturers strongly approved free trade with China. Moreover, they did so

[96] The results reported here in this section focus on consistent position taking by members of Congress. For the analysis of vote choice in each Congress, see the Appendix.

consistently from 1990 to 2001. When Republicans wanted to embarrass the Democratic president by rejecting the extension of China's NTR status, they were cross-pressured from both the party and the constituency. The results, however, demonstrate that Republican members mostly voted for their constituency preferences if they came from farm or manufacturing districts.

Another interesting finding from the pooled analysis was the impact of members' ideology on position taking. According to the analyses, the "ends-against-the-middle" coalition seemed to exist but not persist. Instead, the conditional logistic regression analysis shows that moderate members were active in casting their position-taking votes. Members with DW-NOMINATE Scores between -0.2 and +0.2 voted consistently over the issue of China's NTR extension, whether they were pro-China or anti-China. Members with DW scores greater than +0.5 or smaller than -0.5 revealed no statistical substance in their voting stability over the MFN extension for China.

One explanation concerning the impact of ideological intensity on opinions over China policy might be related to the nature of a polarized Congress in the 1990s. If legislative parties are truly polarized, then, by definition, even party members with strong ideological convictions contrary to the party position will sometimes toe the party line on important votes in Congress. The first Democratic administration in twelve years led even strongly liberal Democrats to switch their votes in support of their president in 1993. Thus, highly ideological Democrats, not centrists and moderates, shifted their policy stance towards China. In the end, members with strong ideological beliefs in a polarized Congress were more likely to change their positions as long as their parties needed them to do so.

To the contrary, moderates have weaker ties with their party leadership; consequently, constituents' pressures make their positions consistent over time. Party leadership also seemed to have less influence on moderate members when those members' position-taking strategies were prevailing in the congressional debates over China policy. Given that the denial of China's NTR status was highly unlikely, centrist lawmakers had strong incentives to present their consistent positions in accordance with their constituencies, who seldom shifted their opinions. Table 4.4 illustrates the classification of diverse partisan and factional positions over China policy as a wedge issue.

In addition, results from table 4.5 demonstrate the difference between position taking and party change. From 1990 to 1999, the congressional role was to disapprove, if necessary, the presidential renewal of NTR status for China. Position-taking strategies were dominant when congressional members realized the difficulty of enacting new legislation dealing with trade and China. Meanwhile, the Clinton administration's push for passage of permanent NTR status in 2000 set in place a totally different game and rules. A return to "normal politics," this game was about coalition building, negotiation, roll-call voting, and the passage of a final bill. When members of Congress confronted a traditional lawmaking processes, ideology and partisanship became critical again.

Table 4.5 shows how members of Congress behaved in a different legislative situation. A significant number of Democrats discarded their once favorable positions over free trade with China. With the exception of pro-business Democrats, most Democrats returned to their traditional stance of "fair trade" protectionism. Some members with extreme ideologies also defected from the "end-against-the-middle"

coalition and supported free trade with China. Not a single moderate lawmaker changed from being against NTR to being for PNTR in 2000. In addition, constituency pressures did not work for members to shift their trade policy positions towards China. This result concurs with Nokken's (2003) findings that the crucial legislative battle over China's permanent free trade status in 2000 signified partisan cleavages with little room left for members' strategic position taking.[97]

IV. Conclusion

The complex China issue illustrates that constituency pressures and interest group demands often conflict with other political factors. For instance, constituents, many of whom used to hold traditional free trade positions and support China's NTR, now show emotional concerns about religious freedom in China. Constituents, many of whom once had a favorable view of engagement policy toward China, now worry about human rights abuses by the Chinese government. Also, members facing less direct pressures from constituents still vote over China policy; for these members, party leadership and ideology often emerge as key determinants of their voting decisions. Along with demand-based accounts of congressional policies towards China, this chapter revisits ideological, procedural and partisan dimensions of China's NTR debates in Congress to explain members' position taking and party change.

I conducted statistical analyses to explore congressional members' strategic voting behavior over China policy. Party members not only represented their

[97] In Appendix, I explain how members of Congress voted over another extension of China's NTR in 2001.

constituents' trade-related concerns, but also spoke out about the "China problem." Members of Congress from districts with significant farming and manufacturing interests were particularly prone to vote for China's free trade status. Members representing blue-collar districts, on the other hand, took hostile positions to China. Liberal and conservative members formed an "ends-against-the-middle" coalition and voted together to revoke China's NTR status during the annual debates (Karol 2005). Bipartisan members resenting China approached the trade vote and took clear positions against China.

In the end, as diverse voting determinants such as interests, ideologies, and institutional frameworks interacted with each other, China policy became a wedge issue for both parties and consequently for neither party. Republicans saw a divide within the Democratic Party between business-oriented pro-China groups and blue-collar-focused anti-China forces. Democrats also found Republicans split between religion-based conservatives and traditional free trade supporters. Due to the nature of China policy as a wedge for both parties, members' frequent position taking ultimately did not influence party change over trade policy towards China. Traditional partisan voting was reinstated over the PNTR debate in 2000.

These findings are important for a better understanding of American foreign policy toward China in the age of post-Cold War globalization. Compared to the Cold War era, economic interests now play a bigger role in the American foreign policymaking processes. At the same time, quite contrary to the "economic-determinism" argument often dominant in the globalization debate, many other factors including social, cultural, and ideological interests also play critical roles in forming the new relationship between

the United States and China. In sum, analyzing the congressional politics of China's NTR extension helps to unmask the hidden impact of domestic interests on American foreign policy choices and changes towards China.

Figure 4.1 Partisan Supports for NTR Status Extension to China, 1990-2000



Source: calculated by the author, from *Congressional Quarterly Almanac,* various years.

Figure 4.2 Partisan Differences for NTR Status Extension to China, 1990-2000



Source: calculated by the author, from *Congressional Quarterly Almanac,* various years.

Figure 4.3. Who Changed Positions on China's NTR?: Republicans vs. Democrats, from 1990 to 2001



Source: calculated by the author, from *Congressional Quarterly Almanac,* various years.

Figure 4.4 Who Changed Positions on China's NTR?



Source: calculated by the author, from *Congressional Quarterly Almanac,* various years.

Table 4.1 House Roll-Call Votes on the Renewal of China's Free Trade Status, from 1990 to 1998

Year	*Total (yea-nay)*	*Republicans*	*Democrats*	*Northern Democrats*	*Southern Democrats*
1990	247-174	81-90	166-84	117-53	49-31
1991	223-204	51-112	171-92	119-60	53-32
1992	258-135	76-79	181-56	121-41	60-15
1993	105-318	63-108	41-210	25-143	16-67
1994	75-356	36-141	38-215	27-145	11-70
1995[a]	321-107	178-52	143-54	96-40	47-14
1996	141-286	65-167	75-119	62-75	13-44
1997	173-259	79-147	93-112	74-76	19-36
1998	166-264	78-149	87-115	73-76	14-39

Note: a = 1995 vote was on the motion to table so that a "yea" was a vote in support of the president's position of the MFN extension for China.
All other votes suggest that a "nay" was a vote in support of the president's position of free trade with China.

Table 4.2 Three House Roll-Call Votes on the Annual Extension versus Permanent Grant: Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status for China in 1999, 2000, 2001

	1999 H J Res 57	**2000 HR 4444**	**2001 H J Res 50**
Date	July 27, 1999	May 24, 2000	July 19, 2001
Description	Disapprove NTR with China	Passage of the bill that would make NTR with China permanent	Disapproving NTR with China
Outcome	Rejected 170-260	Passed 237-197	Rejected 169-259
Republican	71-150	164-57	62-157
Democrat	98-110	73-138	105-102
Northern Democrat	81-72	43-114	89-65
Southern Democrat	17-38	30-24	16-37
New Democrat	10-53	n/a	18-55

Note: A "nay" was a vote in support of the president's position in 1999 and 2001, whereas a "yea" was a vote in favor of the president's position in 2000.
I am still searching for the vote count of the House New Democrat Coalition for PNTR in 2000.

Table 4.3 Conditional Logistic Regression Estimation of Pooled Model for the Whole Period (1990-2001): Continuing Members and Voting Stability over China's NTR

	No Vote Changes over China's Free Trade Status Extension (1990-2001)
Constituency	
Blue collar	-0.105 (0.05) **
Manufacturer	0.053 (0.03) *
Farmer	0.152 (0.05) ***
Military	0.031 (0.04)
Unemployed	-0.026 (0.07)
Income	-0.000 (0.00)
Ideology	
Extreme	0.028 (0.11)
Moderate	0.303 (0.14) **
Party	
Democrat	0.010 (0.03)
North	0.034 (0.12)
Northern Democrat	-0.007 (0.03)
N	2931
Log-likelihood	-1402.21
Pseudo-R^2	0.0086

Note:
(1) *** significant at 0.01; ** significant at 0.05; * significant at 0.1
(2) Dependent Variable is 1 if no vote change in Congress t from Congress t-1, 0 otherwise

Table 4.4 *China Vote as a Wedge Issue*: A Classification of Partisan Positions on China

Issue Areas	Republicans	"Gingrich GOP"	Democrats	"New Democrats"
Trade	Pro-China	Anti-China	Anti-China	Pro-China
Human Rights	-	-	Anti-China	Anti-China
Religious Freedom	Anti-China	Anti-China	-	-
Engagement Policy	Anti-China	Anti-China	Pro-China	Pro-China
Environmental Policy	-	-	Anti-China	Anti-China

Note:
(3) Gingrich GOP refers to Republican lawmakers who arrived at Congress through the so-called Republican Revolution in the 1994 midterm election. The new breed of Republicans strongly supported the Gingrich leadership in the format of the "Contract with America." They were known as more interested in religious freedom and nationalist economic approaches than traditional Republicans (Conley 1999, Stonecash et al 2002)
(4) For the origin and character of "New Democrats," see Hale (1995), Rae (1996), Baer (2000), and Seo and Theriault (2007)

Table 4.5 Vote Changes From Annual NTR in 1999 To Permanent NTR for China in 2000: Logistic Regression Analysis of Vote Changes by Continuing Members, 1999-2000

	From Pro-China in 1999 To Anti-China in 2000
Constituency	
Blue collar	0.106 (0.16)
Manufacturer	-0.008 (0.10)
Farmer	-0.132 (0.21)
Military	-0.237 (0.22)
Unemployed	0.033 (0.25)
Income	-0.000 (0.00)
Ideology	
Extreme	-0.729 (0.40) *
Moderate	-0.521 (0.60)
Party	
Democrat	1.462 (0.73) **
North	0.244 (0.75)
Northern Democrat	0.284 (0.86)
N	394
Log-likelihood	-129.52
Pseudo-R^2	0.12
% Correctly Predicted	87.6%

Note:
a = Moderate variable (DW Score <+-0.2) predicts failure perfectly so that Moderate variables dropped and 35 observations were not used.
In other words, not a single member with moderate ideology has changed from anti-China in 1999 to pro-China in 2000.
(5) *** significant at 0.01; ** significant at 0.05; * significant at 0.1
(6) Dependent Variable is 1 if vote change from 1999 to 2000 as explained, 0 otherwise

Figure 4.5 The Substantive Significance of the Explanatory Variables: Voting For and Against China's Permanent NTR in 2000



Table 4.6 From Permanent NTR in 2000 to Annual NTR Back Again in 2001: Logit Analysis of Vote Changes by Continuing Members

	Position Change *From Pro-China in 2000 To Anti-China in 2001*	**Position Change** *From Anti-China in 2000 To Pro-China in 2001*	**No Position Change** *Anti-China in 2000 and 2001*
Constituency			
Blue collar	-0.029 (0.25)	0.208 (0.17)	**0.482 (0.14)** ***
Manufacturer	0.087 (0.15)	-0.088 (0.10)	**-0.198 (0.08)***
Farmer	-0.175 (0.33)	-0.342 (0.28)	**-0.474 (0.18)** ***
Military	0.073 (0.23)	-0.109 (0.17)	**0.219 (0.11)** **
Unemployed	0.093 (0.39)	-0.189 (0.28)	0.198 (0.21)
Income	-0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Ideology			
Extreme	0.032 (0.47)	-0.124 (0.39)	**1.365 (0.27)** ***
Moderate	n/a[a]	-0.375 (0.62)	0.619 (0.48)
Party			
Democrat	0.406 (0.85)	**2.281 (0.73)** ***	-0.539 (0.49)
North	0.774 (0.68)	0.211 (0.76)	-0.571 (0.40)
Northern Democrat	-1.521 (1.01)	-0.940 (0.86)	**2.165 (0.56)** ***
Constant	-2.601 (3.18)	-3.952 (2.22) *	**-4.700 (1.70)** ***
N	361	395	395
Log-likelihood	-80.15	-127.76	-204.88
Pseudo-R^2	0.03	0.10	0.20
% Correctly Predicted	93.9%	88.4%	74.4%

Note: a = Moderate variable (DW Score <+-0.2) predicts failure perfectly so that Moderate variables dropped and 34 observations were not used.
In other words, not a single member with moderate ideology has changed from pro-China in 2000 to anti-China in 2001.
(7) *** significant at 0.01; ** significant at 0.05; * significant at 0.1; Dependent Variable is 1 if vote change from 2000 to 2001 as explained, 0 otherwise

Figure 4.6 Average State Opposition against China's NTR Extension: Position Taking vs. Party Change

Annual Extension of NTR in 1999



Permanent Grant of NTR in 2000

Table 4.7 Logit Analysis of Congress-to-Congress Votes to Revoke China's Free Trade Status

	1990 (101st Congress)	1991 (102nd Congress)	1993 (103rd Congress)	1995 (104th Congress)	1997 (105th Congress)	1999 (106th/1st Session)	2000 (106th/2ND Session)	2001 (107th Congress)
Constituency								
Blue collar	-0.007 (0.10)	-0.011 (0.11)	0.398 (0.13)***	0.417 (0.12)***	0.558 (0.12)***	0.531 (0.13)***	0.560 (0.14)***	0.425 (0.13)***
Manufacturer	0.009 (0.06)	0.010 (0.06)	-0.111 (0.08)	-0.132 (0.07)*	-0.230 (0.07)***	-0.257 (0.08)***	-0.240 (0.08)***	-0.155 (0.07)**
Farmer	-0.337 (0.10)***	-0.480 (0.12)***	-0.405 (0.20)**	-0.415 (0.20)**	-0.341 (0.15)**	-0.492 (0.16)***	-0.593 (0.17)***	-0.500 (0.16)***
Military	-0.029 (0.07)	0.029 (0.07)	0.103 (0.08)	0.148 (0.08)*	0.139 (0.08)*	0.141 (0.08)*	0.078 (0.08)	0.124 (0.08)
Unemployed	0.023 (0.14)	0.086 (0.16)	-0.453 (0.23)**	-0.310 (0.21)	-0.041 (0.18)	-0.263 (0.19)	-0.019 (0.21)	0.224 (0.20)
Income	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)**	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)***	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Ideology								
Extreme	-0.044 (0.27)	0.893 (0.30)***	0.198 (0.30)	1.254 (0.26)***	1.225 (0.24)***	1.483 (0.25)***	1.233 (0.27)***	1.253 (0.25)***
Moderate	-0.334 (0.26)	-0.303 (0.28)	0.636 (0.33)**	-0.312 (0.49)	0.315 (0.43)	0.082 (0.44)	0.267 (0.43)	0.273 (0.44)
Party								
First-term	-0.103 (0.36)	-1.011 (0.37)***	-0.150 (0.26)	-0.345 (0.34)	-0.138 (0.29)	-0.784 (0.41)**	-0.330 (0.40)	-0.499 (0.45)
Democrat	0.668 (0.41)*	1.315 (0.43)***	-1.672 (0.47)***	-0.029 (0.48)	-0.197 (0.43)	0.031 (0.44)	0.874 (0.44)**	-0.109 (0.45)
North	0.338 (0.40)	-0.159 (0.43)	-1.285 (0.37)***	-0.411 (0.37)	-0.390 (0.33)	-0.270 (0.35)	-0.304 (0.36)	-0.123 (0.35)
Northern Dem	-0.329 (0.48)	-0.062 (0.50)	1.690 (0.47)***	0.668 (0.54)	1.101 (0.49)**	1.266 (0.50)***	1.531 (0.50)***	1.409 (0.51)
GOP since 1995	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.445 (0.35)	0.685 (0.36)*	0.619 (0.38)*	0.603 (0.39)
Constant	0.778 (1.28)	0.634 (1.39)	-2.395 (1.66)	-3.431 (1.66)**	-4.528 (1.50)***	-2.872 (1.53)*	-4.130 (1.68)***	-3.939 (1.60)***
log likelihood	-284.95	-254.12	-212.13	-215.40	-256.62	-244.57	-226.87	-239.03
pseudo-R^2	0.05	0.16	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.16	0.24	0.18
% correctly predicted	60.5%	68.3%	78.2%	77.2%	68.5%	70.6%	74.7%	74.0%

(8) N=435 in each year case. *** significant at 0.01; ** significant at 0.05; * significant at 0.1

(9) Dependent variable is the legislator's position on China's NTR extension (1 = opposes, 0 = otherwise)

(10) Extreme ideology is the case of DW-NONINATE Scores>+0.5 or <-0.5. Moderate is DW scores between -0.2 and +0.2

Table 4.8 Conditional (Fixed-effects) Logistic Regression Estimation of Pooled Model for the Whole Period from 1990 to 2001: Congressional Opposition to China's NTR Extension

	Congressional Opposition To NTR Extension to China, 1990 - 2001
Constituency	
Blue collar	0.284 (0.04) ***
Manufacturer	-0.109 (0.02) ***
Farmer	-0.387 (0.05) ***
Military	0.070 (0.03) ***
Unemployed	0.032 (0.05)
Income	0.000 (0.00) ***
Ideology	
Extreme	0.817 (0.08) ***
Moderate	0.055 (0.11)
Party	
First-term	-0.341 (0.11) ***
Democrat	0.005(0.01)
North	0.144 (0.09)
Northern Democrat	0.013 (0.02)
N	3480
Log-likelihood	-2065.97
Pseudo-R^2	0.07

Note: *** significant at 0.01.

Figure 4.7 NTR Extensions to China and Average State Support, from 1990 to 2000



Source: calculated by the author, from *Congressional Quarterly Almanac,* various years.

Figure 4.8 Farm State vs. Textile State: State Delegation Average Support for Free Trade with China, Nebraska Delegation vs. South Carolina Delegation, 1990-2001



Source: calculated by the author, from *Congressional Quarterly Almanac,* various years.

Chapter Five: Party Cohesion, Party Competition, and Party Change

> *"Only after Rayburn passed from the scene did the caucus become usable as an instrument for the assertion of mainstream Democratic policy. This occurred not as the result of initiatives by the elected leadership of the caucus but rather was pressed on the leadership in increments by the Democratic Study Group, an increasingly effective organization of liberal and mainstream Democratic members. The main condition of their effectiveness was changes in the composition of the House Democratic caucus."*
>
> Nelson W. Polsby
> *How Congress Evolves*[98]

In August 1957, the Soviet Union tested the world's first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). In just two months, the "Evil Empire," as Ronald Reagan would later call the regime, announced its successful launch of *Sputnik*, the first man-made earth-orbiting satellite. These events sparked a national controversy in America. The debate over the so-called missile gap was about the perceived discrepancy between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the number and power of each country's ballistic missiles.

It was John F. Kennedy, then a 40-year-old Democratic senator from Massachusetts, who aggressively led the national security dispute. The young senator with national political ambitions declared that

> "The nation was losing the satellite-missile race with the Soviet Union because of … complacent miscalculations, penny-pinching, budget cutbacks, incredibly confused management, and wasteful rivalries and jealousies."[99]

[98] Polsby (2004, 74)
[99] Quote in Preble (2003, p.804)

Gearing up for his Senate reelection campaign during the summer of 1958, the Massachusetts senator also charged, "Surely, our nation's security overrides budgetary considerations."[100] Senator Kennedy and fellow Democrats criticized the Eisenhower administration for having placed fiscal concerns ahead of national security. The Democratic Party and its presidential candidate in 1960 ensured that the missile gap with America's Cold War rival was a significant component of their campaign strategy. Kennedy's call for a military buildup to close the gap received particular support from American workers displaced by the Republicans' "New Look" policy during the 1950s (Preble 2003).[101]

What this missile gap episode in the early Cold War period illustrates, among other points, is that national security has not always been a "Republican" issue (Mintz and Hicks 1984, Hart 1998, Hogan 1998). As a matter of fact, the Republican Party did not "own" the issue of national security during this period (Petrocik 1996). To the contrary, it was the Democrats who first pressed the issue of lagging missile development and continued to play out the national security card during the 1960 presidential election campaign (Gaddis 1982). It should also be noted that two Democratic administrations, those of FDR and Truman, fought World War II and forged Cold War containment policy.

Since the early 1970s, there has been a reversal of party advantage on the same issue. Many political commentators confirm that Republican efforts to undermine public confidence in Democratic toughness seem to perform well. President Reagan's military buildup against the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War under George H. W. Bush's

[100] *Congressional Record* (14 August 1958), 17571, 17572

[101] A prominent Cold War historian, John Lewis Gaddis (1982, 218) illustrated that Kennedy military buildup included "an increase of 150 percent in the number of nuclear weapons, a 200 percent boost in deliverable megatonnage, the construction of ten additional Polaris submarines and of 400 additional Minuteman missiles."

watch, and George W. Bush's leadership in the post-9/11 crisis have together cemented a strong image of the Republican Party in matters of national security. Conservative Republicans have successfully portrayed Democrats as being "soft" on national security. Virtually all Democratic presidential candidates since the 1980s have been put on the defense over national security debates (Coleman 1996, Destler 2001, Narizny 2003).[102]

In fact, political parties have constantly sought to obtain a favorable reputation and image over policy issues. Most scholarly works on party reputation deal with how party brand name influences electoral and legislative politics. Party-as-brand-name has been already given and Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005) proposed a thorough study of agenda-setting politics. Sellers (2002) analyzed the impacts of party image and label on party leaders' media strategies. Behavioral scholars including Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1994), Petrocik (1996), and Sellers (1998) linked the study of election campaigns with party label and policy reputation.[103]

Two recent studies in particular warrant mention for their focus on party transformation in American political history. First, Gerring (1998) analyzed how the ideologies and images of American parties have changed over time. Gerring disclaims the Hartzian contention that American parties are non-ideological and beset by the

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[102] Democratic Leadership Council, a moderate group within the Democratic Party, analyzed the defeat of their party's presidential candidate John Kerry in 2004 as follows:

> "While Senator Kerry convinced Americans we would be smarter on national security, he could not overcome the party's reputation for being weaker, and that was a deal-breaker for many voters who didn't want to take any chances with their security. In other words, Bush didn't pay the ultimate price for his foreign policy failures because we couldn't put to rest doubts about Democrats." ("What Happened?" By *New Dem Daily*, Nov 4, 2004)

[103] The notions of "issue ownership" (Petrocik 1996) and "message politics" (Sellers 1998, Evans 2001) pay attention to electoral implications of voter perception towards a party reputation and image. Evans (2001, 222), however, also focuses on pre-floor activism by party leadership and notes that "the issue ownership metaphor should not obscure the considerable discretion exercised by congressional leaders in formulating message agendas. A Congressional party may include in its message an issue area that advantages the other party if that matter is sufficiently salient."

American "liberal tradition" (Hartz 1955), and argues instead that the presidential wings of American parties have in fact been ideologically driven. His main point is that diverse ideologies have formed and transformed parties' policy positions. According to his classification of ideological epochs of American parties, the Whig-Republican Party stands for nationalism (1828-1924: state builders and economic nationalists) and neoliberalism (1928-1992: laissez-faire and small government). The Democratic Party has represented Jeffersonianism (1828-1892: white supremacy, antistatism, and civic republicanism), populism (1896-1948: suspicion against monopolies and big business and support of redistribution of wealth through government transfers), and universalism (1952-1992: a general rhetoric of inclusion). In the end, Gerring claims that it has been party leaders who propose a party position with an ideological mantle.

Tichenor's (2002) recent study of changing immigration policy regimes in America is another case in point. Tichenor stresses the dynamic interplay of four processes-– historically changing political institutions, policy alliances, privileged expertise, and international pressures. Contrary to Higham's (1966) classical case of the "volatile passions of nativism" during 1860-1925 and Freeman's (1995) focus on "cliental politics" in Western democracies, Tichenor offers the perspective of "historical institutionalism" and "path-dependence." Challenging Hartz' "liberal consensus," Tichenor offers a powerful rivalry of liberal, republican, and inegalitarian traditions over immigration policymaking processes (Smith 1993, Orren 1991). As a macro-level analysis of shifting immigration politics, Tichenor's work explains how institutional arrangements of the national state and party system interact with privileged expertise,

changing coalitions of interest groups, and international impacts in the policymaking processes.

These previous studies of party change largely center on party response to new policy demands. Scholars suggest that parties shift their united positions when they need to. Few studies have examined how party dynamics themselves (including party unity and competition) have affected the process of party branding and policy change. This dissertation takes on the premise that party members act collectively and simultaneously. My principal claim is that party position change is *endogenous* to the degree of intraparty split and interparty competition. That is, members' conflict and a rival party's concord play a critical role in shifting a party's policy stance.

First, each party makes a policy choice in the legislature and I consider a party's collective choice as a party position. How solid a position is, I assume, depends on how united members are on the position. Any party stance not universally supported by members does not necessarily convey an informative value of party label to voters. Second, party members aim to maximize the expected electoral and institutional payoff given the other party's policy position and party label (Kreps and Wilson 1982, Morton 1993).[104] The level of party competition affects the minds of party leaders in considering the seriousness of an inside party division. In sum, the dynamics of party branding are closely related to party unity and competition, which in turn are largely determined by the interaction between party leadership and rank-and-file members.

Students of congressional parties have long examined how the party leadership interacts with party members in Congress (Froman and Ripley 1865, Jones 1968,

[104] Snyder and Ting (2002) also suggest that party discipline changes the candidates' affiliation decisions. The scope and scale of such decisions determine ideological homogeneity in Congress and the informative value of party label in campaigns.

Peabody 1976, Rohde 1991, Cox and McCubbins 1993, Aldrich 1995, Sinclair 1995). The processes of committee assignment; campaign finance allocation; agenda setting and scheduling; and pork-barrel legislation are among the main venues where congressional scholars try to reveal the role and influence of leadership.[105]

Since the congressional reforms of the early 1970s, party leaders have wielded greater power. Rohde (1991, 36) found that "cohesive parties are the main precondition for strong leadership." In the post-reform House, according to Rohde, members' homogeneous policy preferences made institutional rules and party leadership stronger. Party leaders take advantages of their dominance over the Rules Committee where the leadership adjusts the legislative rules to make their case. Party theorists have also discussed the revival of a strong House speaker, once found in the era of the Reed and Cannon Speakerships at the turn of the twentieth century. Sinclair (1999), with some caveats, suggests that members of party leadership in the 104th and 105th Congress are closer to "transformational leaders" than "faithful agents."

To the contrary, this dissertation pays attention to the story of rank-and-file members. A particular focus is on legislators who break ranks with the party on key policy issues. Party members are sometimes cross-pressured between the constituency and the party. Schattschneider (1960, 65), in his seminal analysis of conflicts in politics, illustrated that:

> "Every political party consists of discordant elements which are restrained by the fact that unity is the price of victory. The question always is: *Which battle do we want most to win?*"

[105] Froman and Ripley in their analysis of the Democratic Party leadership 1965 listed up six factors for the leaders to be successful: 1) leadership commitment, knowledge, and activity 2) the nature of issues (procedural vs. substantive) 3) visibility of the issue 4) visibility of the action 5) constituency pressures and 6) the activity of state delegations.

Especially when a new policy environment arrives, a majority party in America inherently finds its members split between a status-quo group and a new party position force. Those cross-pressured legislators are in trouble. More specifically, members caught between party and constituency are neither disaffected enough to abandon their party position, nor electorally safe enough to do nothing in the legislature.

I argue that in legislative processes, those members under pressure tend to take policy positions that are different from positions of the national party. They use some intermediate votes as a position-taking opportunity in legislative processes. Cross-pressured members tend to side with their constituency and score political points. Then, casting a "make-or-break" final passage vote, party members often restore their faith in the party and hold onto party unity (Smith 1989, Schickler and Rich 1997, Cox and McCubbins 2005).[106]

When a rival party unites its members over wedge issues along with party defectors, party leaders are eventually forced to pay attention to policy defection threats from their cross-pressured members. Intraparty unity and interparty competition is critical for key policy changes in the American party system, although party position transformations and policy changes do not always come at the exact same time.[107]

[106] Contrary to Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005), Schickler and Rich (1997, 1342) claim that "party procedural control therefore varies considerably over time, and is dependent upon the size of the party majority and its homogeneity."

[107] Orren and Skowronek (2002, 746), relying on the notion of "path dependence," point out that "natural disasters, foreign disruptions, economic crises, and the like, may intrude from outside, but their impact is likely to be processed through identities, cleavages, and alliances that have been institutionally constructed."

Party Position Shifts and Ultimate Policy Changes: A Diverse Pattern

The case studies used in this dissertation to evaluate my theory of bottom-up party position shifts show a diverse pattern of ultimate policy change. The first case of Chinese exclusion in the post-Reconstruction period signifies a swift transformation of party positions. A bipartisan coalition of united Democrats and divided Republicans was solid enough to pass the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. Cross-pressured western and midwestern GOP members represented their constituents' anti-Chinese mood. In an environment of severe party competition during the Gilded Age, the Republicans failed to hold onto the label of Lincoln's party but became the party of "anti-Chinese."

Northern Democrats' threat of policy defection over national security and defense spending, as described in chapter 3, did not lead to an immediate policy change in the post-Vietnam Congress. Although the national party leadership was still dominated by southern Democrats, northern liberal members began to switch their votes on the issue of guns-versus-butter, supported by their local interests.[108] In addition, the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) controversy in the 91st Congress (1969-1970) triggered position-taking and coalition-building strategies by cross-pressured northern Democrats.

A détente policy by the Nixon administration brought the ABM programs to an end. Meanwhile, since the Vietnam War, the Democratic Party has transformed itself to become a congressional coalition hostile to increases in military spending. With southern and northern members' preferences becoming increasingly similar, a highly united

[108] With respect to the ideological split inside a party, Bond and Fleisher (1990, 45) point out "although Democratic presidents have had the advantage of partisan majorities in Congress, this advantage is limited because there are more cross-pressured Democrats who are likely to defect and fewer cross-pressured Republicans who might be inclined to support them."

Democratic Party came to oppose Reagan's military buildup in the late 1980s (Rohde 1991).[109]

Chapter 4 concerns a case of party change failure. Trade policy toward China in the 1990s is a vindication that a wedge issue for both parties is not necessarily threatening to party leaders. Republicans and Democrats alike were divided on China policy in matters of human rights, religious freedom, military rivalry, environment, and trade. Position-taking votes over this party-splitting issue from 1990 through 1999 were not marked by strategies to "unite us" and "divide them." Thus, cross-pressured members in a polarized Congress have not altered their parties' position. A real battle over free trade with China took place during President Clinton's final year in the office. In 2000, the two parties were still supportive of their own traditional stance over trade policy.

In spite of these different trends in party position shifts, my analyses of the Chinese exclusion in 1882, the ABM controversy in 1969, and the China trade policy in 2000 consistently show the impacts of party branding dynamics on policy change in American politics. A momentum for a party's new policy choice sometimes comes from rank-and-file members who find the party label and position in conflict with the constituency preference. But, as those cross-pressured members still benefit from the party in many other respects, those backbenchers might be more concerned about their position-taking votes than about actual policy change. If a rival party is united on this wedge issue in Congress, party leaders are likely to reconsider the party's policy choice.

[109] Ware (2006, 2), in his analysis of the Democratic Party's transformation from 1877 to 1962, suggests that "this movement of the Democrats from being a party that had the core of its support in the South to one that was mainly northern oriented is perhaps the most important long-term change in American electoral history."

Legislators, Leaders, and Party Position Shifts in Congress

Another element common in the three case studies concerns the role of procedural politics in party position shifts. Each case in the dissertation concludes that if combined with procedural politics, bottom-up strategies by members would lead parties to take up a new party stance over key policy areas. Of course, congressional procedure is not always used for party transformation. Procedures sometimes function like a trap. In this setting, legislators have little room to express their differing concerns about the issue. In addition, party leaders often design and recommend legislative proposals on the floor in order to put members of Congress on the record as supportive or opposing, which can be easily distorted during campaigns fights.

As evidenced in the three case studies, however, cross-pressured party members tend to rely on congressional procedures for their position-taking strategies. Whether in the case of Chinese exclusion in which a presidential veto was highly expected, in the case of the ABM controversy in which floor amendments and recommittal motions hardly affected the final passage of bills, or in the case of China trade policy in which joint resolutions had little chance to move forward, procedural aspects of legislative politics have frequently given party members leeway to take positions that can satisfy both constituency and party.

This dissertation has sought to answer the question of how political parties in America have shifted policy positions to advance their legislative and electoral goals. A huge departure from the extant literature is the assumption that majority party members are not united but often split. In such a setting, rank-and-file party members try to strike a balance between constituency pressures and party benefits. Being out of step with constituents often means being voted out of office (Canes-Wrone et al 2002). As a

consequence, cross-pressured party members sometimes break with the party position in legislative processes. At the same time, the opposition party's united legislative choice tends to facilitate the majority party's position shifts. In conclusion, the micro foundational and dynamic legislative analyses employed in this dissertation, combined with detailed case studies, shed new light on our understanding of how legislator preference shifts translate through congressional procedures into policy changes over time.

Appendix A: The Congressional Politics of Defense Spending, 1890-1941

President Benjamin Harrison's pursuit of active foreign policy and congressional decisions to construct new battleship fleets has led historians and political scientists to view the year 1890 as a turning point in U.S. foreign policy (LaFeber 1963, Campbell 1976, Trubowitz 1998, Zakaria 1998). This new course of navy expansion, initially proposed in the navy's *Annual Report* of 1889 (Zakaria 1998, 128), obtained momentum during the 1890s, when the Navy's budget share more than doubled, from $22 million to $56 million (Trubowitz 1999, 111).

What is notable in early navy expansion is that the development of the modern battleships primarily served sectional interests in the Northeast. The construction of the navy helped industrialists and bankers to seek greater access to overseas markets for foreign trade (Bensel 2000). Consequently, the partisan cleavage surrounding the navy buildup and interventionist foreign policy was that the Republican Party used the navy development as a "pork-barrel" for consolidating the party-base in the Northeast and expanding party support in the Midwest and the West. Conversely, the Democratic Party, dominant in the South, was opposed to an active foreign policy which might disturb Great Britain and was against the navy expansion that benefited the non-South regions at the expense of the South.

Except for a brief period when the Democratic Party supported (Democratic) president Grover Cleveland's policy to stay the course of navy expansion, the pattern of Republican support and Democratic opposition over navy appropriations had continued throughout the Spanish-American War in 1898. Although the question of why the

Cleveland administration continued further expansion of the battleship navy during 1893-1897 calls for further research, diplomatic historians seem to agree that the new paradigm of American foreign policymaking crossed party lines and personal beliefs (Zakaria 1998, p.145). The so-called "System of 1896" had the Republican Party controlling both congressional chambers and the White House during the turn of the twentieth century (Burnham 1981). In addition, a booming economy combined with a strong presidency minimized the conflict between Congress and the president.

As a result, the system facilitated Theodore Roosevelt's pursuit of full-fledged American power in world politics (Beale 1956, Collin 1985, LaFeber 1989). TR's "power politics" style of foreign policy changed into William Howard Taft's "dollar diplomacy" of maintaining open-door policy in Asia and Latin America. Until the 1916 Democratic Convention in St. Louis, the Democratic Party had consistently denounced imperialism and denied the need for a stronger military.

The Democratic Party platform accepted during the national convention of 1916 included the planks of national unity and military preparedness (Porter and Johnson 1972, Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1997). Chiefly spurred by the war in Europe, this huge change on the part of Democrats in their foreign policy positions made the two parties basically converge on the idea of a strong military. In the process of American involvement in the First World War, Democratic President Woodrow Wilson sought to identify the Democrats with the war and national patriotism, which placed the Republican Party on the defensive.

In the meantime, the Republican victory in the 1918 election allowed the Midwestern Republicans to emerge as an influential faction within the party. In defeating

Wilson's advocacy of the League of Nations, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the new chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, accommodated a more isolationist foreign policy position among the western Republicans. Members of Congress from the West and the Midwest were inherently suspicious of world power and supportive of a limited role played by the United States in international relations (Gould 2003). In addition, the Senate "farm bloc" was formed in the spring of 1921, as a cross-party coalition between southern Democrats and Midwestern Republicans to ameliorate the agricultural sector's postwar crisis. This farm bloc also brought about a Republican divide in Congress over the issue of greater American involvement overseas (Bensel 1984, Schickler 2001).

The lack of consensus among congressional Republicans over the overarching goal of American foreign policy during the 1920s forced the Republican administrations of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover to accept "semi-internationalism." They shared Wilson's vision of a more liberal international order but operated within the domestic demand for "back to normalcy" (Ferguson 1984, McCormick 1989). It was the Washington Naval Conference of 1921 that epitomized much of the post-World War I Republican approaches to foreign policy. Through the naval limitation conference, the United States ensured navy parity with the British and naval supremacy over the Japanese, but reduced government military expenditures at the same time (Combs 1986).

The post-Wilson Democratic Party, on the other hand, faced a severe split between the urban and rural wings for control of the party. Largely divided over the issues of Prohibition and the Ku Klux Klan, the Democratic Convention of 1924 accepted the anti-militaristic planks calling for a strict and sweeping reduction of armaments by land and sea to ban any competitive military program or naval building. The Democrats

tried to return to the position the party had held earlier in the twentieth century (Congressional Quarterly 1997, p.80). There was a broad consensus within American politics to keep defense spending down until 1938 when Europe was rapidly approaching the brink of war (Narizny 2003).

Appendix B: Vote Choice and Change over China's MFN: 1990-2001

The Bush Administration and Another Extension of China's NTR in 2001

Around the middle of 2001, the congressional grant of China's PNTR status was still not in effect due to the delay in China's accession to the WTO. Thus, President George W. Bush was compelled to recommend another one-year extension of NTR status for China. Yet, free trade advocates regarded the disapproval resolution of China's NTR as pointless as the PNTR for China had already been granted the previous year and China would soon become a member country of the WTO.

The relationship between the two great powers did not proceed as smoothly as expected, however. The Ten-day detention of 24 U.S. crew members after the collision of a Navy surveillance plane and a Chinese military jet over the South China Sea on April 1, 2001 outraged some members of Congress. In addition, continued human rights abuses and repression of religious freedom in China led Republican Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) to sponsor a resolution to disapprove Bush's extension of NTR for China. At the end of the day, as usual, the House decisively rejected the resolution (169-259). Meanwhile, China was finally admitted into the WTO on November 11, 2001.

It is intriguing to note that more than eighty members of Congress switched their positions on the NTR extension over a time span of slightly more than a year. Benjamin L. Cardin, a Democrat from Maryland, for instance, voted for the PNTR law in 2000 but voted against the renewal of NTR in 2001. This position change might have come from the fact that, as described by Robert T. Matsui of California, a longtime supporter of engagement policy towards China, "this is a very free vote for members now… I think all

the other trade bills are separate" (*Congressional Quarterly Almanac of 2001,* p.19-11). Twenty-six other members voted the same way as Cardin did by endorsing the PNTR for China in 2000 and disapproving China's NTR status in 2001.

Fifty-six lawmakers, by contrast, switched their positions in the opposite direction. John Conyers (D-MI), a senior member from Michigan voted against PNTR in 2000 and voted for the renewal of China's NTR in 2001. Vote switchers from anti-PNTR in 2000 to pro-NTR in 2001 tried to justify their decisions by suggesting that PNTR status would deprive the United States of key leverage over China, while the extension of the annual NTR in 2001 would merely secure that leverage. Democrat Bob Clement of Tennessee (CQ Almanac 2001, 19-11) explained his vote change in 2001 by arguing that "a policy of principled and purposeful engagement with China remains the best way to advance U.S. interests." In all, thirty-nine Democrats and seventeen Republicans followed this vote switching pattern in 2001. In all, eighty-three members of Congress changed their voting position on China policy from 2000 to 2001.

This case of NTR extension for China in 2001 was quite different from past NTR considerations in many respects. Congressional members were fully aware that it was just a matter of time before China would accede to the WTO so that congressional approval of free trade status for China was even more perfunctory than before. Also, a Republican president in the White House set Democrats free from the need of "defending our president" over critical foreign policy issues.

Consequently, as Table 4.6 indicates, no variable provides a statistically meaningful explanation of any member's vote switching from a pro-China position in 2000 to an anti-China one in 2001. A significant portion of Democrats, however,

changed their minds and approved China's NTR status in 2001, contrary to their opposition to granting PNTR status to China just a year earlier. They claimed that the annual review process of China's free trade status was an effective engagement policy tool towards China issues.

Various constituency demands were evident in accounting for vote stability, particularly in the anti-China position, from 2000 to 2001. As expected, the blue-collar worker variable was strongly correlated with a tendency for members to vote against PNTR status in 2000 and NTR status in 2001, whereas manufacturers and farmers forced their representatives to stand with the Democratic president in 2000 and Republican one in 2001 in favor of free trade with China. Ideologically extreme members of Congress also showed no vote change from 2000 to 2001 and revealed their strong opposition to China's NTR extension. Northern Democrats acted together both times to vote against China's free trade status.

Vote Choice over the Grant of NTR Status to China, from 1990 to 2001

Table 4.7 summarizes how members determined their votes on trade policy toward China from 1990 to 2001. Congress-to-Congress results confirm that constituency demands were critical factors in member voting behavior. The higher the percentage of farmers and manufacturing industries in the district, the more likely the member was to be favorable to China's NTR status. Agricultural interests transformed into the strongest pro-China voting coalition in Congress, even during the 102nd Congress that showed the most hostile attitudes to China due to the Tiananmen massacre in 1990. In addition, during the controversial passage of permanent NTR status for China in 2000,

farm and manufacturing districts heavily influenced members' voting decisions in favor of free trade.

By contrast, if members represented constituencies composed of a greater number of blue-collar workers, they showed a stronger tendency to vote against China's NTR renewal. Ever since 1993, members of Congress could not turn their backs on the protests from blue-collar labor and the unskilled workforce that had to directly compete with low-priced Chinese goods through cheap labor. The district's unemployment rates and income levels, however, showed no discernable statistical effect on members' vote choices. The statistical analyses also suggested that those districts with a greater military population were less favorable to free trade with China, while the heavy military composition of congressional districts significantly affected their members' voting against China's NTR in 1995, 1997, and 1999. In addition, Figure 4.6 contrasts the average state support for free trade with China in 1999 and 2000. It highlights state delegations' opposition to free trade with China for both years. As observed from the maps, there is no dramatic change in state positions between the annual extension in 1999 and permanent NTR in 2000.

Pro-export and pro-business interests among constituents translated into members taking more favorable positions toward the issue of China's NTR extension. Meanwhile, anti-globalization interests with a blue-collar percentage as proxy in the model tended to force their representatives to take hostile positions to China's NTR status. Figure 4.7 presents the average state support for free trade with China as measured by the percentage of the House delegations' average support of China's NTR extension over time. Farm states such as Nebraska, Kansas, and Iowa rank as the top three "pro-China"

states, whereas textile states such as South Carolina and Georgia or northern states like Massachusetts show the least favorable positions towards China's NTR renewal. In addition, figure 4.8 specifically contrasts state differences in setting up their China policy in Congress. Except for 1998, the Nebraska House delegation voted 100 percent for a pro-China position between 1990 and 2001. The South Carolina House delegation, however, showed a 19.4 percentage average support for free trade with China during the same time period.

Members with extreme ideologies, classified as having DW-NOMINATE Scores greater than +0.5 or less than -0.5 for my analysis, picked up their fight against China's NTR extension during the most anti-China House (102nd Congress). Except in1993, the so-called "ends-against-the-middle" voting coalition explains members' positions on China policy during the 1990s. Both devoted liberals and ardent conservatives acted together to revoke the free trade status granted to China. Although this strange coalition was not strong enough to defeat presidential free trade policy toward China in Washington, its members tried to make successful "electoral" cases to their constituents back home. Members with strong ideological convictions took positions against China over various issues such as human rights, religious freedom, the environment, abortion, and weapons sales.

Moderate members of Congress voted jointly against China's NTR extension only once in 1993, which was President Clinton's first year in the White House. This was also the only time when the Democratic members of Congress voted collectively and significantly for China's NTR extension, approving the Democratic president's call for free trade with China. While Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell and San Francisco

Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi agreed with President Clinton and voted for China's NTR extension in 1993, however, moderates such as Republican Benjamin Gilman from New York (DW Score = 0.084) and then-Democrat Billy Tauzin of Louisiana (DW Score = 0.092) cast disapproving votes on the issue.

Partisan politics also mattered for members' votes over China policy. First of all, if a member was a Democrat in 1991, he or she was quite likely to vote *against* free trade with China, but in 1993, he or she was more likely to vote *for* it. This is because Democratic members of Congress in 1991 were out-party members and the same Democrats in 1993 were presidential party members. When "their" president pursued China's NTR extension in his first year in presidency, Democrats voted together to *support* their president's position.

In 2000, however, Democrats in Congress voted together to *oppose* their president, who was finishing his final term in office. A major difference in the two cases, however, is that the executive branch sought to bring about permanent China's NTR in 2000, which was dissimilar in many respects to the annual extension of free trade status for China. Various constituency demands and interest group pressures forced the congressional politics of China policy back to "politics as usual". The degree of the Democrats' opposition to permanent NTR status for China in 2000 reached statistical significance.

With respect to intraparty politics, northern Democrats voted against free trade with China even in the first year of the Clinton presidency. In 1997, 1999, and 2000, Democrats from northern areas of the United States acted together and took positions hostile to China. Their voting decisions and position takings seem to have represented the power of anti-globalization forces in the frost-belt and served to protest domestic

issues in China. If members were from northern areas of the United States but not necessarily Democrats, they found themselves in divided positions on the issue of free trade with China. Only in 1993 did northern members of Congress agree to vote pro-China.

First-term members of Congress also mostly supported China's NTR renewal; however, their support was statistically significant only in 1991 and 1999. Republican members of Congress elected in the "Republican Revolution" of 1994 seem to have shown their detachment from the traditional support of free trade by their party. The signs of coefficients for the variable "GOP since 1995" are all positive in 1997, 1999, 2000 and 2001, indicating that they tended to vote against China's NTR status. In the passage of permanent NTR status for China in 2000, the so-called Gingrich Republicans ended up voting against it, unlike most of their more traditional party colleagues. This seems to suggest that the GOP members might have faced an intraparty opening for debate between traditional free traders and newly emerging nationalists.

A pooled model of congressional opposition to China's NTR renewal provides a somewhat different result on members' vote choices (Table 4.8). I analyzed a conditional logistic regression estimation of panel data from 1990 to 2001 and grouped the data by year to estimate fixed effects. Securing independence across observations (Hood and Morris 1998, Stratmann 2000, Nokken 2003, Broz 2005), statistically significant and negative coefficients on the farmer and manufacturer variables show that pro-export and pro-business interests greatly affected congressional roll-call voting decisions.

Blue-collar labor, large military populations and higher income level in districts led members to regard opposition to China's NTR extension as a "containment" policy

toward a future rival. The collaboration of members with extreme ideologies in an "ends-against-the-middle" coalition is again important in explaining the importance of ideology in congressional China debates. The support level of first-term members of Congress in favor of China was also statistically significant for China's NTR extension debates from 1990 to 2001.

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Vita

Jungkun Seo was born on January 10, 1970, in Seoul, Korea, the son of Youngtai Seo and Yongim Park. He attended Sangmoon High School and entered Seoul National University majoring in political science. During his senior year at SNU, Seo visited the United States for the first time and worked as a summer congressional intern for Representative Louis Stokes (D-OH). After completing a Bachelor of Arts degree and military service thereafter, Seo went to the University of California at San Diego for master's training in international relations from 1997 to 1999. He returned to Korea to work as a researcher at Korea Development Institute, a government think-tank for economic policymaking. In the fall of 2000, Seo entered the doctoral program in the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. Since then, he has served as a teaching assistant within the department and a research assistant for the Public Policy Institute of Texas. In March, 2007, Seo accepted a tenure-track position as an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of North Carolina at Wilmington (UNCW).

Permanent Address: 6805 Wood Hollow Dr. #101, Austin, TX 78731

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